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lit ABSTRACT 
This  thesis  attempts  to  deal  with  the  question  of  whether 
the  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  citizens  of  the 
Member  States  of  the  European  Community  should  be  entrusted  to 
a  uniformly  applied  set  of  norms.  In  other  words,  it  discusses 
whether  the  legal  area  of  human  rights  should  be  subjected  to  the 
process  of  integration  that  has  been  characteristic  of  the 
development  of  the  European  Community  in  the  last  fifty  years.  In 
doing  so,  the  thesis  initially  introduces  the  principles  of  efficiency 
and  uniformity  and  presumes  that  efficiency  of  protection  of 
human  rights  exists  when  protection  is  afforded  by  means  of 
uniformly  applied  sets  of  norms,  whereas  inefficiency  exists  when 
protection  Is  fragmented.  The  validity  of  these  presumptions  is 
then  tested  on  two  non  unitary  entities,  the  European  Community 
and  the  United  States  of  America.  This  is  done  by  means  of  an 
analysis  of  the  whole  spectrum  of  the  protective  measures 
available  in  these  entities,  which  includes  the  uniformly  applied 
sets  of  norms  for  each  one  of  them,  the  European  Convention  on 
Human  Rights,  as  regards  the  European  Community,  and  the  Bill  of 
Rights  of  the  American  Constitution,  as  regards  the  United  States 
of  America.  As  a  result  of  this  analysis  the  thesis  questions  the 
validity  of  the  two  presumptions  Initially  made.  Indeed  in  Europe, 
where  the  protection  of  the  human  rights  of  the  individual  is 
significantly  fragmented,  there  are  no  indications  that  this 
iv protection  Is  inefficient.  In  the  United  States  of  America,  on  the 
other  hand,  where  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  individual  is 
overwhelmingly  bestowed  upon  the  uniformly  applied  provisions 
of  the  federal  Bill  of  Rights,  efficiency  problems  seem  to  exist.  At 
least  that  is  what  the  proponents  of  the  movement  of  New  judicial 
Federalism  suggest  arguing,  consequently,  for  the  decentrallsation 
of  the  protection  of  individual  rights,  by  entrusting  it  to  the 
provisions  of  the  state  constitutions  as  opposed  to  the  ones  of  the 
federal  document.  In  its  conclusion,  the  thesis  argues  that  the 
developments  In  America  should  be  seriously  considered  by  the 
Europeans  in  any  attempts  to  integrate  in  the  area  of  human 
rights.  Moreover,  it  suggests  that  what  is  of  paramount 
Importance  is  that  the  individual  rights  of  the  citizens  of  the 
Member  States  of  the  European  Community  are  efficiently 
protected,  irrespective  of  whether  this  protection  is  afforded  by 
means  of  a  uniformly  applied  set  of  norms,  or  otherwise. 
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xxxiii INTRODUCTION 
This  thesis  examines  the  issue  of  human  rights  and  their 
protection  in  the  European  Community  and  the  United  States  of 
America.  '  It  does  so  from  the  perspective.  of  a  typology  which  in- 
volves  the  two  concepts  of  efficiency  and  uniformity.  It  cannot  be 
a  comprehensive  study  of  all  areas  of  human  rights  law  and  pro- 
cedure  in  all  of  the  Member  States  of  the  EC  and  all  the  American 
states  since  that  kind  of  study  would  be  outwith  the  scope  of  any 
thesis.  It  is  therefore  geographically  circumscribed,  with  study 
concentrated  In  the  USA  on  the  states  of  New  York,  Maryland  and 
Florida  and  In  the  EC  on  the  states  which  were  members  In1992 
and  which  had  incorporated  the  European  Convention  on  Human 
RightS.  2 
Two  hypotheses  are  central  to  this  thesis.  The  first  Is  a  pre- 
diction  that  within  a  system  of  fragmented  procedures  for  the 
protection  of  human  rights  (i.  e.  where  there  is  a  lack  of  uniform 
1.  For  the  remainder  of  the  thesis  the  terms  EC  and  USA  will  be  used  to 
describe  the  European  Community  and  the  United  States  of  America 
respectively.  The  term  European  Community  has  been  preferred  to 
European  Union,  because  of  the  chronological  limits  set  in  this  thesis.  The 
term  European  Union  has  been  used  to  describe  the  European  integrative 
experience  from  1992  onwards.  This  date  is  considered  a  cut-off  date  for  the 
purposes  of  this  study. 
2.  In  1992  the  Members  States  of  the  EC  were  Belgium,  Denmark,  France, 
Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  The  Netherlands,  Portugal, 
Spain  and  the  United  Kingdom.  However,  Denmark,  Ireland  and  the  United 
Kingdom  are  not  considered  in  this  study  because  of  their  negative  position 
as  regards  incorporation  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  in 
their  domestic  law.  The  reasons  that  dictated  in  the  American  context  the 
choice  of  states,  and  in  the  European  context  the  designation  of  1992  as  the 
chronological  limit  of  this  study,  will  be  explained  in  the  following  pages. 
1 protection  of  the  said  rights)  efficiency  will  not  be  achieved.  Thus 
in  Europe,  where  there  is  no  central  and  uniform  system  of  pro- 
tection  of  human  rights  and  instead  the  Member  States,  the  au- 
thorities  set  up  by  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and 
the  EC  share  the  task  of  protecting  human  rights,  it  might  be  sup- 
posed  that  there  is  a  lack  of  an  efflcient  protection  of  human 
rights.  The  second  hypothesis  is  that,  where  a  uniform  system  ex- 
Ists  there  will  be  maximum  efflciency  in  the  protection  of  the 
rights  of  the  individual.  Thus,  in  the  USA  where  there  appears  to 
be  uniformity  In  the  protection  of  human  rights,  It  can  be  pre- 
dicted  that  there  Is  a  very  efficient  protection  of  the  rights  of  the 
individual. 
At  the  back  of  these  hypotheses  is  the  question  which  has 
been  raised  by  scholars  as  to  the  role  of  human  rights  in  integra- 
tion  and  In  federal  and  quasi-federal  structures.  Can  the  collective 
protection  of  human  rights  form  a  vehicle  for  integration  of  nation 
states7  Should  human  rights  be  used  as  such  a  mechanism7 
Cappelletti3  argues  In  favour  of  this  position.  The  aim  of  this  thesis 
is  not  to  reiterate  what  has  gone  before  but  to  answer  the  ques- 
tion  from  a  different  Perspective.  We  argue  that  the  protection  of 
human  rights  should  not  be  seen  as  a  vehicle  for  Integration  but 
as  an  end  in  Itself  in  any  state  or  quasi  state  structure.  That 
means  that  when  it  comes  to  choosing  between  a  uniform  but  not 
always  efflcient,  protection  of  human  rights  and  a  fragmented  but 
efficient  one,  then  it  should  be  the  latter  which  should  be  the 
preferred  approach.  This  consideration  Is  related,  specifically 
within  the  European  context,  with  the  plans  for  the  creation  of  a 
3.  M.  Cappelletti,  M.  Seccombe  and  J.  Weiler,  "Integration  Through  Law. 
Europe  and  the  American  Federal  Experience"  (Berlin,  Walter  de  Gruyter, 
1986)  volume  I. 
2 catalogue  of  rights  which  will  apply  uniformly  and  will  constitute 
the  Integrative  attempt  of  Europe  In  the  field  of  human  rights.  The 
conclusion  of  this  thesis  is  that  it  is  questionable  that  such  a  cata- 
logue  can  contribute  to  the  efficient  protection  of  the  European 
citizen.  The  possible  side-effects  of  such  attempt  are  pinpointed, 
by  utilising  the  paradigm  of  the  situation  In  the  USA. 
Some  definitions  are  useful  at  this  point.  The  concepts  of 
efficiency  and  uniformity  are  crucial  to  the  argument  of  this 
thesis.  By  efficiency  is  meant  the  existence  of  an  adequate  and 
sufficient  legal  remedy,  which  is  based  on  legal  norms  and  is 
provided  by  a  court  of  law.  4  Admittedly,  this  Is  a  fairly  simple 
definition  but  is  a  useful  heuristic  device  for  the  purpose  of 
analysis.  What  distinguishes  efficient  norms  from  non-efficient 
ones  is  that  the  former  manage  to  achieve  the  results  that  were 
Intended  when  they  were  conceived,  whilst  the  latter,  for  various 
reasons,  do  not.  In  the  field  of  human  rights  protection 
specifically,  an  efficient  provision  Is  one  that  provides  an 
adequate  and  sufficient  level  of  protection  of  the  rights  of  the 
Individual,  as  opposed  to  a  non-efficient  one,  which  falls  to  do  so. 
Two  remarks  are  necessary  as  regards  efficiency.  In  the  first 
place,  efficiency  must  be  distinguished  from  the  concept  of 
effectiveness,  a  concept  widely  utilised  especially  In  relation  to  EC 
law.  Numerous  studies  have  dealt  with  the  issue  of  effectiveness, 
both  from  the  theoretical  and  the  policy  point  of  view.  They  tend 
In  their  majority  to  focus  their  attention  on  the  examination  of  the 
Issue  within  the  ambit  of  EC  law,  and  the  definitions  that  are 
4.  Snyder  seems  to  agree  with  such  a  definition  of  efficiency,  albeit  In  an 
indirect  manner.  See  F.  Snyder  "  The  Effectiveness  of  European  Community 
LaNw.  institutions,  Processes,  Tools  and  Techniques"  in  "Implementing  EC 
Law  in  the  United  Kingdom"  T.  Daintith  (ed.  )  (1994),  at  p.  52. 
3 provided  relate  effectiveness  to  compliance,  Implementation, 
enforcement  and  impact.  5  Admittedly,  the  characteristics 
attributed  to  effectiveness  can  be  useful  in  evaluating  efficiency. 
Nevertheless,  the  consideration  of  effectiveness,  in  any  of  its 
dimensions,  lies  outside  the  scope of  this  thesis.  Its  concern  is  the 
nature  of  efficiency. 
The  second  point  that  can  be  made  about  efficiency  is  that 
more  than  one  efficient  norm  may  cover  specific  situations.  In  this 
case  It  must  be  decided  which  is  the  efficient  provision  that  best 
suits  the  particular  situation.  In  the  field  of  human  rights 
specifically,  a  selection  procedure  must  take  place  in  order  for  the 
highest  level  of  protection  of  the  Individual  to  be  achieved,  by 
means  of  choosing  the  appropriate  norm  or  set  of  norms. 
Therefore,  choice  of  protection  by  means  of  specific  norms  may 
mean  that  these  norms  are  considered  to  offer  higher  levels  of 
protection  than  others  which  were  also  available  but  eventually 
not  utilised. 
The  concept  of  uniformity  is  also  central  to  this  thesis.  By 
uniformity  is  meant  the  existence  of  a  single  overarching  author- 
Ity  or  body  of  law  which  binds  the  organs  of  state  or  government 
and  which  deflnes  the  standard  of  protection.  Uniformly  applied 
norms  then  are  relevant  to  the  concept  of  efflclency,  In  that  they 
form  part  of  the  available  protective  remedies.  Whether  they  are 
efficient  or  not  will  depend  on  the  quality  of  protection  they 
offer.  If  they  offer  a  high  quality  protection,  then  they  would 
classify  as  efficient.  If  not,  other  norms  may  be  preferred. 
5.  See  for  example  Sledentopf  and  Ziller  (eds),  "Making  Furopean  Policies 
Work:  The  Implementation  Of  Community  Legislation  in  the  Member 
States",  2  vols.  (1988). 
4 In  the  context  of  this  thesis  it  is  important  to  stress  that  the 
political  formations  which  are  under  discussion  are  not  simple 
unitary  states.  The  USA  is  the  paradigm  of  a  federal  structure 
with  a  single  federal  Constitution  and  50  state  constitutional 
structures.  The  EC  is  composed  of  individual  Member  States  with 
an  element  of  shared  or  pooled  sovereignty  and  can  be  seen  as  a 
confederal  or  quasi-federal  structure  In  areas  where  competencies 
are  shared6.  Efficiency  and  uniformity  are  concepts  used  within 
this  context  and  for  this  reason  the  specific  definitions  given 
above  should  Inform  the  following  discussion. 
One  reason  for  choosing  the  thesis  in  this  way,  Is  to  develop 
the  debate  on  New  judicial  Federalism  In  the  USA  and  to  apply 
some  of  the  concepts  developed  In  that  debate  to  the  emerging 
political  order  of  Europe.  As  will  be  seen  from  chapter  2,  Ideas  of 
New  judicial  Federalism  stemmed  from  the  liberal  Ideas  of  certain 
influential  thinkers  in  the  USA  who  were  fearful  that  reliance  on 
central  and  federal  protection  of  human  rights  did  not  in  fact 
provide  an  efficient  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  individual.  They 
argued  that  the  devolution  of  protection  (i.  e.  fragmentation)  would 
prove  more  efficient.  For  a  European  approaching  these  debates, 
this  may  seem  that  the  New  Federalists  were  advocating  a  system 
of  divided  responsibilities  as  is  exactly  the  case  In  Europe.  This 
raises  questions  within  the  debate  on  the  protection  of  human 
6.  See  for  example,  Himnings,  "The  Future  of  Community  law"  in  "Federal 
Solutions  to  European  Issues"  5  1-61  (B.  Burrows,  G.  Denton  &  G.  Edwards  eds, 
London,  MacMillan,  1978);  Taylor,  "The  Politics  of  the  European 
Communities:  The  Confederal.  Phase"  27  World  Pols.  336  (1975);  Pentland, 
"Political  Theories  of  European  Integration:  Between  Science  and  Ideology, 
in  "Les  Communautds  Europ6ennes  en  Fonctionnement/The  European 
Communities  in  Action  545,558  ff  (D.  Lasok  &  P.  Soldatos  eds.  Brussels, 
Bruylant,  1981);  Wallace,  "Less  than  a  Federation,  More  than  a  Regime:  The 
Community  as  a  Political  System"  in  "Policymaking  in  the  European 
Community"  403  (H.  Wallace,  W.  Wallace  &  C.  Webb  eds.,  Chichester,  Wiley  & 
Son,  1983) 
5 rights  in  Europe  and  whether  there  should  be  developed  a  "fed- 
eral"  legal  order  in  this  respect  given  the  perceived  weaknesses  of 
the  US  system,  at  least  according  to  the  proponents  of  New 
Federalism.  It  must  also  be  pointed  out  that  the  aim  of  this  thesis 
is  not  to  analyse  the  concepts  of  New  Federalism  as  such,  but  to 
use  the  ideas  from  the  debates  as  a  guide  for  discussion  and  anal- 
ysis  in  the  European  context. 
This  thesis  utillses  the  approach  of  comparative  legal  studies 
in  attempting  to  answer  the  question  of  efficiency  and  uniformity 
outlined  above.  The  points  of  comparison  are  the  USA  and  the  EC. 
The  reason  for  this  approach  lies  In  the  presumption  that  histori- 
cal  and  cultural  similarities  exist  between  the  two  formations, 
similarities  which  suggest  that,  If  we  can  presume  that  Europe  is 
moving  towards  becoming  a  kind  of  federal  entity,  then  the 
American  federal  experience  should  be  seriously  taken  Into  con- 
sideration.  Therefore,  a  comparative  exercise  between  the  two 
entities  seems  valid.  It  Is  admitted,  and  this  will  be  elaborated  in 
chapter  1  of  this  thesis,  that  there  are  contrasts  In  the  Integrative 
experiences  of  the  two  entities.  There  are  strong  historical  and 
ideological  arguments  against  possible  modelling  of  European  In- 
tegrative  attempts  on  the  American  federal  structure,  something 
that  might  suggest  that  a  comparison  between  the  European  Inte- 
grative  experience  and  the  American  one  is  not  appropriate,  and 
consequently  that  the  American  human  rights  paradigm  has  no 
practical  usefulness  for  Europe.  We  consider,  however,  that  certain 
Important  elements,  such  as  common  cultural  heritage  or  the  def- 
Inite  influence  on  the  European  integration  process  by  the  interest 
of  the  Americans  themselves  to  assist  Europe  Into  a  federal  expe- 
rience,  weigh  against  the  above  suggestion. 
6 Within  the  USA  only  a  limited  number  of  states  have  been 
selected  for  comparison,  namely  Florida,  New  York  and  Maryland. 
The  states  chosen  have  been  selected  partly  because  of 
availability  of  information  and  partly  on  the  basis  of  certain 
geographical  and  socio-political  criteria.  New  York  Is  a  northern, 
wealthy,  large  state  with  a  somewhat  atypical  history  of  early 
Dutch  settlement.  Florida  and  Maryland  are  both  situated  In  the 
south.  Florida  makes  an  interesting  subject  because  of  its 
character  as  a  retirement  community  and  the  influences  of  the 
non  indigenous  population  mainly  of  Hispanic  origin,  whereas 
Maryland  Is  a  small  state  which  maintains  most  of  the  character- 
Istics  of  the  old,  traditional  South.  The  reason  for  the  use  of  such  a 
small  number  of  states  lies  in  the  fact  that  we  intend  to  offer  only 
examples  of  the  possible  Influences  of  New  judicial  Federalism, 
not  to  use  these  states  as  a  sample  representative  of  a  statistical 
analysis.  As  it  was  mentioned  before,  this  lies  outside  the  aim  of 
this  thesis. 
Within  the  geographical  comparison  we  are  comparing  the 
method  of  protection  of  human  rights  ratherthan  the  protection 
of  one  specific  right  or  group  of  rights  although  such  a  comparison 
might  feasibly  made  In  another  context.  This  approach  was  con- 
sidered  to  be  more  fitting  to  the  birds-eye  view  that  this  thesis 
adopts  in  order  to  achieve  Its  aim. 
The  study  is  limited  In  time  between  the  two  milestone 
dates  of  1977  and  1992.1977  is  a  key  date  in  the  emergence  of 
the  debate  on  New  Federalism  In  the  USA,  with  the  publication  of 
the  article  by  Justice  Brennan  which  opened  the  debate.  1992  is 
the  key  European  date  of  the  adoption  of  the  Treaty  on  European 
Union  which  establishes,  among  other  things,  the  European  Union 
7 itself  and  the  concept  of  citizenship  of  that  Union.  The  Union  is  the 
most  concrete  attempt  to  date  at  a  federal  state  for  Europe,  which 
will  regulate  a  wide  variety  of  activities  and  within  which 
citizenship  constitutes  an  important  conceptual,  if  not  practical, 
development  One  result  of  using  this  cut-off  date  is  that  there  is 
no  discussion  within  the  body  of  the  thesis  of  states  which  joined 
the  Union  after  1992.  Another  limitation  of  the  thesis  as  regards 
its  European  consideration,  is  that  It  does  not  discuss  the  influence 
of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  on  the  states  of  the 
Union  that  have  not  incorporated  it  In  their  domestic  law,  unlike 
the  states  that  Incorporated  the  Convention  which  are  extensively 
scrutinised.  The  Inability  of  the  citizens  of  these  states,  the  United 
Kingdom  being  one  of  them,  to  invoke  the  Convention  in  front  of 
their  national  courts  renders  the  concept  of  efficiency  of  law 
rather  weaker  when  compared  to  the  citizens  of  states  which  in- 
corporated  the  Convention,  who  actually  can  use  it  locally.  A 
sound  comparison  dictates  that  the  two  concepts  of  efflciency  and 
uniformity  should  have  an  equal  application  to  the  states  under 
examination. 
The  thesis  analyses  cases  which  have  been  brought  before 
the  courts  of  a  number  of  states  of  Europe,  the  United  States  of 
America,  the  European  Court  of  justice,  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  and  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  USA.  Statutory  and 
treaty  interpretation  is  also  an  essential  source  of  Information  and 
will  be  used  where  relevant.  The  thesis  also  relies  on  secondary 
materials  in  the  form  of  analytical  commentaries  on  the  practice 
of  courts.  These  latter  commentaries  are  important  In  providing 
additional  evidence  of  the  manner  and  frequency  of  the  applica- 
8 tion  of  human  rights  principles  to  cases  both  in  the  USA  and 
Europe. 
One  interesting  facet  about  the  work  done  for  this  thesis  is 
that,  in  the  course  of  assessing  the  evidence,  it  became  apparent 
that  what  is  needed  for  an  efficient  protection  of  human  rights  is 
uniformity  but  not  necessarily  In  the  sense  of  the  term  as  it  is 
applied  in  the  USA.  Conversely,  fragmentation  of  procedures  need 
not  necessarily  lead  to  Inefficiency.  However,  if  fragmentation 
leads  to  gaps  In  the  protection  of  human  rights,  then  efficiency 
cannot  be  achieved.  Efficiency  requires  that  at  the  interface  of 
Member  State  and  Community  or  state  and  federal  competencies 
there  Is  a  mechanism  for  ensuring  that  the  citizen  has  adequate 
solutions  as  regards  the  enforcement  of  his/her  rights.  Where  this 
Interface  Is  not  clearly  defined  then  this  is  where  problems  are 
likely  to  emerge-which  Is  a  problem  for  Europe.  Inefficiency  can 
also  arise  not  just  out  of  the  fragmentation  of  procedures,  but  also 
where  the  single  uniform  structure  declines,  for  whatever  reason, 
to  play  an  active  role  In  the  protection  of  human  rights.  The  with- 
drawal  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  from  the  human  rights 
arena  has  been  seen  by  some  to  create  a  problem  of  Inefficiency 
which  could  only  be  met  by  introducing  a  fragmented  system, 
albeit  In  a  limited  way 
Chapter  1  of  this  thesis  discusses  the  historical  approaches 
of  the  Integrative  experiences  of  Europe  and  the  United  States.  It 
argues  that,  despite  a  contrast  in  experiences,  there  are  enough 
similarities  to  permit  a  comparison  between  the  two  systems,  for 
the  benefit  of  evaluating  whether  occurrences  in  the  American 
context,  within  the  specific  area  of  human  rights,  could  be  useful 
for  consideration  by  the  Europeans  in  regard  to  any  relevant  plans 
9 that  might  exist.  Chapter  2  discusses  the  general  influence  of  the 
movement  of  New  judicial  Federalism  in  the  protection  of  human 
rights  In  the  USA.  Chapter  3  evaluates  the  concept  of  efficiency  of 
the  law  of  human  rights  In  Europe  and  the  United  States.  it  does 
so  by  referring  to  the  available  legislation  protecting  the  indi- 
vidual  liberties  of  European  and  American  citizens.  Chapter  4  ex- 
amInes  the  concept  of  uniform  application  of  the  law  of  human 
rights  in  the  two  systems  under  discussion.  In  doing  so,  it  exam- 
ines  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  the  Bill  of 
Rights  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  which  are  the  uniform  protec- 
tive  pieces  of  legislation  for  European  and  the  American  citizens, 
respectively.  Chapter  5  attempts  to  test  the  concepts  of  efficiency 
and  uniformity  at  the  European  level.  It  evaluates  the  legal 
choices  of  the  European  states  as  regards  protection  of  the  rights 
of  their  citizens.  The  preference  of  the  relevant  uniform  piece  of 
legislation,  namely  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights 
Instead  of  their  own  national  provisions  or  vice  versa,  would 
Indicate  which  set  of  norms  Is  considered  by  them  to  be  the  most 
efficient.  For  the  purposes  of  this  specific  survey,  It  was 
considered  appropriate  to  adapt  and  apply  to  the  European  situa- 
tion  two  of  the  approaches  that  the  movement  of  New  judicial 
Federalism  has  proposed  In  similar  situations  In  the  USA.  To  that 
effect,  the  primacy  and  Interstitial  approaches  will  be  borrowed, 
expanded  and  utillsed  In  order  to  demonstrate  the  attitudes  of  the 
courts  of  the  European  states  when  faced  with  the  dilemma  of 
entrusting  the  protection  of  the  individual  rights  of  their  citizens 
to  their  national  protective  provisions  or  the  parallel  protective 
provisions  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  Chapter 
6  is  involved  in  a  similar  survey  in  the  American  context.  It  looks 
10 at  the  situation  In  the  selected  three  American  states,  engaging 
Inevitably  In  the  question  of  whether,  and  if  so  to  what  extent,  the 
movement  of  New  judicial  Federalism  has  influenced  the  state 
Judiciary.  That  would  have  as  a  consequence  that  the  state  judges 
would  give  precedence  to  the  protective  provisions  of  their  own 
state  constitution  Instead  of  the  respective  measures  of  the 
Federal  Constitution,  which  Is  the  uniform  piece  of  law  in  the  USA. 
And  that  would  mean  that  state  judges  consider  the  state 
constitutional  provisions  to  provide  a  higher  level  of  protection 
than  the  parallel  ones  of  the  federal  document.  In  other  words, 
they  would  choose  one  set  of  norms  over  another,  because  the 
preferred  provisions  are  the  efficient  ones.  On  the  basis  of  its 
flndings,  the  thesis  concludes  by  questioning  the  validity  of  the 
two  hypotheses  Initially  set,  namely  that  fragmented  procedures 
for  the  protection  of  human  rights  do  not  guarantee  this 
protection  In  an  efflclent  manner,  something  that  occurs  when  a 
system  of  uniform  protection  exists.  It  then  argues,  taking  Into 
consideration  the  repercussions  of  the  movement  of  New 
Federalism  In  the  USA,  that  whether  human  rights  could  be  used 
as  a  vehicle  for  Integration  In  Europe  and  whether  they  should  be 
used,  are  two  different  questions.  This  Is  exactly  where  the 
concept  of  efficiency  comes  into  play.  What  is  of  paramount 
importance  Is  that  the  European  citizen  Is  efficiently  protected, 
Irrespective  of  whether  the  protective  measures  are  uniform  or 
not  The  protection  of  human  rights  In  Europe  must  be  seen as  an 
end  in  ItselL 
11 CHAPTER  1 
Europe  and  the  United  States  of  America:  Two  tales  of  Integration 
1.1.  Introductory  note 
Following  the  end  of  World  War  11,  a  tendency  developed 
among  public  figures  and  theorists  having  to  do  with  the 
Involvement  with  the  problem  of  international  political 
unification.  They  started  entering  Into  discussions  regarding  the 
possibilities  of  some  kind  of  unification  in  Europe.  The  most 
commonly  mentioned  point  of  reference  In  terms  of  desired 
results  and  political  experiences  was'that  of  the  United  States  of 
America.  At  the  time  the  USA  seemed  to  be  a  useful  alternative  to 
the  "discredited  and  obsolete  formula  of  national  states". 
The  number  of  political  scientists,  lawyers  and  historians 
that  studied  the  potential  applicability  of  the  American  model  to 
the  European  situation  was  significant.  Some  of  them  regarded  the 
United  States  of  America  or  even  the  Swiss  Confederation  as  the 
Ideal  solution  for  the  European  states.  Not  surprisingly  though,  the 
vast  majority  came  to  the  conclusion  that  an  analogy  could  not  be 
L  A.  Spinelli,  "The  Growth  of  the  European  Movement  since  the  Second 
World  War.  "  in  "European  Integration"  (ed.  Michael  Hodges,  Penguin  Books 
1972). 
12 drawn  between  the  two  and  that  the  application  of  an  American 
style  federal  arrangement  In  the  attempt  to  unite  Europe  was 
condemned2. 
According  to  Dusan  Sidjanski  two  reasons  justify  the 
inapplicability  of  the  American  model  to  the  European  situation3. 
Firstly,  a  European  Federation  would  have  to  be  created  out  of 
established  nations  with  highly  structured  societies,.  not 
susceptible  therefore  to  radical  transformations.  Secondly,  the 
existing  federal  systems,  the  American  one  included,  were 
formulated  at  a  time  when  the  economies  of  the  constituent  units 
were  less  developed  than  those  of  the  existing  European  states. 
These  arguments  were  also  supported  by  MacFarquhar4.  He 
claimed  that  the  United  States  was  the  antithesis  of  the  European 
Community.  The  Community  consisted  at  the  time  of  ten  different 
states,  inhabited  by  old  established  peoples,  speaking  eight 
different  languages  and  the  collaboration  of  which  materialised 
after  hundreds  of  years  of  Individual  development.  That  Is  not  the 
case  In  the  United  States.  The  element  of  Individuality  did  not 
exist.  The  first  stage  was  a  confederation  which  was  then  followed 
by  federal  integration.  In  terms  of  Institutions  Europe  has  only 
managed  to  establish  a  weak  parliament  elected  by  universal 
suffrage  and  a  weak  technocratic  bureaucracy.  MacFarquhar 
further  argued  that,  when  the  United  States  was  In  the  making, 
they  consisted  only  of  three  million  Inhabitants,  with  common 
I  M.  Bellof,  "The  United  States  and  The  Unity  of  Europe"  (Washington  D.  C., 
Brookings  Inst.,  1963),  L  Lindberg  &  S.  Sheingold,  "Europe's  Would  -Be 
Policy:  Patterns  of  Change  in  the  European  Community"  (Englewood  Cliffs, 
N.  J.,  Prentice  Hall  1970). 
3  D.  Sidianki,  "Dimensions  Europeenes  de  la  Science  Pofitique"  122  ff  (Paris, 
Librairie  generale  de  droit  et  de  jurisprudence,  1963). 
4.  macFarquhar,  "The  Community,  the  Nation  State  and  the  Regions"  in 
"Federal  Solutions  to  European  Issues"  17-24  (B.  Burrows,  G.  Denton  &  G. 
Edwards  eds.,  London,  McMillan,  1978). 
13 characteristics  such  as  origin,  language,  culture  and  institutional 
past,  as  well  as  the  same  experiences  of  a  common  war  of 
liberation  against  a  foreign  power. 
Max  Bellof,  puts  forward  three  reasons  to  which  the 
differences  between  Europe  and  the  United  States  are  attributed.  5 
Firstly,  the  American  colonies  had  a  common  culture,  origin,  reli- 
gion,  pd  language,  characteristics  that  are  not  shared  by  the  dif- 
ferent  European  states  which,  In  addition,  differ  In  terms  of  their 
systems  of  government  and  their  philosophies  of  life.  Secondly, 
the  American  Federation  was  preceded  by  a  confederation.  Europe 
on  the  other  hand,  had  evolved  in  an  entirely  different  manner. 
Finally,  the  American  Union  was  formed  primarily  for  defensive 
reasons.  As  regards  Europe,  the  motives  for  the  unification  were 
primarily  economic.  The  logic  of  these  arguments  does  not  seem 
very  convincing  to  Greilsammer.  6  He  argues  that  the  American 
model  represents  only  one  possibility  of  the  existing  variety  of 
federated  states.  In  addition  the  argument  that  the  Integrative 
process  in  Europe  was  primarily  motivated  by  economic  reasons, 
does  not  seem  accurate  to  him.  An  equally  decisive  factor, 
according  to  Grellsammer,  was  that  of  the  defensive  aspects,  as 
expressed  in  the  Dunkirk  Pact  (1947)  between  France  and  the  UK, 
the  Brussels  Pact  (1948)  between  France,  the  UK  and  the  Benelux 
countries,  and  NATO  (1949).  Finally,  he  considers  that  the  strong 
Identities  and  the  long  history  of  the  European  nations  will  not  to 
be  able  In  the  future  to  present  an  obstacle  to  some  kind  of 
federal  arrangement  In  Europe. 
5-See  note  2 
6.  L  Greilsammer,  "Some  Observations  on  European  Federalism",  in 
"Federalism  and  Political  Integration"  107  (D.  Elazar  ed.,  Ramat  Gan, 
Turtledove  Pub.,  1979). 
14 The  arguments  of  all  these  scholars  appear  basically  con- 
vIncing.  Indeed  an  attempt  to  compare  the  process  of  unification 
In  the  two  systems  indicates  the  differences  between  them. 
However,  we  should  not  Ignore  the  argument  that  the  American 
unification  experience  has  exerted  some  kind  of  influence  on  the 
relevant  European  theories  and  methods. 
In  order  to  be  able  to  comprehend  and  pinpoint  the  areas 
and  issues  where  similarities  or  contrasts  exist  and  come  to  a 
conclusion  as  regards  influences,  if  any,  it  is  considered  useful  to 
Indulge  in  a  comparative  analysis  and  explore,  delving  into 
history,  the  process  of  the  integrative  experiences  of  the  two  sys- 
tems  under  examination.  The  European  attempts  will  be  explored 
first,  followed  by  an  examination  of  the  developments  that  led  to 
what  is  known  as  American  federal  democracy.  The  purpose  of 
the  following  discussion  is  to  establish  whether  the  American 
federal  experience  has  Influenced  to  any  degree  the  Integrative 
attempts  of  Europe,  in  order  to  justify  a  comparison  between  the 
two  systems  in  the  area  of  human  rights  and  this  should  Inform 
the  following  discussion. 
1.2.  The  Integrative  process  in  Europe 
The  aim  that  the  study  of  regional  integration 
attempts  to  achieve  is,  according  to  Haas,  to  "explain  the  tendency 
toward  the  voluntary  creation  of  larger  political  units,  each  of 
which  self-consciously  eschews  the  use  of  force  in  the  relations 
between  the  participating  units  and  groups".  7  An  inherent 
7-  E.  B.  Haas,  "The  Study  of  Regional  Integration:  Reflections  on  the  joy  and 
Anguish  of  Pretheorizing",  International  Organisation  (1970),  vol.  24,  pp. 
607-646. 
15 difflculty  that  seems  to  e.  3dst  is  to  define  what  the  term  "integra- 
tion"  means.  It  has  been  defined  as  a  process  whereby  states 
voluntarily  give  up  certain  sovereign  powers  and  evolve  new 
techniques  for  resolving  conflict  between  themselves,  while  others 
consider  it  as  the  final  stage  of  the  above  mentioned  process, 
where  a  new  entity  encapsulating  several  previously  Independent 
units  Is  created.  8 
Several  theories  have  offered  different  definitions  of  what 
Integration  Is.  Three  approaches  are  predominant:  the  federalist 
approach,  the  neofunctionalist  and  the  transactionalist.  jr 
Federalism,  according  to  Elazar,  is  the  political  principle  that 
has  to  do  with  the  constitutional  diffusion  In  power  so  that  the 
constituting  elements  In  a  federal  arrangement  share  in  the  pro- 
cesses  of  common  policy  making  and  administration  by  right, 
while  the  activities  of  the  common  government  are  conducted  in 
such  a  way  as  to  maintain  their  respective  IntegrItIes.  9  Its 
supporters  argue  that  It  provides  an  arrangement  that  satisfies 
the  twin  criteria  of  efficiency  and  democracy,  by  creating  a 
number  of  main,  central  bodies  for  certain  functions  and  by 
allocating  other  activities  to  peripheral  formations  to  ensure  local 
control  and  autonomy.  The  federalist  theory  is  regarded  as  a 
means  to  achieve  common  purposes  and  needs.  It  presupposes 
that  a  federal  structure  can  assume  these  objectives  at  all  the 
levels  it  operates,  and  that  Institutions  that  have  been  successful 
In  countries  with  federal  arrangements  like  the  USA,  Switzerland 
and  Germany  will  also  be  effective  In  supranational  formations. 
&  see  note  1 
9.  see  note  6 
16 One  Important  aspect  regarding  federalism  in  Europe  has  to 
do  with  Its  origins.  Edouard  Bonnefous  called  "early  federalists" 
those  who,  between  the  fourteenth  and  eighteenth  centuries 
initially  believed  In  the  Idea  of  a  united  Europe.  10  According  to 
Grellsammer,  "  the  plans  put  forward  by  intellectuals,  like  Pierre 
Dubois,  Antoine  Marine,  Emeric  Cruce,  William  Penn  and  Comte  de 
Saint-Simon  could  not  be  described  as  federalist  in  nature  due  to 
the  fact  that  they  analysed  federalism  from  a  structural  and 
constitutional  perspective  and  not  from  a  socio-political  one.  These 
were  rather  plans  of  interstate  co-operation  than  federal  ones. 
Grellsammer  then  tends  to  agree  with  Denis  de  Rougemont,  12  that 
the  two  scholars  who  really  talked  of  federalism  and  therefore 
could  be  considered  the  founding  fathers  of  this  theory  were 
Pierre-Joseph  Proudhon  and  Emanuel  Kant. 
Federalism  started  to  have  a  serious  Impact  after  the  end  of 
World  War  11.  The  emergence  of  a  new  situation  accentuated  the 
problem  of  unity  In  Europe.  This  was  fertile  ground  for  new  Ideas. 
In  the  flrst  place,  there  was  a  widespread  feeling  that  the  national 
state  was  no  longer  worth  the  absolute  respect  it  enjoyed  In  the 
past.  The  work  of  Intellectuals  like  Alexandre  Marc  and  Denis  de 
Rougemont,  which  was  supported  by  various  Influential  pressure 
groups  that  have  worked  since  1944  on  the  formulation  of  a 
federalist  charter,  had  a  lot  to  do  with  It.  A  number  of  Important 
works  were  published.  Among  them  Alexander  Marc's  "Le 
Revolution  Federallste"  and  "Principes  du  Federalisme"  as  well  as 
various  journals  Including  "Le  Bulletin  Federaliste,  Federation  and 
10-  E.  Bonnefous,  "Videe  europeene  et  sa  realisation",  (Paris,  Editions  du 
Grand  Siecle,  1952). 
11-  see  note  6. 
12-  D.  de  Rougemont,  "Vingt-huit  siecles  d'  Europe.  La  Conscience  Europeen  a 
travers  les  textes,  d'Hesiode  a  nos  jours",  (Paris,  payit,  1961). 
17 Liaisons  Federaliste.  "  In  1947  a  European  Union  of  Federalists  was 
founded. 
According  to  SpIneIlI13  there  were  three  events  In  1952  that 
created  what  was  called  West  Europe's  "federalist  phase".  These 
were  the  establishment  of  the  European  Steel  and  Coal 
Community,  the  signing  of  the  European  Defence  Community  and 
the  proposals  for  the  creation  of  a  European  Political  Community. 
The  sovereign  state,  however,  seemed  to  still  have  an 
important  status  In  Europe.  The  EDC  proposals  were  rejected  in 
1954  by  the  French  assembly  and  the  EPC  was  consequently 
abandoned. 
One  of  the  reasons  for  the  failure  of  the  federal  movements 
was  considered  to  be  the  different  approaches  concerning  the 
theory  of  the  movement.  There  was  an  initial  controversy 
between  I'minimalism"  and  "maximalism"  federalism. 
Minimalism  Involved  a  "federal  pact"  between  governments 
to  join  In  one  political  system.  Maximalism,  on  the  other  hand, 
advocated  a  "constituent  assembly"  created  either  by  the  existing 
legislative  bodies  or  by  the  people  In  general. 
A  further  controversy  was  between  "Proudhonlan"  or  in- 
tegral  and  "Hamiltonian"  federalism.  This  controversy  was  more 
substantial  than  the  previous  one.  The  "Proudhonian"  theory  was 
conceived  and  developed  In  France  between  1945  and  1948.  It 
was  popular  among  young  people  who  were  inspired  by  Intellec- 
tuals  of  socialist  background  like  Tocqueville,  La  Tour  du  Pin  but 
mainly  Proudhon.  It  advocated  that  the  notion  of  the  sovereign 
nation-state  was  obsolete.  "Integral  federalism",  as  It  was  named 
13  A.  Spinelli,  "The  Eurocrats:  Conflict  and  Crisis  in  the  European 
community",  (John  Hopkins  Press,  1966). 
18 by  Alexandre  Marc,  concerned  not  only  political  institutions  but 
society  at  large  and  Its  aim  was  to  transform  totally  the  societal 
structures.  On  the  other  hand,  the  "Hamiltonians"  were  mainly 
Italians  influenced  by  the  thinking  of  Altiero  Spinelli,  Mario  Al- 
bertini  and  others.  They  ignored  the  problems  of  a  "European 
society"  and  rejected,  therefore,  "integral"  federalism.  Their 
concerns  were  exclusively  structural.  According  to  them,  the 
establishment  of  the  European  federal  state  would  be  feasible  If 
the  federal  Idea  was  applied  to  the  organisational  and  not  to  the 
,  societal  aspects  of  a  democratic  Europe.  Their  Ideas  were  initially 
expressed  In  the  "European  Manifesto"  which  was  published  in 
1943  by  the  Italian  resistance  fighters  and  In  1957  In  Altiero 
Spinelli's  "Manifesto  of  the  European  Federalists". 
The  failure  of  EDC  struck  a  blow  to  the  federalist  Ideas.  And 
despite  the  fact  that  personalities  like  Spinelli,  Monnet  and 
Hallstein  continued  to  persist  that  federalism  was  the  appropriate 
solution  for  a  united  Europe,  this  movement  did  not  have  any 
significant  impact  after  the  late  1960s. 
The  "functionalist"  theory  of  integration  was  based  on  the 
Ideas  of  David  Mitrany.  14He  advocated  the  distinction  between 
the  political  and  socio-economic  functions  of  the  state.  According 
to  It,  a  large  number  of  International  agencies  and  Institutions 
with  specific  tasks  In  the  socio-economlc  sectors  would  be  created, 
upon  which  specific  state  functions  would  be  transferred,  until 
gradually  the  state's  entire  technical  fleld  would  change  hands. 
The  desired  result  would  be  for  the  people  to  eventually  transfer 
14-  D.  Mitrany,  "A  Working  Peace  System",  (London,  Royal  Institute  of 
International  Affairs,  1946). 
19 their  confidence  and  loyalty  to  those  organisations,  forcing  thus 
their  governments  to  co-operate  on  the  political  level  as  well. 
Functionalism  appeared  an  appealing  theory.  However,  it 
soon  became  obvious  that  its  practical  application  was 
problematic,  mainly  due  to  lack  of  popular  appeal  for 
international  organisations.  Functionalism,  consequently  withered, 
but  its  theoretical  premises  influenced  another  school  of  thought 
that  flourished  in  the  1950s,  known  as  neofunctionalism. 
The  father  of  neofunctionalism  was  Ernst  Haas.  In  his  1958 
study  "The  Uniting  of  Europe:  Economic,  Social  and  Political  Forces 
1945-1958"  he  defines  international  integration  as  a  process  of 
gradual  "politicisation"  by  which  the  political  actors  are  persuaded 
to  transfer  their  loyalties  to  central  independent  organisations. 
This  process  begins  with  the  integration  of  limited  but 
fundamental  economic  sectors  and,  by  a  spill-over  phenomenon, 
automatically  results  in  a  "political  community".  There  are  many 
common  features  with  functionalism  as  well  as  two  Important 
differences.  The  first  one  is  that  the  neofunctionalist  theory  talks 
of  supranational  organisations  whereas  the  functionalist  one  of 
International.  The  difference  lies  In  the  fact  that  a  supranational 
organ  would  be  autonomous,  with  more  independent  than  inter- 
governmental  powers  and  would  have  the  ability  to  expand  its 
activity  at  will.  The  second  Important  divergence  from  the 
functional  theory  has  to  do  with  the  rejection  of  the  distinction 
between  politics  and  economics.  According  to  Haas,  these  two 
spheres  of  state  activity  are  linked  and  the  progression  from  the 
economic  to  the  political  sphere  happens  automatically.  This  "spill- 
over"  effect  from  the  economic  to  the  political  sphere  is  extremely 
20 gradual  but  it  has  the  inevitable  result  of  the  process  being  the 
creation  of  a  political  community. 
In  1958,  when  Haas'  study  appeared,  the  facts  seemed  to 
agree  with  the  neofunctIonal  analysis.  The  first  phase  of  Inte- 
gration  was  successful.  From  the  Schuman  Plan  of  1950,  which 
proposed  the  creation  of  a  steel  and  coal  community,  to  the  sign- 
ing  of  the  EEC  and  Euratom.  Treaties  In  1957,  Haas  presented  evi- 
dence  of  spill-over  resulting  from  the  Interplay  of  competing  In- 
terests. 
Even  though  the  establishment  of  the  EEC  and  Euratom. 
Treaties  seemed  to  confirm  the  neofunctional  spill-over  assump- 
tions,  the  development  of  the  European  Communities  has  put 
many  of  the  arguments  of  that  theory  in  question.  Although,  such 
a  reorientation  seemed  to  be  taking  place,  Lindberg  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  majority  of  Interest  group  activity  remained 
geared  towards  national  goals.  's  One  reason  could  be  that  these 
groups  found  It  easier  to  turn  to  national  solutions  instead  of  at- 
tempting  to  achieve  a  transnational  consensus  on  general  policy 
Issues,  as  distinct  from  an  agreement  on  technical  matters.  When 
It  comes  to  general  policy  Issues,  It  has  been  easier  for  Interest 
groups  to  operate  at  national  level  by  pressurising  their  national 
governments.  It  Is  natural  that  the  Member  States  of  the  EC  will 
attempt  to  be  present  In  Brussels  with  a  coherent  national  position 
rendering  therefore  difficult  any  Influence  by  Interest  groups  op- 
erating  at  the  supranatIonal  level. 
Neofunctionallsm  was  heavily  criticised  by  most  federalist 
thinkers.  They  felt  that  a  Common  Market  strictly  based  on  the 
15-  L.  N.  Lindberg,  "The  Political  Dynamics  of  European  Economic 
Integration",  (Stanford  University  Press,  1963). 
21 economic  level  would  never,  despite  Haas'  predictions,  grow  into  a 
political  community.  The  so  called  spill-over  effect  was  considered 
a  myth.  There  could  be  no  automatic  shift  from  the  economic  to 
the  political  field. 
In  the  end,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  neofunctionalism  Is 
a  rather  sophisticated  theory,  Its  major  drawback  Is  that  it  Is  "ex- 
clusively  concerned  with  the  dynamics  of  regional  integration,  not 
with  the  political  community  which  is  its  outcome".  16 
Federalism,  as  described  above,  concerns  Itself  with  a  spe- 
c1fic  type  of  legal  and  Institutional  framework.  Neofunctionalism 
analyses  the  manipulation  of  the  focus  of  popular  sovereignty  in 
order  for  a  transfer  from  a  national  to  a  supranational 
government  to  be  achieved.  This  process  is  automatic,  once 
started,  but  the  Initiation  by  the  national  government,  which  Is 
the  original  carrier  of  popular  loyalty,  is  necessary.  In  contrast  to 
both  the  above  mentioned  approaches  the  transactionalist  one 
concerns  Itself  with  the  conditions  necessary  to  promote  and 
maintain  a  sense  of  community  among  the  population  of  a  certain 
region. 
The  founding  father  of  this  theory  Is  Karl  Deutsch,  17  who  has 
used  the  logic  of  cybernetics  for  the  study  of  regional  Integration. 
Its  basic  premise  Is  that  the  only  way  of  achieving  mutual  rele- 
vance  and  responsiveness  that  distinguish  organised  groups  from 
random  formation  of  Individuals,  is  communication.  Integration  is 
conceived  as  a  process  of  strengthening  the  cohesion  of  such 
16-  D.  Elazar  and  1.  Grellsammer,  "  Federal  Democracy:  Ibe  U.  SA  and  Europe 
Compared.  A  Political  Science  Perspective"  in  "Integration  Through  Law" 
Book  1,  M.  Cappelletti,  M.  Seacombe,  J.  Weiler  eds.,  (Berlin,  Walter  de 
Gruyter,  1986)  Volume  1. 
17-  K.  Deutsch,  "Political  Connnunity  and  the  North  Atlantic  Area: 
international  Organization  in  the  Light  of  Historical  Experience" 
(Princeton,  Princeton  U.  P.,  1957). 
22 transnational  groups.  As  the  flow  of  transactions  between  these 
groups  intensifies,  a  mutual  Interdependence  among  the  groups 
and  the  political  actors  occurs  that  promotes  an  integrative  pro- 
cess.  A  sense  of  community  might  this  way  be  created,  a 
"community  of  security"  as  Deutsch  called  it.  There  are  two  types 
of  such  a  community.  The  amalgamated  community,  which  In- 
cludes,  confederate,  federal  and  unitary  states  and  is  formed  by  a 
merger  of  two  or  more  previously  Independent  societies,  and  the 
pluralistic  community,  where  the  governments  remain  Indepen- 
dent  but  Initiate  some  forms  of  co-operation.  When  It  comes  to  the 
practical  level  the  application  by  Deutsch  of  his  theory  in  the 
European  context  reached  a  result  away  from  amalgamation  and 
closer  to  a  form  of  pluralistic  society,  18  a  disappointing  view  for 
the  future  of  European  integration. 
The  theory  of  transactionalism  tends  to  ignore  certain 
questions  of  actor  perceptions,  assuming  that  these  will  be 
reflected  by  trends  in  the  transactions  themselves,  and  Its  pre- 
dictive  capability  seems  to  be  limited.  It  considers  Integration  to 
be  more  like  a  process  where  the  Incorporation  of  the  necessary 
elements  could  be  random,  as  long  as  they  are  all  there,  than  a 
process  where  the  sequence  of  stages  is  fixed. 
1.3.  The  American  federal  experience 
The  contemporary  model  of  federal  democracy  Is  the  United 
States  of  America.  Although  the  Constitution  of  1787,  which 
establishes  and  regulates  this  association  of  states  nowhere 
I&  Y-  Deutsch,  "France,  Germany  and  the  Western  Afliance"  (New  York,  C. 
Scribner's  Sons,  1967). 
23 describes  it  as  federal  government  or  mentions  the  terms  "fed- 
eral"  or  "federation",  federal  democracy  Is  clearly  an  American 
conception.  It  draws  heavily  from  religion,  specifically  from  the 
Puritan  idea  of  "covenant",  that  eventually  developed  from  the 
federal  theology  that  was  dominant  both  In  the  churches  and  the 
local  governments  in  colonial  America.  According  to  federal 
theory  every  relationship,  political  or  other,  derives  from  the 
original  covenant,  that  was  agreed  between  God  and  mankind,  to 
be  bound  together  in  a  union  in  order  to  work  for  the  redemption 
of  the  world.  This  Is  done  under  the  condition  that  the  respective 
Integrities  of  both  sides  remain  Intact  in  order  for  their  freedom 
to  be  preserved.  And  It  can  be  assumed  that  to  help  mankind  to 
connect  with  Him,  God  would  have  to  give  up  a  certain  amount  of 
omnipotence.  Eventually  the  covenant  Idea  dominated  the 
structure  of  political  and  social  organisation  initially  of  New 
England,  spreading  gradually  to  every  part  of  America. 
The  implementation  of  the  theory  of  federal  democracy  took 
place,  as  soon  as  the  United  States  became  Independent  In  1776, 
In  as  much  as  there  was  a  definite  federal  element  in  the  declara- 
tion  of  Independence  Itself  since  It  presupposed  certain  actions  on 
behalf  of  the  representatives  of  the  states,  each  state  having  its 
own  voice.  The  federal  character  of  the  foundation  of  the  United 
States  is  further  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that,  simultaneously 
with  the  declaration  of  Independence,  the  transformation  of  the 
colonies  Into  states  was  materiallsing  through  the  actions  of 
delegates,  other  than  the  ones  responsible  for  the  Declaration  of 
Independence.  Actually,  In  1776  eight  colonies  adopted  state 
24 constitutions,  four  of  them  even  preceded  the  Declaration.  19  The 
federation  expanded  and  eventually  resulted  in  what  America  is 
now.  Alaska  and  Hawaii  joined  in  1959  and  1960  respectively. 
Earlier  In  1952  Puerto  Rico  became  the  first  "free  associate  state" 
and  in  1976  the  Northern  Mariana  Islands  were  added  under  the 
same  status. 
1.4.  Contrasts  In  the  integrative  experiences  and  American  influ- 
ences  in  the  European  integrative  attempts 
It  is  not  difficult  to  see  from  the  above,  that  the  process  of 
integration  has  followed  different  routes  In  the  two  systems  under 
examination.  In  Europe  the  decision  to  come  to  some  kind  of 
union,  has  been  the  outcome  of  the  policy  of  highly  developed, 
established,  Independent  sovereign  states.  On  the  other  hand  the 
American  case  Is  different.  There,  the  model  is  that  of  a  political 
entity  which  was  federal  almost  from  the  beginning.  The  result 
was  that  In  the  process  of  European  Integration,  the  Issues  that 
have  been  touched  upon  and  the  problems  that  had  to  be  resolved 
were  quite  different  from  those  which  confronted  the  United 
States.  An  Initial  problem  the  Europeans  were  faced  with  was  that 
of  the  geographic  limits  of  the  Union.  A  number  of  solutions  were 
there  to  adopt.  The  basis  for  a  united  Europe  could  be  political, 
with  the  Inclusion  of  only  democratic  regimes.  It  could  be  a  com- 
mon  cultural  framework  or  an  economic  one,  Including  states 
19.  The  adoption  of  national  constitutions  of  New  Hampshire,  South 
Carolina,  Virginia  and  New  Jersey  predated  the  Declaration  of 
Independence.  Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  Delaware  and  North  Carolina 
immediately  followed. 
25 with  a  consistent  economic  development  or  a  realistic  one,  with 
states  that  would  just  agree  to  unite. 
Certain  attempts  have  been  made  to  use  a  common  cultural 
denominator  as  a  foundation  for  integration  in  Europe.  The  French 
political  scientist  Andre  Siegfried  asserted  that  such  a  basis  In- 
deed  existed.  20  He  argued  that  the  European  cultural  identity  is 
the  outcome  of  three  distinctive  streams,  namely  Greek  philoso- 
phy,  Roman  institutions  and  conception  of  law  and  Christian  and 
Jewish  religious  traditions,  what  he  called  the  "European  spirit". 
The  "European  spirit"  might  Indeed  exist,  however  it  is 
doubtful  whether  these  traditions  could  provide  a  basis  for  the 
foundation  for  European  union.  In  addition,  their  capacity  to 
prompt  by  themselves,  with  the  absence  of  other  common  fea- 
tures  the  creation  of  a  large  Integrated  formation  Is  highly  ques- 
tionable. 
All  these  problems  were  non  existent  as  regards  the 
American  states.  The  basis  of  the  association  has  never  been  a 
problem  of  such  controversy,  as  in  Europe.  We  saw  how  the 
colonies  turned  Into  states,  how  the  states  united  to  form  a  fed- 
eration  and  how  the  federation  expanded  as  other  states  joined  In. 
Common  culture  was  not  a  problem  either  since  there  was  only 
one.  Politically,  all  the  states  had  similar  regimes  with  only  pe- 
ripheral  differences  and  experience  with  federal  mechanisms  and 
arrangements  of  some  kind.  Their  economic  development  was  of 
the  same  level  too.  And  we  should  not  ignore  the  fact,  that  apart 
from  the  distinctive  traditions  the  two  systems  were  challenged 
by  different  situations.  What  the  Americans  had  to  face  was  the 
20 
. 
A.  Siegfried,  IT'Ame  des  Peuples",  (Paris,  Hachette,  1950). 
26 size  of  their  own  country  as  compared  to  its  population,  a  situation 
unfamiliar  to  Europe. 
Considering  the  differences  in  history,  ideology,  culture  and 
general  background  which  surrounded  the  founding  and  evolution 
of  the  two  systems  it  has  to  be  conceded  that  there  is  a  gap 
between  them  that  It  is  difficult  to  bridge.  This  does  not  mean 
however,  that  the  developments  In  Europe  mainly  after  the  end  of 
World  War  H  were  not  Influenced  by  the  American  experience. 
After  all  the  founding  of  federalism  represented  a  milestone  with 
the  Inevitable  result  to  have  an  Impact  positive  or  negative  on  ev- 
ery  other  integrative  plan  that  followed. 
We  have  seen  already  that  the  creation  of  the  European 
Steel  and  Coal  Community  materiallsed  through  a  neofunctionalist 
rather  than  a  federalist  process.  However,  the  support  of  the 
federalist  ideals  by  Important  personalities  with  participation  In 
the  conception  and  execution  of  these  documents  had  as  a  result 
the  Inclusion  of  clauses  with  federal  characteristics  such  as 
Articles  49-50  ECSC  Treaty  whereby  a  tax  of  federal  character  is 
Imposed  by  the  High  Authority  directly  on  coal  and  steel 
enterprises,  and  Articles  164-188  EEC  Treaty  regarding  the  Court 
of  justice,  an  Institution  with  a  lot  of  federal  potential.  Influential 
personalities  were  not  though  the  only  ones  that  contributed  In 
the  spreading  of  the  federal  theory.  A  significant  number  of 
pressure  groups  devoted  their  activities  towards  the  application  of 
the  exact  American  model  to  Europe.  These  groups  were 
International  In  origin  and  they  were  guided  by  men  that  had 
studied,  explained  and  promoted  the  Idea  of  the  American  federal 
democracy.  These  groups  made  several  attempts  to  federalise  the 
Community  Institutions  but  resistance  from  Inside  condemned 
27 them  to  failure.  Another  factor,  flnally,  of  federal  character  that 
influenced  the  process  of  European  Integration  was  the  interest 
that  the  Americans  themselves  demonstrated  to  assist  Europe  to 
get  Involved  In  an  experience  similar  to  theirs. 
1.5.  Concluding  remarks 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  there  is  a  definite  contrast  in  the 
Integrative  experiences  between  the  USA  and  Europe.  Having  said 
that,  It  is  difficult  to  ignore  that  the  American  federal  Influence 
has  been  an  important  factor  In  formulating  a  united  Europe.  But 
In  the  end,  can  this  Influence  justify  a  comparison  between  the 
two  systems,  to  the  extent  that  occurrences  in  a  specific  legal  area 
in  the  USA,  namely  the  field  of  human  rights  protection,  should  be 
seriously  considered  by  the  Europeans  In  the  further  development 
of  relevant  protective  mechanisms?  We  submit  that  Indeed  that  Is 
the  case.  The  fact  that  Europe  and  the  USA  did  not  integrate  In  an 
absolutely  similar  manner  does  not  mean  that  in  specific  legal 
fields,  certain  actions  would  cause  different  reactions.  In  the  USA, 
Individuals  are  protected  from  breaches  of  their  rights  both  by 
the  federal  Bill  of  Rights  and  Its  state  counterparts.  For  reasons 
which  will  be  examined  in  the  following  chapter,  a  certain  pattern 
has  been  formulated  wherebyq  In  cases  of  violation,  It  was,  and 
still  is,  the  federal  and  not  the  state  bills  of  rights  that  become  the 
protective  norm.  This  was  felt  by  some  to  cause  a  problem  of 
efficiency  In  the  protection  of  Individual  rights.  If  we  suppose  that 
in  the  context  of  the  European  Union  a  similar  plan  of  uniform 
protection  of  human  goes  ahead,  what  assurances  are  there  that 
the  same  problems  will  not  arise?  We  submit  therefore,  that  a 
28 comparison  between  the  two  systems  for  the  purpose  of  the 
present  discussion  is  valid,  and  that  legal  developments  in  certain 
areas  should  not  be  Ignored  by  the  Europeans  in  their  attempts  to 
integrate  further. 
29 CHAPTER  2 
The  phenomenon  of  New  judicial  Federalism  and  its  Impact  on  the 
protection  of  human  rights  in  the  United  States  of  America 
2.1.  Introductory  note 
The  consideration  of  the  movement  of  New  judicial 
Federalism  is  of  major  Importance  to  this  thesis.  The  consequences 
of  Its  emergence  and  development  in  the  field  of  the  protection  of 
the  Individual  from  violations  of  Its  human  rights  by  the  gov- 
ernment  have  not  only  become  the  subject  of  Immense  theoretical 
debate  but,  most  Importantly,  found  the  support  of  a  significant 
part  of  the  state  judiciary  in  the  USA.  In  essence,  what  New 
judicial  Federalism  advocated,  and  partially  achieved,  was  a 
switch  as  regards  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  Individuals 
from  the  central,  uniformly  applied  norms  of  the  federal  Bill  of 
Rights,  to  the  protective  norm§  of  the  constitutions  of  the 
Individual  states.  The  argument  was  that  the  uniform  protective 
provisions,  and  the  way  they  were  Interpreted  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  could  no  longer  afford  the  best 
protection  to  the  American  cItIzen.  In  other  words,  their  efficiency 
had  been  undermined.  What  follows  Is  an  analysis  of  the 
circumstances  that  led  to  the  birth  of  the  New  Judicial  Federalism 
30 The  Influence  it  has  had  on  the  theoretical  as  well  as  the  practical 
level  will  also  be  considered.  Finally,  an  evaluation  of  its  future 
perspectives  will  conclude  this  chapter. 
2.2.  The  emergence  and  development  of  New  judicial  Federalism 
When  nineteen  years  ago,  justice  Brennan  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  wrote  an  article  in  which  he  invited 
state  courts  to  "step  into  the  breach"  I  left  by  what  he  conceived  to 
be  a  retreat  of  the  country's  highest  court  from  its  commitment  to 
protect  individual  rights,  and  urged  them  to  seize  control  of  that 
protection  by  looking  at  their  own  state  constitution  instead  of  the 
federal  one  as  interpreted  by  the  Supreme  Court  led  by  Chief 
Justice  Burger,  he  could  hardly  have  Imagined  the  impact  his  mes- 
sage  would  have  in  the  American  legal  world.  This  article  has 
been  named  the  "Magna  Carta"  of  state  constitutionalism,  earning 
him  the  title  of  "patron  saint"  of  state  constitutional  law  and  gave 
birth  to  the  movement  of  "New  judicial  Federalism".  2 
New  judicial  Federalism,  in  legal  jargon,  describes  the 
growing  awareness  in  the  state  courts  of  the  United  States  of 
America  of  the  importance  of  state  law,  specifically  state  constitu- 
tional  law,  as  the  basis  for  the  protection  of  Individual  rights 
against  violations  by  the  state  governments.  It  depicts  the  desire 
of  the  state  courts  to  become  the  final  arbiters  when  It  comes  to 
1.  W.  J.  Brennan,  Jr.,  "State  Constitutions  and  the  Protection  of  Individual 
Rights"",  90  Harvard  Law  Review  489,503  (1977);  also  W.  J.  Brennan,  Jr., 
"The  Bill  of  Rights  and  the  States:  The  Revival  of  State  Constitution  as 
Guardians  of  Individual  Rights",  New  York  University  Law  Review  535 
(1986). 
2.  The  name  "New  Judicial  Federalism"  distinguishes  this  movement  from 
"New  Federalism",  which  was  the  name  given  to  a  legislative  program  put 
forward  by  the  Reagan  administration. 
31 their  citizens'  individual  rights,  by  relying  on  their  own  law,  In 
this  case  the  state  constitution.  New  judicial  Federalism  is  based  in 
the  assumption  that  the  federal  Constitution  provides  minimum 
rather  than  maximum  protection  of  Individual  rights  and  liberties 
and  that  in  appropriate  circumstances  state  courts  should  apply 
their  own  constitutional  law  to  ensure  adequate  protection  of  their 
citizens'  rights  within  the  state  jurisdiction.  Its  origins  are  rooted 
In  the  simultaneous  occurrences  of  the  liberal  reaction  to  the 
Burger  Court  change  of  jurisprudencial  attitude  in  the  1970s  as 
regards  constitutional  protection  of  Individual  rights,  and  the 
dormancy  of  state  courts  when  it  came  to  the  development  of  vig- 
orous  and  independent  bodies  of  state  constitutional  law  detached 
from  the  character  of  the  jurisprudence  of  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court. 
It  might  be  helpful  to  state  some  principles  of  the  American 
system  of  government  dwelling  a  little  In  history.  It  Is  a  fact  that 
before  the  enactment  by  Congress  on  September  25,1789  and 
ratification  by  the  states  on  December  15,1791  of  the  first  ten 
amendments  to  the  United  States  Constitution,  commonly  known 
as  the  Bill  of  Rights,  fundamental  liberties  such  as  freedom  from 
unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  were  guaranteed  by  state 
constitutional  provisions.  Moreover,  the  federal  Bill  of  Rights  pro- 
tected,  as  legal  theory  advocated  and  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
country  decided  in  1833  In  the  case  of  Barron  v.  Mayor  of 
Baltimore  3  those  liberties  from  federal  breach  only,  rendering  the 
state  constitutions  guards  against  encroachments  by  state  gov-, 
ernments. 
3.32  U.  S.  (7  Pet)  242  (1833). 
32 It  was  the  post-Civil  War  amendments  to  the  Constitution, 
namely  the  Thirteenth,  Fourteenth  and  Fifteen  Amendments, 
which  brought  about  new  guarantees  of  equality  and  liberty 
whereby  the  federal  government  committed  itself  to  protect  citi- 
zens  against  violations  by  the  states.  Despite  the  fact  though  that 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  Imposed  Immediate  federal  restric- 
tions  on  state  Interference,  decades  passed  before  these  restric- 
tions  were  actually  applied  against  the  states.  It  was  not  until 
1925  In  the  case  of  Gidow  v.  New  York,  4  that  the  federal  Supreme 
Court  declared  that  the  First  Amendment  guaranteed  the  free- 
doms  of  speech  and  press  against  violations  by  the  states  and 
until  1949,  In  Wolf  v.  Colorado  5,  that  the  Court  applied  the  Fourth 
Amendment  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  by  state 
officials.  The  consequence  of  this  jurisprudenclal  stance  of  the 
Supreme  Court  was,  that  for  almost  one  and  a  half  century  of  the 
history  of  the  United  States  of  America,  untilGitlow  was  decided,  it 
was  the  states'  bills  of  rights  and  not  the  federal  one  that  pro- 
tected  citizens  In  their  relations  with  the  state  governments. 
AfterGitlow  the  federal  Supreme  Court  started  filling  the 
gaps,  by  adopting  the  rationale  that  because  certain  parts  of  the 
federal  Bill  of  Rights  were  indispensable  to  an  ordered  scheme  of 
liberty,  there  was  reason  to  encompass  them  In  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  thereby  rendering  them  applicable  to  the  states. 
Consequently,  the  relevant  process,  described  in  the  legal  jargon 
as  incorporation  of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  began.  Between  1925  and 
1970,  but  predominantly  during  the  1960s,  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  led  by  Chief  justice  Warren,  by  using  the 
4*  268  US.  652  (1925). 
5.33  8  US.  25  (1949). 
33 Fourteenth  Amendment  to  Impose  national  standards  of  fair  pro- 
cedure  and  equal  treatment  In  the  states,  made  the  vast  majority 
of  the  provisions  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  applicable  to  the  state  consti- 
tutions. 
Following  the  expansion  of  the  federal  constitutional  guaran- 
tees  by  the  Warren  Court,  the  protection  of  Individual  rights  by 
the  state  constitutional  provisions  lost  its  usefulness.  Not  inclined 
to  take  the  lead,  state  courts  followed  the  steps  of  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court.  That  was  the  trend  between  lawyers,  aca- 
demIclans  and  state  court  judges.  They  neglected  to  examine  the 
state  constitutions  In  order  to  determine  whether  It  possibly  af- 
forded  the  same  or  even  greater  protection.  The  emphasis  was 
concentrated  In  the  federal  government. 
Things  started  to  change  In  the  1970s.  The  new  Judges  ap- 
pointed  to  the  Supreme  Court  brought  with  them  a  more  conser- 
vative  legal  thinking.  As  a  result,  their  decisions  as  regards  fed- 
eral  protection  of  individual  rights  reflected  this.  And  that  was 
exactly  the  Incentive  for  justice  Brennan,  writing  In  the  Harvard 
Law  Review  In  1977,  to  observe  signiflcant  changes,  for  the  worse, 
In  the  Supreme  Court's  attitude  towards  Individual'  rights. 
Primarily,  he  and  others  detected  a  retrenchment  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  then  led  by  Chief  justice  Burger,  from  Its  previous 
favourable  position  of  protecting  the  rights  of  American  citizens 
against  both  federal  and  state  breaches.  Secondly,  they  saw  a  de- 
fiberate  barring  of  the  door  to  the  federal  courthouses  by  means 
of  procedural  devices,  to  limit  adjudication  of  claims  against  state 
action.  Thus,  justice  Brennan  urged  state  courts  to  look  into  their 
own  constitutions,  and  become  thereby  a  new  fountain  of  individ- 
ual  liberties. 
34 This  Is  how  the  movement  of  New  judicial  Federalism  was 
born.  The  early  literature  was  mainly  devoted  to  criticising  state 
court  decisions  for  what  New  judicial  Federalism  proponents 
described  as  sloppy  or  Inappropriate  constitutional  decision  mak- 
Ing  practices.  These  practices  included  avoiding  reliance  on  state 
constitutions  at  all,  6  inadequate  Interpretation  of  the  latter  with 
the  consequence  that  poor  guidance  was  offered  to  litigants  and 
judgeS7,  and  finally  inappropriately  relying  on  federal  rules  as 
tools  of  construction  of  state  constitutions.  8  As  the  movement 
grew,  its  followers  started  to  argue  that  state  constitutional  ju- 
risprudence  should  be  considered  as  something  more  than  a  vehi- 
cle  for  re-litigating  individual  rights  cases  lost  In  the  federal 
courts.  An  overwhelming  consensus  has  been  created  within  the 
movement  opposing  the  so-called  "reactive"  state  constitutional 
jurisprudence,  whereby  state  rulings  reject  federal  constitutional 
decisions  only  on  the  basis  of  the  state  court's  disagreement  with 
the  outcome-9  Instead,  state  constitutional  law  should  follow  Its 
own  particular  way  on  the  strength  of  It  being  an  Independent 
body  of  law. 
New  judicial  Federalism  supporters  use  a  variety  of 
arguments  In  favour  of  state  constitutional  Independence.  Some 
claim  historical  reasons  based  on  the  fact  that  state  constitutions 
6  See  for  example  C.  G.  Douglas,  JIl,  "State  Judicial  Activism-The  New  Role 
fýr  State  Bills  of  Rights",  Suffolk  Iaw  Review  1123,1144  (1978;  S.  S. 
Abrahamson,  "Reincarnation  of  the  State  Courts",  36  Southwestern  Law 
journal  951,957-58  (1982);  S.  Mosk,  "State  Constitutionalism  After  Warren: 
Avoiding  the  Potomac's  Ebb  and  Flow"  in  "Developments  in  State 
Constitutional  Law"  201  (Bradley  D.  McGraw  ed.,  1985). 
7  H.  Linde,  "First  Things  First:  Rediscovering  the  States'  Bill  of  Rights-,  9 
JjIIYýersity  of  Baltimore  Law  Review  379,390  (1980). 
8  IE.  13.  Spaeth,  Jr.,  "Toward  a  New  Partnership:  The  Future  Relationship  of  Federal 
and  State  Constitutional  Law",  University  of  Pittsburgh  Law  Review 
729,736-37  (1988). 
9  See  for  example  P.  J.  Galie,  "The  Other  Supreme  Courts:  Judicial  Activism 
j5:  Qong  State  Supreme  Courts",  33  Syracuse  Law.  Review  731,779,786  (1982). 
35 predated  their  federal  counterpart,  serving  therefore  as  models 
for  the  drafters  of  the  latter  and  the  federal  Bill  of  Rights.  10  Others 
point  to  the  differences  between  the  state  and  the  federal 
constitutions  and  argue  that  the  reason  for  the  creation  as  wen  as 
the  differences  in  text,  completely  distinguish  each  one  from  the 
rest  of  them.  "  Additionally,  state  courts  are  institutions  signifi- 
cantly  distinct  from  the  federal  courts  In  both  their  authority  and 
the  way  this  authority  is  exercised.  These  differences  necessarily 
define  an  Independent  body  of  law.  Finally,  the  argument  is  put 
forward  that  a  vigorous  and  Independent  body  of  state 
constitutional  law  is  not  only  contemplated  but  demanded  by  the 
American  federal  system.  In  a  federal  structural  framework  the 
constituent  entities  are  supposed  to  act  as  counterweights  to  the 
central  power,  an  arrangement  designed  to  protect  liberty.  A 
strong,  Independent  state  constitutional  jurisprudence  Is  a  nec- 
essary  aspect  as  well  as  a  condition  of  a  healthy  federalist 
construction.  12 
State  constitutionalism  has  developed  to  the  point  where 
different  methods  of  analysing  constitutional  claims  have 
emerged.  The  models  that  are  proposed  have  generally  been 
Identified  as  the  primacy,  the  Interstitial  and  the  dual  sovereignty 
ones. 
The  primacy  model,  most  eloquently  supported  by  justice 
Hans  Linde  of  the  Oregon  Supreme  Court  has  also  been  called  the 
self-reliant  approach.  13  It  considers  the  state  constitution  as  an 
10.  see  note  7. 
11.  B.  Newborne,  "Forward:  State  Constitutions  and  the  Evolution  of  Positive 
Rights",  20  Rutgers  Law  Journal  881,893-901  (1989). 
12.  S.  S.  Abrahamson,  "Homegrown  Justice:  The  State  Constitutions"  in 
"Developments  in  State  Constitutional  Law"  at  3  06,3  14. 
13.  This  method  has  also  been  supported  by  Abrahamson,  Douglas,  Folk, 
Collins  and  other  distinguished  judges. 
36 Independent  source  of  rights  and  relies  on  it  as  the  predominant, 
fundamental  law.  Because  under  this  model  federal  law  and  anal- 
ysis  are  not  presumed  correct,  even  when  a  developed  federal 
precedent  or  doctrine  Is  available,  state  courts  are  urged  to  exam- 
Ine  the  state  provisions  and  the  state  history,  doctrine,  text  and 
structure  first.  Only  if  the  result  sought  falls  below  the  standards 
set  by  the  federal  Constitution  should  the  state  court  decide  the 
case  on  the  basis  of  the  federal  law.  The  state  courts  have  an  obli- 
gation  to  look  Into  their  own  constitution  the  way  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court  would  with  the  federal  document.  According 
to  the  primacy  model  then,  federal  law  is  limited  to  a  secondary 
position. 
The  Interstitial  modeI14  dictates  that  the  state  courts  should 
recognise  the  federal  doctrine  as  being  the  minimum  protective 
provision  and  inquire  whether  the  state  constitutional  provisions 
could  supplement  or  amplify  the  federal  rights.  It  advocates  that 
state  courts  should  look  into  the  federal  constitution  first  and  only 
if  the  federal  document  approves  the  challenged  state  action  or  is 
ambiguous  should  the  state  court  turn  to  the  state  constitution. 
The  most  articulate  defender  of  this  approach  Is  justice  Stewart 
Pollock  of  the  New  Jersey  Supreme  Court.  15  The  advantage  of  this 
approach  lies  in  Its  acknowledgement  of  the  role  of  the  United 
States  Constitution  as  the  basic  protector  of  Individual  rights  and 
consequently  to  the  placement  of  the  state  constitutional  law  in  a 
more  modest  position  than  the  one  the  primacy  model  advocates. 
14.  "Developments  in  the  Law.  The  Interpretation  of  State  Constitutional 
Rights",  95  Harvard  law  Review  1324,1330-1331  (1982). 
15 
0  S.  G.  Pollock,  "State  Constitutions  as  Separate  Sources  of  Fundamental 
Rights",  35  Rutgers  Law  Review  707  (1983). 
37 Finally,  the  dual  sovereignty  model  analyses  both  the  state 
and  the  federal  constitutions.  For  many  years  this  was  the  ap- 
proach  of  many  state  courts.  The  tendency  was,  however,  that 
state  courts,  after  this  Initial  analysis,  simply  applied  the  federal 
construction  to  the  state  constitutional  provisions.  In  recent  years 
though,  some  courts  have  developed  a  state  constitutional  analysis 
that  Is  independent  from  the  federal  one,  without  at  the  same 
time  ignoring  the  federal  counterparts.  Simultaneous  evaluation  of 
both  state  and  federal  provisions  Is  the  feature  of  courts  applying 
the  dual  sovereignty  model,  even  when  the  decision  rests  firmly 
on  state  grounds.  16  This  kind  of  analysis  reflects  the  policies  of  the 
American  federal  system  by  making  available  to  the  citizens  the 
whole  spectrum  of  protection  that  both  levels  of  government  have 
to  offer. 
Mention  should  also  be  made,  to  a  certain  method  of  Inter- 
pretation  of  state  constitutional  provisions  which  discourages  the 
development  of  an  Independent  state  analysis.  When  state  courts, 
In  situations  where  litigants  raise  both  federal  and  state  constitu- 
tional  claims,  hold  that  the  analysis  and  the  result  are  the  same 
under  both  constitutions  on  the  facts  of  the  case,  then  the  two 
documents  have  been  interpreted  in  what  Is  called  "lockstep".  17 
The  lockstep,  approach  is  seen  as  anathema  by  the  proponents  of 
New  judicial  Federalism  and  as  a  blessing  by  its  opponents.  It  dis- 
courages  litigants  from  making  clear  state  constitutional 
arguments  because  in  the  end,  even  where  the  wording  of  the  two 
provisions  Is  not  similar,  the  court  will  nevertheless  look  into  the 
16.  R.  F.  Utter,  11  Swimming  in  the  Jaws  of  the  Crocodile:  State  Court  Conunent 
on  Federal  Constitutional  Issues  when  Disposing  of  Cases  on  State 
Constitutional  Grounds",  63  Texas  Law  Review  1025  (1985). 
17.  See  note  1,  at  55  0-5  5  1. 
38 federal  law  for  guidance  and  apply  an  analysis  used  by  federal 
courts  under  the  federal  Constitution. 
The  proponents  of  New  judicial  Federalism  were  encour- 
aged,  In  1983,  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  by  means  of 
its  judgement  In  the  case  of  Michigan  v.  Long.  18  There  the  Court 
reformed  Its  prior  rulings  as  regards  the  doctrine  of  adequate  and 
independent  state  grounds,  according  to  which  It  would  not  re- 
view  a  state  court  decision  based  on  state  grounds  even  if  the 
state  decision  also  rested  on  federal  law  grounds,  for  which  a  fed- 
eral  appeal  would  normally  be  available.  It  said  that,  because 
state  law  is  unreviewable  by  federal  courts,  a  Supreme  Court  de- 
cision  on  the  federal  Issue  could  not  affect  the  outcome  of  the  case 
and  would,  therefore,  simply  be  an  advisory  opinion  beyond  the 
Court's  jurisdiction.  Therefore,  the  Supreme  Court  now  requests 
that  the  state  courts  say  explicitly  when  their  decisions  rest  on 
state  grounds  If  they  want  to  insulate  their  decisions  from  federal 
review.  The  Importance  of  this  decision  then  for  the  future  of 
state  constitutionalism  can  easily  be  comprehended. 
New  judicial  Federalism,  however,  also  has  fierce  opponents. 
They  consider  this  movement  to  be  -a  vehicle  through  which  a 
bunch  of  liberal  judges  and  academics  are  attempting  to  promote 
their  personal  Ideas  about  federalism.  The  number  and  variety  of 
arguments  put  forward  Is  Indeed  abundant.  The  most  common 
reference  regards  the  Infrequency  of  decisions  by  the  state  courts 
based  on  the  state  constitutions.  Even  when  the  state  courts 
attempt  to  do  so,  they  usually  fail  to  specify  whether  the  ruling 
was  based  on  the  state  or  the  federal  provision.  This  may  be  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  federal  and  the  state  documents  have  been 
18.463  U.  S.  1032  (1983). 
39 Interpreted  as  having  the  same  meaning,  the  "lockstep"  analysis, 
discussed  above.  The  opponents  of  New  judicial  Federalism  have 
even  reached  the  point  of  considering  it  a  danger  to  the 
fundamental  values  of  the  American  federalist  structure.  19 
in  the  end,  those  who  argue  In  favour  of  New  Judicial 
Federalism  seem  optimistic  about  the  prospect  of  the  movement. 
They  base  this  optimism  on  the  fact  that  state  courts  have  decided 
more  than  five  hundred  cases  so  far  relying  on  state  constitutions 
as  opposed  to  the  federal  document.  A  large  amount  of  state  con- 
stitutional  law  literature  has  emerged  with  titles  such  as  "reincar- 
nation",  "revival",  even  "revolution".  20  A  new  journal  called 
"Emerging  Issues  In  State  Constitutional  LaW',  has  even  been  es- 
tablished  to  provide  a  forum  for  such  commentary.  Whether  such 
optimism  Is  justified  Is  a  question  that  has  no  easy  answer.  The 
literature  on  the  New  judicial  Federalism  puts  forward  a  dual  ar- 
gument  for  the  state  court  judges  to  develop  state  constitutional 
law.  The  first  one  Is  to  avoid  conservative  federal  judicial  rulings 
and  pursue  liberal  decisions  instead.  The  second  one  is  to  enhance 
the  e)dsting  system  of  judicial  federalism  without  taking  substan- 
tive  results  Into  consideration.  A  number  of  studies  has  been  un- 
dertaken  as  an  attempt  to  discover  whether  state  courts  faced  up 
to  those  challenges.  It  Is  useful  to  consult  the  most  influential 
ones. 
One  of  the  most  comprehensive  Is  the  survey  conducted  by 
Barry  Latzerý21  In  which  almost  every  state  high  court  criminal 
19.  J.  A.  Gardner,  "The  Failed  Discourse  of  State  Constitutionalism",  go 
Nfichigan  Law  Review  761,827  (1992). 
20  See  for  example  A.  E.  Dick  Howard,  "The  Renaissance  of  State 
Cýnstitutional  Law",  1  Emerging  Issues  In  State  Constitutonal  Law  1,12-13 
(1988). 
21  B.  Latzer,  "The  Hidden  Conservatism  of  the  State  Court  "RevOlution"",  74 
jt;;  icature  195  (1991) 
40 procedure  decision  was  analysed.  It  must  be  indicated  in  the  first 
place,  that  this  study  has  certain  limitations,  the  most  Important 
of  which  is  its  confinement  to  criminal  justice  cases,  omitting  state 
constitutional  rulings  on  issues  such  as  freedom  of  speech,  reli- 
gion,  abortion  and'race  discrimination.  This  is  justified  by  the  ar- 
gument  that  criminal  cases  constitute  the  majority  in  state  court 
workload  and  for  this  reason  are  good  Indicators  of  state  court  ac- 
tivism.  The  author  himself  concedes  though,  that,  if  decisions  in 
these  areas  were  taken  Into  consideration,  a  different  picture  of 
New  judicial  Federalism  would  emerge.  The  method  used  for  the 
study  dictated  the  collection  of  all  of  the  state  high  court  criminal 
procedures  cases  between  the  late  1960s  and  the  end  of  1989. 
The  cases  then  were  grouped  by  state,  and  within  each  state,  by 
conformity  or  non  conformity  with  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court.  Florida 
and  California  were  treated  differently  from  the  rest  of  the  states 
because  of  the  anti-exclusionary  rule  amendments  to  their  respec- 
tive  constitutions.  22  Latzer's  findings  indicate,  In  the  first  place, 
that  state  supreme  courts  based  relatively  few  of  the  examined 
decisions  on  their  own  state  constitutional  provisions.  Only  slightly 
more  than  one  in  five  decisions  (22%)  relied  on  state  law.  Out  of 
these  decisions,  98%  defer  to  precedents  established  by  the  U.  S. 
Supreme  Court.  Additionally,  even  when  state  courts  based  their 
decisions  In  state  constitutional  law,  the  latter  provisions  were  not 
developed  enough  to  became  viable  alternatives  to  federal  law. 
Almost  three  quarters  (70%)  of  the  decisions  that  are  based  on 
state  law  rely  on  state  court  precedents,  and  of  these  decisions, 
fewer  than  a  third  are  based  on  state  constitutions,  statutes,  or 
22.  Cal.  Const.  art  1  para.  28(d);  Fla.  Const.  art.  1  para.  12. 
41 common  law  doctrines.  23  These  findings  indicate,  according  to 
Latzer,  that  state  supreme  courts  were  not  committed,  at  least 
during  the  first  years  of  the  movement  of  New  judicial 
Federalism,  to  developing  state  law. 
Two  useful  studies  were  conducted  by  Fino.  In  the  first  one, 
all  the  decisions  of  six  state  high  courts  for  the  year  1975  were 
analysed.  24  She  found  that  only  17%  of  all  the  cases  dealing  with 
state  constitutional  matters  were  decided  on  the  basis  of  state 
constitutional  law.  This  percentage  fell  to  8%  when  Issues  of 
criminal  procedures  were  involved.  25  In  the  second  one,  constitu- 
tional  issues  that  raised  equal  protection  claims  before  the  . 
50 
state  supreme  courts  between  1975  and  1984,  were  considered.  It 
was  found  that  fewer  than  7%  of  all  cases  were  decided  on  state 
constitutional  law,  a  percentage  that  dropped  to  5%  for  criminal 
cases  raising  equal  protection  claIMS.  26 
Emmert  and  Traut,  in  an  Important  study  which  considers 
the  full  range  of  decisions  of  the  state  supreme  courts,  found27 
that,  between  1981  and  1985,  not  more  than  16%  of  all  state 
supreme  court  cases  that  Involved  state  statute  challenges  were 
decided  on  the  basis  of  state  law.  28  In  order  to  come  to  this 
conclusion,  the  authors  grouped  the  50  state  supreme  courts  Into 
four  categories  depending  on  the  percentage  of  their  decisions 
which  relied  on  federal  law.  The  courts  that  based  at  least  half  of 
their  decisions  on  state  law  were  characterised  as  "highly  support- 
23.  Latzer,  see  note  2  1,  at  2  8. 
24  Fino,  "The  Role  of  State  Supreme  Courts  in  the  New  Judicial  Federalism" 
70  (1987);  Fino,  "Judicial  Federalism  and  Equality  Guarantees  in  state 
Supreme  courts",  17  Publius  53  (1987). 
25  Fino,  The  Role  of  state  courts,  see  note  at  142. 
26:  Fino  , 
pUbliUS,  see  note  24,  at  6. 
27.  Emmert  and  Traut,  "State  Supreme  Courts,  State  Constitutions,  and 
jtidicial  Policymaking",  16  justice  System  Joumal  44,  Table  2  (1982) 
28.  Ibid  at  44. 
42 ive".  Eight  state  supreme  courts  (16%  of  the  total)  fall  in  this  cate- 
gory.  These  were  the  courts  of  Alaska,  New  Jersey,  New  York, 
Texas,  South  Dakota,  Tennessee,  Florida  and  Arkansas. 
Surprisingly  enough,  the  courts  of  California,  Oregon  and 
Washington  which  are  considered  leaders  in  state  constitutional 
jurisdiction  were  not  included  in  this  category.  "Moderately  sup- 
portive"  courts  based  less  than  half,  but  more  than  one-fourth  of 
their  decisions  on  state  law.  Eleven  courts  (22%  of  the  total)  fan  in 
this  category.  As  courts  of  "low  support"  were  classified  the  ones 
that  based  no  more  than  one-fourth  of  their  decisions  on  state 
law.  Seventeen  courts  (34%  of  the  total)  fall  in  this  category. 
Finally,  as  courts  of  "zero  support"  are  described  the.  ones  that  did 
not  rely  on  state  law  In  any  of  their  decisions.  Fourteen  courts 
(28%  of  the  total)  fall  in  this  category.  It  becomes  evident,  that 
most  of  the  state  supreme  courts,  do  not  often  rely  on  state  consti- 
tutional  law. 
Finally,  one  last  study  to  be  mentioned  is  the  one  conducted 
by  James  Gardner,  a  fierce  opponent  of  New  Judicial  Federalism, 
as  a  part  of  an  article  that  caused  a  lot  of  theoretical  contro- 
versy.  29  He  examined  the  decisions  of  the  highest  courts  of  a 
sample  of  seven  states,  namely  New  York,  Massachusetts,  Virginia, 
Louisiana,  California,  Kansas  and  New  Hampshire.  This  selection 
was  justified  by  reasons  of  size,  age,  history  and  continuity  of 
constitutional  traditions.  The  survey  was  also  limited  chronologi- 
cally,  since  it  considered  cases  decided  during  a  single  year,  1990. 
In  total,  Gardner  claims  to  have  examined  a  total  of  more  than 
1200  cases.  His  first  observation  Is  that  state  courts  construe 
29.  see  note  19. 
43 their  state  constitution  with  remarkable  Infrequency.  30  He  then, 
by  using  as  an  example  cases  decided  in  the  New  York  courts,  dis- 
covers  a  general  unwillingness  among  state  supreme  courts  to  en- 
gage  In  state  constitutional  legal  analysiS.  31  Additionally,  obscurity 
concerning  the  basis  of  the  rulings  as  well  as  silence  on  state 
constitutional  history  and  adherence  to  lockstep  analysis  further 
contribute,  according  to  Gardner,  to  the  failed  discourse  of  state 
constitutionalism.  32  Having  arrived  at  these  conclusions,  Gardner 
reluctantly  admits  that  there  are  exceptions,  and  these  consist  of 
state  courts  that  actually  diverge  from  federal  law  and  engage 
frequently  In  true  Independent  analysis  of  their  state  constitution. 
Surprisingly  enough,  these  exceptions  concern  four.  out  of  the 
seven  states  he  uses  as  his  sample,  namely  New  Hampshire, 
Louisiana  and  New  York  and  to  a  large  extent  Callfornia.  33  Despite 
that,  one  of  Gardner's  final  conclusions  Is  that  state  courts  by  and 
large  have  shown  little  interest  in  contributing  to  the  formulation 
of  an  independent  body  of  constitutional  law.  34 
2.3.  Concluding  remarks 
It  has  to  be  admitted,  that  the  conservatism  of  most  state 
political  systems  as  well  as  legal  and  Institutional  barriers  do  not 
favour  the  widespread  development  of  state  constitutional  law. 
The  fact  that  four  out  of  five  decisions  decided  by  state  supreme 
courts  rely  on  federal  law  Is  a  testimony  to  that.  Having  said  that, 
the  movement  towards  Increased  development  and  reliance  on 
30 
*  Ibidat780. 
31  Ibidat781. 
32:  Ibidat785,793,789. 
33 
,  Ibidat  795,799,800,801. 
34.  Ibid  at  804. 
44 state  constitutions  is  still  young  and  the  supporters  of  New 
judicial  Federalism  have  reason  to  be  optimistic  for  the  future. 
Established  institutional  and  legal  barriers  might  not  fall  easily 
but  they  are  not  immutable.  Law  journals  and  other  publications 
as  well  as  the  Inclusion  of  state  constitutional  courses  in  law  cur- 
ricula  can  play  an  Important  role  In  the  promotion  of  the  ideas  of 
New  judicial  Federalism.  If  courts  continue  to  produce  more  state 
constitutional  law  and  Insist  that  lawyers  actually  use  the  state 
constitutional  rulings  in  the  cases  they  present,  as  they  are 
expected  to  do  in  the  late  1990s,  other  state  courts  might  follow. 
When  courts  In  particular  states  base  more  decisions  on  state  law, 
other  claims  based  on  state  law  could  be  put  forward.  Therefor6,  it 
could  be  the  case  that  institutional  pressures  play  a  crucial  role  in 
developing  principles  of  state  constitutional  law. 
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Efficiency  of  protection  of  fundamental  rights  In  the  European 
Community  and  the  United  States  of  America. 
3.1.  Introductory  note 
This  chapter  will  concentrate  on  the  concept  of  efficient 
protection  of  fundamental  rights  and  Individual  liberties  in  the 
two  formations  under  examination.  In  order  to  do  so,  it  will  con- 
sider  the  whole  spectrum  of  the  available  protective  mechanisms 
for  the  citizen  that  regulate  the  relevant  area,  both  at  the  national 
and  European  level  for  the  EC,  and  at  state  and  federal  level  for 
the  USA,  and  test  them  for  their  compliance  with  the  efficiency 
criteria,  as  defined  In  the  introduction  to  this  thesis.  Following 
that,  it  will  try  to  offer  an  opinion  on  why  one  efficient  measure  is 
preferred  over  another  which  was  also  deemed  to  be  efficient.  it 
should  be  remembered,  that  a  norm  or  set  of  norms  will  classify 
as  efficient  If  they  achieve  an  adequate  and  sufficient  remedy 
which  is  based  on  legal  norms  and  Is  provided  by  a  court  of  law. 
Among  the  norms  that  will  be  considered  for  their  compliance 
with  the  efficiency  criteria,  albeit  briefly  in  this  instance,  are  the 
uniformly  applied  protective  norms  for  each  formation,  namely 
the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  and  the  Bill  of  Rights  of 
46 the  American  Constitution.  The  outcome  of  this  specific  part  of  the 
analysis  will  be  Important  in  deciding  whether  the  uniformly 
applied  norms  for  each  formation  can  be  a  part  of  the  mechanism 
of  the  efficient  safeguarding  of  the  rights  of  the  individual. 
Initially  the  situation  In  Europe  will  be  looked  at.  Following  that, 
the  attention  will  be  focused  on  the  relevant  area  In  the  USA. 
3.2.  Effliciency  of  protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  the  European 
Community 
,  When  considering  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights  in 
general,  the  Initial  question  that  has  to  be  answered  Is  whether 
the  classical  fundamental  rights  have  been  subjected  to  any 
process  and  evolution.  The  basic  concern  of  fundamental  rights 
has  always  been  the  protection  of  Individuals  from  Inappropriate 
intrusion  by  state  authority  In  their  personal  autonomy. 
It  has  to  be  noted,  In  the  first  place,  that  the  term 
"fundamental  rights"  does  not  Include  social  fundamental  rights. 
According  to  Van  Boven  "fundamental  human  rights"  should  be 
distinguished  from  "other  human  rights".  '  The  former  represent 
rights  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  the  International  community, 
are  backed  by  a  real  consensus  and  are  valid  under  all  cir- 
cumstances,  Irrespective  of  time  and  place  with  no  possibility  for 
derogation.  The  latter  represent  disputed  rights,  certain  program- 
matic  social  and  economic  rights,  as  well  as  collective  rights  and 
are  not  Included  In  the  classic  catalogue  of  fundamental  rights.  It 
should  be  noted  that  the  catalogue  of  the  French  Declaration  of 
1.  T.  C.  Van  Boven,  "Distinguishing  Criteria  of  Human  Rights'  in  K.  Vasak 
(Ed.  ),  "The  International  Dimensions  of  Human  Rights"  (Greenwood  Press, 
Westport/Unesco,  Paris,  1982)  pp.  43-59. 
47 1793  included  public  welfare  as  well  as  the  duty  of  society  to 
support  those  who  needed  help,  something  that  led  to  the 
Incorporation  of  the  rights  to  work  and  social  protection  in 
numerous  constitutions.  On  the.  other  hand,  social  fundamental 
rights  have  been  mentioned  sporadically  in  western  constitutions. 
The  reason  for  that  seems  to  be  that  their  protection  has  been 
ensured  outside  the  catalogue  of  fundamental  rights,  both  at 
national  and  international  level. 
There  are  Indications,  however,  suggesting  that  the  consid- 
eratIon  of  fundamental  rights  Is  nowadays  more  strongly 
connected  to  overall  democratic  demands  than  it  used  to  be.  In  a 
discussion  of  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  the  EC,  the 
consideration  of  this  tendency  Is  necessary.  Should  only  the 
classical  fundamental  rights  be  protected  and  strengthened  or 
should  social  and  democratic  rights  enjoy  such  privileges?  There 
are  strong  arguments  for  both  positions.  This  discussion,  though, 
will  be  conducted  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  former.  The  rea- 
son  for  that  has  to  do  with  both  the  limited  capability  of  social  and 
democratic  rights  to  be  formulated  In  a  clear  and  unequivocal 
manner,  and  their  limited  susceptibility  to  direct  application  and 
enforcement  by  the  courts. 
The  limiting  of  the  state  authority  by  means  of  fundamental 
rights  Is  one  of  the  most  important  achievements  of  the  modern 
constitutional  state.  The  differences  in  traditions  and  the  Influence 
of  history  have  contributed  to  the  variations  of  protection  of  fun- 
damental  rights  from  state  to  state.  Both  at  national  and  interna- 
tIonal  level,  the  efflciency  of  the  protection  of  human  rights  Is  a 
major  concern.  One  of  the  areas  where  these  aspects  have  been 
discussed  Is  EC  law. 
48 Despite  the  fact  that  the  Treaties  of  the  European 
Community  contain  individual  provisions  and  make  reference  to 
the  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  individual,  no  collective  protec- 
tion  of  all  fundamental  rights  exists.  That,  of  course,  does  not 
mean  that  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  EC  citizens  remain  unpro- 
tected.  Protection  Is  provided  by  the  legal  systems  of  the  Member 
States  as  well  as  in  International  law,  In  particular  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights.  Additional  protection  Is  afforded  by 
means  of  the  already  existing  written  Community  law  and  the  de- 
cisions  of  the  Court  of  justice.  The  question,  though,  that  has  to  be 
answered  is  whether  the  above  mentioned  remedies  can  safe- 
guard  the  rights  of  the  individual  within  the  EC,  In  the  absence  of 
a  catalogue  of  fundamental  rights.  In  other  words,  is  the 
protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  EC  citizen  efficient?  In 
order  to  attempt  to  provide  a  solution  to  the  dilemma  It  is 
suggested  that  an  analysis  of  each  of  the  available  protective 
mechanisms  mentioned  Is  conducted.  Initially,  the  remedies  avail- 
able  to  the  Community  citizen  at  the  domestic  level  will  be  consid- 
ered.  It  is  suggested  that  the  analysis  should  consider  both 
remedies  available  in  the  national  law  of  the  Member  States,  as 
well  as  those  available  In  the  field  of  Community  law.  Within  this 
context,  the  Issue  of  the  judicial  protection  against  action  by  the 
Community  itself  will  be  dealt  with  separately,  since  Its  particular 
characteristics  seem  to  differentiate  It  from  the  other  forms  of 
protection.  It  will  then  be  followed  by  an  analysis  of  the  available 
protective  measures  as  regards  fundamental  rights  at  the 
European  level,  with  specific  mention  of  the  European  Convention 
on  Human  Rights. 
49 3.2.1.  Efficiency  of  protection  of  fundamental  rights  of  the 
European  citizen  at  the  national  level 
3.2.1.1.  The  domestic  law  of  the  Member  States 
One  Initial  remark  that  has  to  be  made,  is  that  the  consid- 
eration  of  fundamental  rights  In  all  Member  States  has  Inevitably 
been  influenced  by  the  historical  development  of  fundamental 
rights  as  well  as  by  an  understanding  of  them  as  rights  protecting 
the  Individual  against  undue  Infringements  by  the  state.  In  the 
United  Kingdom  for  instance,  the  experience  of  centuries  of  consti- 
tutional  struggles  has  a  continuing  effect  in  the  field  of  fundamen- 
tal  rights.  In  France,  the  contemporary  guarantee  of  fundamental 
rights  In  the  national  Constitution  Is  closely  linked  with  the  French 
Revolution,  by  references  to  the  Constitution  of  1946  and  the 
Declaration  of  Human  and  Civil  Rights  of  1789.  The  provisions  In 
the  constitutions  of  other  European  states,  such  as  the  Belgian 
Constitution  also,  date  back  to  the  first  half  of  the  last  century. 
Constitutional  re-formulations  of  fundamental  rights,  as  In 
Germany,  Italy  and  Luxembourg,  contain  as  a  rule,  no  fundamen- 
tal  changes  compared  with  the  past.  It  could  be  said,  overall,  that 
In  terms  of  constitutional  history  the  protection  of  fundamental 
rights  within  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Community 
demonstrates  similar  concepts  and  basic  structures. 
In  the  Member  States,  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights 
is  judicially  secured  to  different  degrees.  All  European  states  ac- 
cept  the  principle  of  Judicial  control  as  regards  the  legality  of  ex- 
ecutive  action.  Some  states  are  In  favour  of  the  Position  that  ad- 
ministrative  acts  can  only  be  challenged  in  court  in  the  cases  pro- 
50 vided  for  by  law.  This  is  known  as  the  principle  of  enumeration. 
Other  states  provide  for  judicial  review  of  all  executive  actions  by 
means  of  a  general  provision.  The  judicial  control  of  the  executive, 
taken  with  the  requirement  of  legality  in  administrative  action, 
seems  to  be  In  principle  undisputed  and  a  common  element  in  the 
legal  thinking  In  the  Member  States.  This  Is  not  the  case,  however, 
when  it  comes  to  control  over  the  legislature  In  relation  to  respect 
for  fundamental  rights.  The  theoretically  absolute  power  to  re- 
view  legislation  of  the  Bundesverfassungsgericht  In  Germany  dif- 
fers  from  the  position  in  other  states,  where  the  courts  are  bound 
constantly  by  the  law  and  have  no  right  to  contradict  Its  constitu- 
tionality.  This  is  the  position  under  UK  constitutional  law  as  well 
as  in  the  Benelux  countries  and  France.  In  Italy,  contrary  to  the 
above,  the  Corte  Costituzionale  is  a  court  of  final  Instance  that  also 
controls  in  an  effective  manner  what  the  Parliament  does. 
There  are  more  differences  in  the  way  that  fundamental 
rights  are  protected  In  the  Member  States.  The  United  Kingdom 
does  not  possess  a  list  of  fundamental  rights  at  all.  Protection  of 
particular  rights  must  be  based  on  various  Instruments,  statutes 
and  recognised  principles  of  law.  In  France  consideration  must  be 
given,  apart  from  basic  constitutional  provisions,  to  the 
Declaration  of  Fundamental  Human  and  Civil  Rights,  the  funda- 
mental  laws  and  the  general  principles  of  law,  evolved  mainly  by 
the  Conseil  d'Etat.  The  rest  of  the  Member  States  have  also  a  com- 
prehensive  list  of  fundamental  rights  in  their  constitutions.  A 
complete  examination  of  the  separate  catalogues  of  fundamental 
rights  of  all  the  Member  States  would  certainly  be  more  Indicative 
of  the  different  situations,  but  this  is  a  huge  task  and  Is  outwith 
the  limitations  of  this  study.  In  general,  though,  it  can  be  said  that 
51 certain  rights  such  as  freedom  from  arbitrary  arrest,  freedom  of 
expression,  freedom  of  communication  are,  as  a  rule,  guaranteed. 
When  the  rights  of  the  Individual  are  likely  to  conflict  with  the 
interests  of  the  community,  the  discretion  to  the  legislature  to 
elaborate,  Is  greater.  That  can  be  achieved  either  under  an  express 
provision  In  the  catalogue  of  fundamental  rights  or  under  a 
general  power  of  the  legislature  to  draw  the  line  In  a  manner 
exempt  from  judicial  control  between  the  Individual  and  the 
Interests  of  the  community.  This  is  the  case,  for  Instance,  for  the 
protection  of  property,  where  no  legal  system  can  dispense  with 
some  provision  for  expropriation,  and  the  freedom  of  trade  and 
occupation,  which  can  not  have  the  same  general  meaning  for 
every  occupation,  and  which  is  closely  linked  to  the  economy  of 
the  relevant  state. 
Can  it  then  be  said  that  the  fundamental  rights  of  the 
citizens  of  the  Member  States  of  the  EC  are  efficiently  protected  at 
the  domestic  level?  It  Is  safe  to  suggest  that  this  is  so.  The  criteria 
of  efflclency  set  earlier  are,  in  this  occasion,  complied  with.  All  the 
Member  States,  possess  mechanisms,  usually  in  the  form  of  lists  of 
the  rights  guaranteed,  which  ensure  that  adequate  and  suffIcient 
remedies  are  provided  for  their  respective  citizens  by  a  court  of 
law.  The  fact  that  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights  has  been 
secured  in  different  degrees  In  the  Member  States  does  not 
detract  from  the  fact  that  these  rights  are,  at  the  domestic  level  of 
the  Member  States,  efflciently  protected. 
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Justice 
. As.  is  known,  there  Is  no  catalogue  of  fundamental  rights  in 
the  treaties  relating  to  the  EC.  This,  however,  does  not  mean  that 
In  the  framework  of  Community  law  the  rights  of  the  individual 
remain  unprotected.  Various  EC  provisions  exist  which  cover 
nearly  every  area  of  economic  life.  Thus,  the  prohibition  of 
discrimination  between  Community  citizens  because  of  their  na- 
tionality  Is  part  of  the  basic  principles  of  the  Treaties,  as  pre- 
sented  in  Articles  7,40,45  and  95  of  the  EC  Treaty.  The  provi- 
sions  on  competition  (Articles  85  et  seq.  ),  deal  with  prohibitions  of 
discrimination,  having,  thus,  an  Impact  on  the  principle  of  equal- 
ity.  The  provisions  of  Article  48  et  seq.  and  52  et  seq.  and  59  et 
seq.  on  the  freedom  of  workers,  establishment  and  services  re- 
spectively,  deal  with  the  freedom  to  practise  a  trade  or  occupa- 
tion.  Article  119  advocates  equal  pay  for  men  and  women  dealing, 
thus,  with  an  extremely  important  problem  touching  upon 
fundamental  rights  and  the  relations  between  individuals.  In 
addition,  Article  220  providing  for  negotiations  to  secure  for 
Community  citizens  equality  of  treatment  in  other  areas  and 
Article  222,  whereby  the  Treaty  shall  not  prejudice  the  rules  In 
Member  States  governing  the  system  of  property  ownership, 
should  also  be  considered. 
A  discussion  of  the  issue  of  the  protection  of  fundamental 
rights  in  EC  law,  must  inevitably  consider  the  relevant  jurispru- 
dence  of  the  Court  of  justice.  The  way  the  Court  has  handled  the 
53 problem  has  been  the  object  of  many  studIeS2  and  the  background 
is  well  known.  Despite  the  fact  that  proposals  for  insertion  of  a 
provision  guaranteeing  fundamental  rights  were  turned  down 
when  the  EC  Treaties  were  drafted,  3  the  Court  has  incorporated 
certain  aspects  of  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights  as  general 
principles  of  EC  law.  The  reason  for  that  was  the  attitude  of  the 
Constitutional  Courts  of  Italy  and  Germany,  which  suggested  that 
they  might  at  a  certain  point  put  their  national  human  rights  leg- 
islation  above  EC  provisions.  4  In  the  Stauder  case  the  Court 
decided  that  "...  the  provision  at  issue  contains  nothing  capable  of 
prejudicing  the  fundamental  human  rights  enshrined  in  the 
general  principles  of  Community  law  and  protected  by  the  Court". 
In  the  Second  Nold  case5  the  Court  went  as  far  as  declaring  that: 
"In  safeguarding  these  rights,  the  Court  is  bound  to  draw  inspira- 
tion  from  constitutional  traditions  common  to  the  Member  states, 
and  it  cannot  therefore  uphold  measures  which  are  Incompatible 
with  fundamental  rights  recognised  and  protected  by  the  consti- 
tutions  of  those  states.  Similarly,  International  treaties  for  the 
2.  N.  Foster,  'The  European  Court  of  Justice  and  the  European  Convention  for 
the  Protection  of  Human  Rights'  HRIJ  (1987)  245;  J.  Weiler,  "Eurocracy  and 
Distrust:  Some  Questions  Concerning  the  European  Court  of  Justice  in  the 
Legal  order  of  the  European  Communities"  Washington  Law  Review  (1986) 
1103-42;  M.  Mendelson,  'The  European  Court  of  justice  and  Human  Rights' 
YEL(1981)121. 
3L  Betten,  'The  Right  to  Strike  in  Community  Law"  (Amsterdam,  Elsevier 
Science  Publishing  1985). 
4.  Frontini  case  (No.  183)  Corte  Costituzionale  27  Dec  1973  (1974)  2  CMLR  386; 
German  Handelgesellschaft  case  Bundesverfassungsgericht  29  May  1974 
(1974)  2  CMIR  551.  This  danger  appeared  not  to  apply  to  Germany  as  a  result 
of  the  Solange  11  decision  of  22  Oct  1986  Re  WiInsche  HandelgeselIschaft 
(1987)  3  CMIR  225,  where  the  Constitutional  Court  declared  that  as  long  as 
the  protection  of  human  rights  in  Community  law  was  considered  adequate 
by  German  standards,  it  would  not  review  secondary  Community  legislation 
for  compatibility  with  German  human  rights  provisions.  Recently, 
however,  the  Constitutional  Court  seemed  to  return  to  its  previous  attitude 
when  in  its  Brunner  decision  [Brunner  v  E.  U.  Treaty  (1994)  1  CMLR  57] 
, 
it 
said  that  at  a  certain  point  it  would  put  the  German  human  rights 
legislation  above  the  EC  provisions. 
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.  Case  4/73  Nold  V  Commission  (1974)  ECR  491. 
54 protection  of  human  rights  on  which  the  Member  states  have  col- 
laborated  or  of  which  they  are  signatories,  can  supply  guidance 
which  should  be  followed  within  the  framework  of  Community 
law.  116 
Another  important  case  which  came  before  the  Court  was 
the  Hauer  case7.  There  the  Court  dealt  with  the  right  to  property. 
It  stated  that  such  a  right  is  protected  in  the  Community  legal  or- 
der.  The  Court  also  referred  to  Article  1  of  the  First  Protocol  to  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  The  Court  has  also  re- 
ferred  in  other  cases  regarding  the  right  to  an  effective  remedy,  8 
to  the  European  Convention  and  Constitutional  traditions  common 
to  the  Member  States. 
In  two  later  cases  the  Court  reiterated  its  intention  to  ensure 
the  protection  of  fundamental  rights  and  draw  its  inspiration  both 
from  constitutional  traditions  common  to  the  Member  States,  as 
well  as  from  international  Instruments  concerning  human  rights 
on  which  the  Member  States  have  collaborated  or  of  which  they 
are  signatories.  It  continued: 
"The  fundamental  rights  recognized  by  the  Court  are  not  absolute, 
however,  but  must  be  considered  In  relation  to  their  social  func- 
tion.  Consequently,  restrictions  may  be  imposed  on  the  exercise  of 
these  rights,  In  particular  in  the  context  of  a  common  organization 
of  a  market,  provided  that  those  restrictions  in  fact  correspond  to 
objectives  of  general  interest  pursued  by  the  Community  and  do 
not  constitute,  with  regard  to  the  aim  pursued,  a  disproportionate 
6.  Case  4/73  (1974)  ECR  491  at  507. 
T.  Case  44/79,  Hauer  v  Land  Rheinland-Pfalz  (1979)  ECR  3727. 
8.  Case  222/84,  Johnston  v  Chief  Constable  of  the  Royal  Constabulary  (1986) 
ECR  165  1. 
55 and  intolerable  interference,  impairing  the  very  substance  of 
those  rights.  "9 
The  Court  then  Imposed  an  obligation  on  the  Member  States 
a  to  interpret  the  EC  regulation  in  such  a  way  as  to  ensure  that  the 
protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  the  Community  legal  order  is 
ensured.  According  to  the  Court  there  is  a  large  margin  of  appre- 
ciation  left  by  the  regulation  forilts  appropriate  application  by  the 
national  authorities. 
It  should  be  noted  that  this  formulation  of  the  Court  of 
justice  has  sometimes  caused  adverse  reactions  by  the  courts  of 
the  Member  States.  The  Irish  Supreme  Court,  for  Instance, 
declared  in  its  decision  in  the  Grogan  10  case  that  it  could  not  put 
the  freedom  to  provide/receive  services  provided  for  by  Article 
59,  as  interpreted  by  the  Court  of  justice,  above  the  right  to  life  as 
protected  in  the  national  legal  order. 
One  remark  that  has  to  be  made,  is  that  the  Court  does  not 
consider  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  to  be  the  ab- 
solute  authority  on  fundamental  rights,  as  it  was  made  clear  In  the 
Hauer  case.  There  the  Court  mentioned  Article  1  of  the  First 
protocol  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  which  pro- 
tects  the  right  to  property  but  It  seemed  to  be  more  Interested  In 
the  rules  and  practices  in  the  Member  States.  The  Court  also  re- 
ferred  to  Its  decision  In  the  Nold  case,  where  the  fact  that  the 
freedom  to  pursue  trade  or  professional  activities  Is  a  fundamen- 
tal  right  protected  in  the  Community  legal  order  was  confirmed. 
The  importance  lies  In  that  this  right  Is  not  Included  in  the 
9.  Case  5/88,  Hubert  Wachauf  v  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  (1989)  ECR 
2609.  Also  Case  265/87,  Hermann  SchrAder  HS  Kraftfutter  GmbH  and  Co.  KG  v 
Hauptzollamt  Gronau  (1989)  ECR  2237. 
10.  SPUC  v  Grogan  (1990)  1  CMIR. 
56 European  Convention.  This  demonstrates  that  the  protection  of 
fundamental  rights  in  the  Community  is  capable  of  going  further 
than  that  afforded  by  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights. 
When  it  comes  to  the  status  of  the  European  Convention  in 
the  Community  legal  order,  it  can  be  considered  as  supporting  the 
general  principles  of  law  which  can  already  be  found  to  exist  in 
the  constitutional  traditions  of  the  Member  States.  The  develop- 
ment  of  fundamental  rights  within  the  Community  has  not  been 
dependent  on  the  European  Convention.  Parties  to  an  action  can- 
not  be  sure  how  a  claim  based  on  a  provision  of  the  Convention 
will  be  handled  by  the  Court.  A  clearer  position  as  regards  the 
status  of  the  European  Convention  in  the  EC  would  promote  legal 
certainty  to  the  benefit  of  all  the  Interested  parties.  The  question 
that  has  to  be  asked  is,  whether  this  Is  going  to  be  achieved 
through  the  decisions  of  the  Court  of  justice  or  through  other 
means. 
The  Court  of  Justice  itself  does  not  seem  to  wish  to  clarify 
the  situation.  In  its  Opinion  of  March  28,1996,11  at  the  request  of 
the  Council  of  the  European  Union  for  an  opinion  on  the  accession 
of  the  EC  to  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights,  the  Court 
declared  that  the  Community  has  no  competence  to  accede  to  the 
European  Convention,  as  Community  law  now  stands.  This  opinion 
of  the  Court  means  that  the  status  of  the  European  Convention 
remains  unchanged  within  the  EC  legal  order.  At  the  same  time 
the  questions  regarding  its  usefulness  are  left  unanswered. 
Are  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  EC  citizen,  then,  efficiently 
protected  at  the  Community  level?  In  the  absence  of  an  express 
catalogue  of  fundamental  rights  in  relation  to  EC,  it  would  seem 
".  Opinion  2/94  (1996)  ECR  I-1. 
57 that  one  of  the  conditions  of  efficiency,  as  defined  earlier,  that  of 
the  existence  of  legal  norms  on  which  a  sufflicient  and  adequate 
remedy  is  based,  is  not  met.  It  is  suggested,  however,  that  the  use 
by  the  Court  of  justice  of  the  general  legal  principles  of  the 
Member  States  and  of  International  treaties,  remedies  this 
problem.  These  norms  are  more  than  able  to  regulate  issues  of 
fundamental  rights.  Therefore,  taking  into  consideration  that 
within  the  EC  context  a  court-the  Court  of  Justice-can  provide, 
adequate  and  sufficient  remedies  based  on  legal  norms-the 
general  legal  principles  of  the  Member  States  and  of  international 
treaties-  It  can  be  assumed  that  the  EC  citizens  are  efficiently 
protected  at  the  Community  level. 
3.2.1.3.  Protection  of  fundamental  rights  against  action  by  the 
European  Community 
One  remark  that  has  to  be  made,  in  the  first  place,  Is  that  an 
infringement  of  fundamental  rights  by  the  EC  or  its  agents  is 
more  a  theoretical  than  an  actual  problem.  The  vast  majority  of 
fundamental  rights  lie  outside  the  fields  in  which  the  EC  operates, 
because  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  EC  are  limited  to  specific  sub- 
jects.  Most  intrusions  of  fundamental  rights  are  more  likely  to  be 
made  by  the  states  than  by  the  EC.  However,  the  powers  of  the  EC 
are  constantly  Increasing  and  they  tend  to  cover  fields  where  fun- 
damental  rights  come  into  play.  There  have  been  occasions,  in 
practice,  where  citizens  have  claimed  before  the  European 
Convention  authorities  that  their  fundamental  rights  have  been 
infringed  by  the  EC.  In  1977  the  French  Union  CFDT  argued  that 
its  absence  from  the  Consultative  Committee  of  Article  18  of  the 
58 ECSC  Treaty  was  an  infringement  of  Article  11  of  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights.  12  In  the  cases  of  DUfayB  and  C.  M.  & 
Co  14  a  breach  of  the  right  to  a  fair  process,  incorporated  In  Article 
6  of  the  European  Convention,  was  alleged.  Nevertheless,  it  has 
been  a  common  practice  that  whereas  scrutiny  as  regards 
measures  for  human  rights  compliance  can  take  place  either  at 
national  level  or  under  the  European  Convention  machinery,  ac- 
tion  taken  by  EC  organs  can  only  be  reviewed  by  the  European 
Court  of  justice.  The  European  Commission  of  Human  rights  has 
rejected  applications  against  the  Community  stating  that  the 
Community  is  not  a  party  to  the  Convention.  15  Claims  directed 
against  the  Member  States  jointly  and  the  Individual  Member 
States  have  also  been  dismissed. 
The  only  case  that  almost  succeeded  before  the  European 
Commission  of  Human  rights,  was  actually  the  one  by  Ms  Dufay 
mentioned  earlier.  16  This  case  was  declared  inadmissible  for  non- 
exhaustion  of  domestic  remedies. 
Frowein  Is  not  very  optimistic  as  regards  the  possibility  of 
the  Community  being  brought  before  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights: 
"One  may  conclude  that  the  European  Community  is,  at  present, 
not  subject  to  the  control  of  the  supervisory  organs  set  up  by  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  The  responsibility  of  Indi- 
vidual  Member  States  under  the  Convention  for  acts  of  the 
12 
,  Conf6d6ration  Fran4;  aise  D6mocratique  du  Travail  (CFDT)  contre 
Communautds  Europ6ennes,  nr.  8030/77,  DR  13,  p.  23  1. 
13 
*  Dufay  contre  Communautds  Europ6ennes,  Application  No.  13539/88. 
14  C.  M.  &  Co.  v  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Application  No.  13258/87, 
cýuncij  of  Europe  Press  Communiqu6  C  (90)  19,  of  13  Feb.  1990. 
15  Re  the  European  School  in  Brussels:  Dv  Belgium  and  the  European 
Cýmmunifies  (1986)  2  CMIR  57. 
16.  see  note  13. 
59 European  Community  could  be  engaged  only  in  rather  exceptional 
cases.  It  does  not  seem  likely  that  this  gap  could  be  bridged  by 
the  jurisprudence  of  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights.,,  17 
Consequently,  it  is  the  Court  of  justice  which  is  exclusively 
responsible  for  the  safeguarding  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  the 
Individual  from  breaches  by  the  EC.  The  Court  has  examined  the 
action  of  the  Community  organs  with  the  rights  incorporated  in 
the  European  Convention,  staff  regulations  and  fundamental  rights 
existing  In  EC  law.  Of  particular  Importance  here  Is  the  joint 
Declaration  of  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the 
Commission  of  April  5,1977,  that  stresses  the  Importance  which 
these  Institutions  attach  to  fundamental  rights  as  found  in  the 
constitutions  of  the  Member  States  and  the  European  Convention 
on  Human  Rights.  That  does  not  mean  however,  that  the  Court  of 
justice  does  not  offer  any  protection  at  all  against  the  action  of 
Community  institutions.  In  a  1987  judgement'8  the  Court  went 
beyond  the  Constitutions  of  the  Member  States  and  the  European 
Convention  and  incorporated  the  right  for  a  company  not  to  in- 
criminate  Itself  in  questioning  by  the  Commission,  even  though 
this  right  existed  neither  in  the  constitutional  orders  of  the 
Member  States  nor  In  any  International  Instrument. 
The  European  Convention  has  been  mentioned  by  the  Court 
of  justice  as  well  in  cases  dealing  with  questions  of  religious 
discrimination,  (Article  9),  19  due  processes  (Article  6),  20  and 
17 
*  J.  A.  Frowein,  S.  Schulhofer,  and  S.  Shapiro  ',  The  Protection  of 
Fundamental  Human  Rights  as  a  Vehicle  of  Integration"  in  M.  Cappelletti, 
M.  Seccombe  and  J.  Weiler  (eds.  )  "Integration  Through  Law.  Europe  and  the 
American  Federal  Experience",  (Berlin,  Walter  de  Gruyter,  1986)  Volume  1. 
18 
*  Case  374/87,  Orkem  v  Commission  (1989)  ECR  3283. 
19 
,  Case  130/75,  Prais  v  Council  (1976)  ECR  1185. 
20  Case  209-215  and  218/78,  Landewyck  et  al  (1980)  ECR  3125;  also  cases  100- 
163180,  Musique  Diffusion  Franýaise  v  Commission  (1983)  ECR  1825. 
60 Invasion  of  privacy  under  Article  8.21  Attention  should  be  paid  to 
two  specific  cases.  In  the  Fedetab  case22  the  EC  Commission  was 
accused  of  infringing  Article  6(1)  of  the  European  Convention 
which  protects  the  right  to  a  tribunal  for  the  determination  of 
one's  civil  rights  and  obligations.  The  Court  rejected  the  argument 
arguing  that  the  Commission  was  not  a  tribunal.  However,  closer 
examination  of  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of  Human  rights  would 
have  demonstrated  that  if  the  disputed  right  is  a  civil  right,  then 
the  Member  State  is  obliged  to  ensure  that  a  tribunal  is  available. 
Whether  the  body  already  responsible  is  a  tribunal  or  not,  is 
irrelevant.  The  other  case  is  Hoechst  AG  v  Commission  23  where 
the  plaintiff  company  argued  that  the  Commission,  by  carrying  out 
a  search  of  its  premises,  invaded  its  privacy  and  accordingly 
breached  Article  8  of  the  European  Convention.  The  Court  of 
justice  pointed  to  the  divergences  in  the  Member  States 
concerning  protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  connection  with 
commercial  premises,  and  denied  the  protection  of  Article  8  of  the 
European  Convention  to  Hoechst  AG.  This  decision  could  be  open  to 
criticism,  as  in  an  earlier  case24  the  European  Court  of  Human 
Rights,  albeit  without  discussing  whether  strictly  commercial 
premises  were  covered  by  Article  8,  considered  that  the  case  did 
fall  within  Article  8. 
In  order  then  for  the  situation  to  be  clarified,  closer  co-op- 
eration  between  the  two  Courts  is  required.  However,  the  differ- 
ences  in  approach  are  obvious.  This  is  natural,  since  the  one  Court 
is  charged  with  furthering  the  objective  of  the  Community  when 
21  Case  136/79,  National  Panasonic  (1980)  ECR  2033. 
22:  Cases  209-215  and  218/78,  Fedetab  (1980)  ECR  3  125. 
23 
'  Cases  46/87  and  227/88  Hoechst  AG  v  Commission  (1989)  ECR  2859. 
24  chappell  v  United  Kingdom,  judgement  of  March  3  0,1989,  Series  A,  Vol. 
Iii 
61 the  other  is  solely  concerned  with  the  protection  of  fundamental 
rights.  The  relationship  of  the  two  Courts  could  suffer  more 
drawbacks,  after  the  negative  opinion  that  the  Court  delivered,  at 
the  request  of  the  Council  of  the  European  Union,  in  regard  to  the 
accession  of  the  EC  to  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights 
mentioned  earlier.  25  In  the  text  of  the  opinion,  the  observation  of 
the  Belgian  Government  about  11  ...  the  lack  of  any  personal  and 
functional  link  between  the  Court  of  justice  and  the  organs  of  the 
Convention,  "  26  accurately  reflects  the  situation  as  is  at  present 
When  it  comes  to  the  question  of  whether  the  EC  citizen  is 
efficiently  protected  from  possible  encroachments  by  the 
Community  organs,  the  answer  should  be  no  different  than  the 
one  suggested  earlier  in  the  case  of  general  protection  at  the  EC 
level.  The  Court  of  Justice  can  provide  sufficient  and  adequate 
remedies  to  the  EC  citizens,  in  case  of  breaches  of  their 
fundamental  rights  by  the  Community  organs,  by  utilising,  in  the 
absence  of  express  provisions  In  the  Treaties  of  the  Community, 
the  general  principles  of  the  Member  States  and  international 
treaties. 
3.2.2.  Efficiency  of  protection  of  fundamental  rights  of  the 
European  citizen  at  the  non-national  level 
For  our  purposes,  It  is  the  European  Convention  for  the 
Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms  that  is  of 
particular  significance.  It  Is  indeed  considered  to  be  the  major 
contributor  to  human  rights,  not  only  regionally  but  at  a  global 
25.  See  note  11. 
26.  Ibid 
62 level.  The  Convention  was  first  signed  in  1950  and  is  now  In  force 
to  some  extent  or  another  in  all  the  members  of  the  European 
Community. 
More  than  450  million  persons  in  Europe,  among  them  all  of 
the  citizens  of  the  Member  States  of  the  EC,  may  bring  before  the 
European  Commission  of  Human  Rights  allegations  that  their  rights 
have  been  violated.  Such  applications  will  be  considered  by  the 
Commission  and  well-founded  ones  will  be  passed  to  the  Court  of 
Human  Rights  or  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of 
Europe  for  a  decision  on  violation. 
The  guarantees  of  the  European  Convention  can  be  regarded 
as  a  system  complete  In  Itself  and  comprehending  all  the  Impor- 
tant  rights  of  the  individual  organised  convincingly  and  coher- 
ently.  It  incorporates  predominantly  the  classical  rights  against 
particularly  grave  intrusions  by  state  authority.  The  list  begins 
with  the  right  to  life  in  Article  2,  followed  by  the  prohibition  on 
torture,  slavery  and  forced  labour,  and  the  right  to  freedom  from 
unjustified  arrest  and  imprisonment.  These  mainly  deal  with  the 
protection  from  arbitrary  measures  of  a  police  state.  Article  6 
guarantees  rights  concerning  legal  proceedings  and  Article  7  de- 
clares  that  no  punishment  will  be  imposed  if  It  is  not  provided  for 
by  law.  Article  8  protects  the  right  to  respect  for  the  privacy  of 
the  individual,  which  includes  postal  secrecy  (Article  9),  the  right 
to  free  expression  of  opinion  (Article  10),  freedom  of  assembly 
and  association  (Article  11)  and  the  right  to  marry  and  create  a 
family  (Article  12).  Prohibitions  on  discrimination  are  contained  in 
Article  14.  The  First  Additional  Protocol  has  complemented  the 
rights  of  the  Convention,  by  adding  the  protection  of  property,  the 
right  to  education  and  the  guarantee  of  free  and  secret  elections. 
63 The  Fourth  Additional  Protocol  guarantees,  inter  alia  ,  the  freedom 
of  establishment  and  the  freedom  of  movement.  Most  guarantees 
of  fundamental  rights  in  the  Convention  and  the  additional 
Protocols  are  accompanied  by  possible  derogations.  In  this  regard 
the  respective  paragraph  2  of  Articles  8  to  10  of  the  Convention 
are  of  special  Importance. 
The  proposition  then,  that  state  authority  is  in  principle 
subject  to  no  constraint  under  international  law  in  relation  to 
domestic  acts  and  its  exercise  of  power  In  relation  to  Its  own 
nationals  is  now  a  thing  of  the  past.  To  that  effect  the  contribution 
of  the  European  Convention  has  been  paramount. 
To  conclude,  the  question  must  be  asked  whether  the 
European  Convention  can  classify  as  an  efficient  set  of  norms  for 
the  protection  of  the  EC  citizens.  It  is  suggested  that  the  answer 
should  be  positive.  All  the  efficiency  criteria  are  met  since  a 
court-the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights-exists,  which  can 
provide  adequate  and  sufficient  remedies,  based  on  legal  norms- 
the  provisions  of  the  European  Convention. 
3.3.  Efficiency  of  protection  of  fundamental  rights  In  the  United 
States  of  Amerlca 
Following  the  attempt  to  tackle  the  question  of  efficient 
protection  of  fundamental  rights  and  liberties  for  the  European 
citizen,  It  is  proposed  that  the  same  course  of  analysis  Is  main- 
tained  as  regards  individuals  In  the  United  States.  American  citi- 
zens  enjoy  double  protection  as  far  as  their  fundamental  rights 
and  liberties  are  concerned.  This  is  afforded  from  the  bills  of 
rights  that  are  included  in  their  separate  state  constitutions  as 
64 well  as  the  Bill  of  Rights  which  is  part  of  the  federal  Constitution. 
What  follows  is  an  attempt  to  demonstrate  the  means  through 
which  this  protection  materiallses.  Initially  the  case  of  the  state 
constitutions  will  be  dealt  with.  For  the  sake  of  the  discussion, 
specific  attention  will  be  paid  to  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  a  specific 
state,  Texas,  as  an  example  of  a  state  bill  of  rights.  The  choice  of 
the  specific  state  was  random.  It  simply  met  the  criterion  of  not 
being  one  of  the  three  states  analysed  later  in  this  thesis,  namely 
Florida,  Maryland  and  New  York.  Then  this  discussion  will  proceed 
with  reference  to  the  protection  of  Individual  rights  and  liberties 
provided  for  by  the  Federal  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
3.3.1.  Efficiency  of  protection  of  fundamental  rights  of  the 
American  citizen  at  state  level 
Protection  of  individual  rights  by  a  formal  constitution  starts 
with  the  state  constitutions,  which  predate  the  Federal 
Constitution.  Between  1776  and  1784  each  of  the  original  thirteen 
states  adopted  its  own  constitution,  which  incorporated  the  prin- 
ciple  that  individual  liberties  were  to  be  protected  against  gov- 
ernment  action.  Formal  bills  of  rights  were  part  of  many  of  the 
colonial  charters  and  revolutionary  declarations  and  constitu- 
tions.  27  During  the  months  preceding  independence,  uniformity  of 
state  constitutions  was  debated  but  rejected  in  order  for  the  states 
themselves  to  draw  up  constitutions  appropriate  to  their  particu- 
lar  needs.  The  realistic  answer  was  diversity. 
Historically  speaking,  state  constitutions  are  extremely  sig- 
nificant.  They  were  used  as  models  for  the  federal  Constitution. 
27.  J.  B.  Schwartz,  'The  Bill  of  Rights;  A  Documentary  History"  49-379  (1971). 
65 strangely  enough,  the  states  formed  after  the  drafting  of  the  fed- 
eral  Constitution  did  not  model  their  constitutions  on  the  federal 
document.  They  looked  to  their  individual  framework  of  govern- 
ment  or  to  the  constitutions  of  their  sister  states.  Thus,  the 
Wisconsin  Constitution,  which  is  Wisconsin's  first  and  only  consti- 
tution,  was  patterned  after  the  New  York  Constitution,  because  the 
Wisconsin  Constitution  was  adopted  by  a  convention  in  which  New 
Yorkers  were  prominent.  The  present  Texas  Constitution  dates 
back  to  1876  and  is  the  eighth  constitution  of  the  state.  The  1876 
Texas  constitution  was  based  on  the  1845  constitution  and  the 
constitutions  of  other  states,  particularly  Pennsylvania  and 
Louisiana. 
I  State  constitutions  and  consequently  state  bills  of  rights  are 
both  similar  to  and  different  from  the  federal  Constitution. 
Actually,  while  there  are  differences  among  the  states,  state  bills 
of  rights  on  the  whole  are  more  similar  to  each  other  than  to  the 
federal  Bill  of  Rights.  In  order  to  evaluate  the  protection  afforded 
as  regards  individual  rights  it  is  proposed  examine  the  provisions 
of  a  state  bill  of  rights,  that  of  Texas.  It  is  reminded,  that  the 
reason  why  the  specific  state  wa&  chosen  for  consideration  is 
simply  to  provide  information  on  a  state  bill  of  rights,  other  than 
the  ones  of  Florida,  Maryland  and  New  York,  which  are  analysed 
later  In  this  thesis. 
The  Texas  Bill  of  Rights  appears  at  the  beginning  of  the 
constitution  as  article  I  and  Its  importance  in  the  Texas  constitu- 
tional  scheme  is  borne  out  by  several  provisions,  including  article 
XVII,  adopted  In  1972.  That  article  called  for  a  constitutional  con- 
vention  In  1974,28  expressly  providing  at  the  same  time  that  11  [t)  he 
28.  TEX.  CONST.  art.  XVII,  para.  2(c). 
66 Bill  of  Rights  of  the  present  Texas  Constitution  shall  be  retained  in 
fUll.  1129 
Unlike  the  federal  Bill  of  Rights,  its  Texas  counterpart  con- 
sists  of  thirty-three  sections,  30  which  may  be  divided  into  three 
general  categories.  Some  provisions  are  identical  to  the  federal 
ones  or  very  nearly  S0.31  Others  parallel  federal  amendments,  but 
use  different  language.  32  Others,  fInally,  have  no  parallel  at  all.  33 
Additionally,  provisions  in  other  parts  of  the  Texas  Constitution 
seem  to  be  concerned  with  individual  rights  and  liberties.  34 
Whether  they  should  be  considered  the-  equivalent  of  provisions 
of  bill  of  rights  Is  debatable. 
The  Important  Issue,  though,  Is  how  closely  the  state  courts 
should  follow  federal  precedents  in  applying  their  states,  provi- 
sions.  Glancing  through  the  Texas  Bill  of  Rights,  it  Is  easy  to  see  the 
complications.  Article  I,  section  1,  which  has  no  actual  federal 
parallel,  provides  that  "Texas  Is  a  free  and  independent  State, 
subject  only  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  the 
maintenance  of  our  free  institutions  and  the  perpetuity  of  he 
Union  depend  upon  the  preservation  of  the  rights  of  local  self- 
government,  unimpaired  to  all  the  States.  "  It  is  Important  to  eval- 
uate  the  significance  of  this  section.  Is  it  simply  rhetoric  or  Is  it  an 
argument  for  taking  the  Texas  Bill  of  Rights  seriously?  Is  the  ar- 
gument  for  attaching  added  meaning  to  the  Texas  BIB  of  Rights  not 
strengthened  by  Article  I,  section  29,  the  final  provision  of  the 
Texas  Bill  of  Rights,  a  section  that  has  no  federal  counterpart? 
29.  Ibid  para.  2(g). 
30.  TEx.  coNST  art  I. 
31.  See  e.  g.,  ibid  paras.  9,25,27. 
32.  See  e.  g.,  ibid  paras.  6,8. 
33.  See  e.  g.,  Ibid  paras.  1,18 
34.  see  e.  g.,  TEX.  CONST.  art  V,  para.  10;  ibid.  art.  XVI,  para.  49. 
67 "To  guard  against  transgressions  of  the  high  powers  herein 
delegated,  we  declare  that  everything  in  this  "Bill  of  Rights"  is  ex- 
cepted  out  of  the  general  powers  of  government,  and  shall  forever 
remain  inviolate,  and  all  laws  contrary  thereto,  or  to  the  following 
provisions,  shall  be  void.  " 
On  the  other  hand,  it  could  be  argued  that  sections  I  and  29 
do  nothing  more  than  declare  explicitly  what  is  implicit  in  the 
federal  constitution.  And  it  is  true  that  little  can  be  gained  on  this 
particular  point  by  looking  to  federal  cases. 
-  Sections  3  and  3a  of  Article  I  are  analogues  of  the  equal 
protection  clause  of  the  federal  fourteenth  amendment,  but  only 
to  a  degree.  Section  3,  entitled  "Equal  Rights",  uses  language  that  is 
not  at  all  like  that  of  the  fourteenth  amendment.  35  Section  3a, 
entitled  "Equality  Under  the  Law,  "  is  similar  to  the  proposed  equal 
rights  amendment,  which  the  states  failed  to  ratify.  36  Texas  actu- 
ally  went  well  beyond  the  ERA  and  Included  "race,  color,  creed,  or 
national  origin"  as  protected  categories  In  addition  to  sex 
Article  I,  section  8,  the  free-speech  provision,  has  received 
considerable  judicial  attention.  The  language  of  section  8  differs 
considerably  from  the  flrst  amendment  to  the  federal  Constitution. 
The  Texas  version  reads: 
35 
,  Compare  TEX.  CONST.  art.  I,  para.  3  ("All  free  men,  when  they  form  a 
social  compact,  have  equal  rights,  and  no  man,  or  set  of  men,  is  entitled  to  I 
exclusive  separate  public  emoluments,  or  privileges,  but  in  consideration 
of  public  services.  ")  with  U.  S.  CONST.  amend.  XIV  ("No  State  shall  ...  deny  to 
any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.,,  ). 
36 
*  Compare  TEX.  CONST.  art.  1,  para.  3a  ("Equality  under  the  law  shall  not  be 
denied  or  abridged  because  of  sex,  race,  color,  creed,  or  national  origin. 
This  amendment  is  self-operative.  ")  with  H.  R.  J.  Res.  208,92d  Sess.,  Stat. 
1523  (1972)  (adoption  of  propose  amendment  stating  that  "[elquality  of 
rights  under  the  law  shall  not  be  denied  or  abridged  by  the  United  States  or 
by  any  State  on  account  of  sex").  The  Equal  Rights  Amendment  fell  short  of 
the  thirty-eight  states  required  for  ratification. 
68 "Every  person  shall  be  at  liberty  to  speak,  write  or  publish 
his  opinions  on  any  subject,  being  responsible  for  the  abuse  of 
that  privilege;  and  no  law  shall  ever  be  passed  curtailing  the  lib- 
erty  of  speech  or  of  the  press.  In  prosecutions  for  the  publication 
of  papers,  Investigating  the  conduct  of  officers,  or  men  In  public 
capacity,  or  when  the  matter  published  is  proper  for  public  infor- 
mati'On,  the  truth  thereof  may  be  given  In  evidence.  And  in  all  In- 
dictments  for  libels,  the  jury  shall  have  the  right  to  determine  the 
law  and  the  facts,  under  ý  the  direction  of  the  court,  as  In  other 
cases.  1137 
This  section  can  be  broken  down  into  several  parts.  The  clause 
"and  no  law  shall  ever  be  passed  curtailing  the  liberty  of  speech 
or  of  the  press"  is  fairly  similar  to  the  first  amendment.  The  sec- 
ond  and  third  sentences,  dealing  with  libels  and  criticism  of  gov- 
ernment,  are  consistent  with  the  United  States  Supreme  Court's 
holding  In  New  York  Times  Co.  v  Sullivan.  38  These  two  sentences 
reflect  the  early  hostility  to  seditious  libel  laws  evident  In  many 
state  constitutions. 
The  first  clause  of  section  8,  on  the  other  hand,  is  very  dif- 
ferent  from  the  first  amendment.  The  former,  unlike  Its  federal 
counterpart,  speaks  not  of  a  limitation  on  government,  but  of  an 
affirmative  liberty:  "Every  person  shall  be  at  liberty  to  speak, 
write  or  publish  his  opinions  on  any  subject  ...... 
39  Similar  provi- 
sions  appear  in  thirty-eight  other  state  constitutions. 
37  TEX.  CONST.  art  1,  para.  8.  Compare  this  with  the  First  Amendment's  bare 
"6ongress  shall  make  no  law  ...  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech,  or  of  the 
ess.  " 
3  76  U.  S.  254,279-280  (1964)  (prohibiting  public  officials  from 
recovering  damages  for  a  defamatory  falsehood  relating  to  his  official 
conduct  unless  he  proved  that  the  statement  was  made  with  knowledge  of 
its  falsity  or  reckless  disregard  of  whether  it  was  true). 
39.  TEX.  CONST.  art.  1,  para.  8. 
69 Most  of  the  provisions  between  article  I,  section  8  and  art!  - 
cle  1,  section  14  of  the  Texas  Constitution  seem  to  be  parallel  to 
federal  provisions,  except  for  the  open  courts  provision4O  and  the 
use  of  the  term  "due  course  of  law'  instead  of  'due  process  of  law.  " 
The  rest  of  the  Texas  Bill  of  Rights  (other  than  the  previ- 
ously  mentioned  section  29)  is  similar  to  the  federal  constitution; 
most  differences  deal  with  fairly  discrete  areas  of  laW.  41 
Provisions  in  other  articles  of  the  Texas  Constitution  could  be  dis- 
cussed  here,  even  though  they  do  not  fall  within  the  traditional 
barriers  of  the  Texas  Bill  of  Rights.  One  such  provision  is  article 
Vil,  section  1,  which  makes  It  the  legislature's  duty  "to  establish 
and  make  suitable  provision  for  the  support  and  maintenance  of 
an  efficient  system  of  public  free  schools.  "  Other  provisions  that 
may  be  considered  with  the  Bill  of  Rights  are  found  In  article  XVI, 
entitled  "General  Provisions.  "  They  deal  with  matters  such  as  free 
suffrage,  42  the  right  of  women  to  sit  on  Juries,  43  exemptions  from 
public  duty,  44and  the  protection  of  personal  property  and  home- 
steads  from  forced  sales.  45  Finally,  an  important  provision  from 
the  environmental  point  of  view,  is  that  of  article  XVI,  para.  59(a) 
40.  TEX.  CONST.  art.  I,  para.  13. 
41.  See  e.  g.,  TEX.  CONST.  art.  I,  para.  15  (providing  for  temporary 
commitment  of  the  mentally  fll  without  jury  trial);  ibid  para.  15-a 
(establishing  procedures  or  "Commitment  of  persons  of  unsound  mind"); 
ibid  para.  17  (providing  more  specific  protection  against  the  taking  of  the 
property  for  public  use  than  does  the  federal  fifth  amendment);  ibid.  para. 
18  (forbidding  imprisonment  for  debt);  ibid  para.  20  (forbidding  outlawry 
or  transportation  out  of  the  state  for  an  offence  committed  in  the  state); 
ibid  para.  24  (declaring  the  military  at  all  times  subordinate  to  the  civil 
authority);  ibid  para.  26  (forbidding  perpetuities,  monopolies, 
primogeniture,  or  entailments);  ibid  para.  28  (stating  that  "[n]o  power  of 
suspending  laws  in  this  State  shall  be  exercised  except  by  the  Legislature"). 
42.  TEx.  coNST.  art.  XVI,  para.  2. 
43.  Ibid  at  para.  19. 
44.  Ibid  at  para.  43. 
45.  Ibid  at  paras.  49,5  0. 
70 which  declares  that  "  [t]  he  conservation  and  development  of  all  of 
the  natural  resources  of  this  State  are  public  rights  and  duties.  " 
One  other  provision  should  be  considered.  Article  II  of  the 
Texas  Constitution  provides  in  its  only  section  that: 
"The  powers  of  the  Government  of  the  State  of  Texas  shall 
be  divided  Into  three  distinct  departments,  each  of  which  shall  be 
confided  to  a  separate  body  of  magistracy,  to  wit:  Those  which  are 
Legislative  to  one,  those  which  are  Executive  to  another,  and  those 
which  are  judicial  to  another;  and  no  person,  or  collection  of  per- 
sons,  being  of  one  of  these  departments,  shall  exercise  any  power 
properly  attached  to  either  of  the  others,  except  In  the  Instances 
herein  expressly  permitted.  " 
Thus  even  though  judges  have  many  sources  of  power  and  the 
duty  to  exercise  that  power  on  behalf  of  the  people,  they  must 
also  remember  that  the  two  other  branches  of  government  are 
entitled  to  respect.  These  duties  are  paradoxical  and  not  easily  re- 
solved  but  this  Is  not  an  excuse  to  turn  the  state  constitution  Into 
a  dead  letter.  Constitutional  rights  are  the  special  concern  of 
courts,  and  numerous  provisions  in  state  constitutions  affect  indi- 
vIdual  and  group  rights. 
The  above  analysis  of  the  Texas  constitution  is  important  In 
answering  the  question  of  whether  the  American  citizen  is 
efficiently  protected  at  state  level.  In  Texas,  as  In  every  state  In 
the  USA,  the  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  citizens 
can  be  entrusted  to  the  provisions  of  the  state  bill  of  rights.  These 
provisions  are  detailed  and  seem  to  be  able  to  adequately  and 
sufficiently  remedy  the  vast  majority  of  the  situations  where 
breaches  of  the  rights  of  the  individuals  can  occur.  These  remedies 
are  provided  by  the  state  courts.  Therefore,  the  conditions  of  the 
71 definition  of  efficiency  which  demand  the  e.  Nistence  of  adequate 
and  sufflclent  remedies,  based  on  legal  norms  and  provided  by  a 
court,  are  met.  It  can  be  suggested,  then,  that  the  American  citizen 
is  efflelently  protected  at  state  level. 
3.3.2.  Efficiency  of  protection  of  fundamental  rights  of  the 
American  citizen  at  the  federal  level 
The  second  layer  of  provisions  concerning  individual  rights 
which  Is  provided  by  the  US  federal  Constitution  and  specifically 
the  federal  Bill  of  Rights.  It  has  been  mentioned  earlier  that  this 
has  not-  always  been  the  case.  Indeed,  when  the  federal 
Constitution  was  initially  drawn  up,  a  Bill  of  Rights  was  not 
considered  necessary,  mainly  because  state  constitutions  afforded 
efflcient  protection  as  regards  the  rights  of  the  citizens.  And  later 
when  a  Bill  of  Rights  was  added,  it  was  considered  to  be  applicable 
only  against  the  power  of  the  federal  government  and  not  against 
that  of  the  states.  That  meant  that  the  American  citizens  at  the 
time,  could  avail  themselves  only  of  their  state  constitutional 
provisions,  but  not  of  the  federal  ones.  This  was  made  clear  by  the 
Supreme  Court  in  1833,  when  In  Barron  v.  Baltlmoreý6  it  held  that 
the  Bill  of  Rights  was  not  applicable  against  Intrusions  by  the 
states.  It  stated  that  the  federal  Constitution  "was  ordained  and 
established  by  the  people  of  the  United  States  for  themselves,  for 
their  own  government,  and  not  for  the  government  of  the  Individ- 
ual  states".  47 
46 
*  32  U.  S.  (7  Pet.  )  243  (1833). 
47.  ibid  at  247i, 
72 It  was  the  enactment  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  that 
changed  things  and  banished  the  spectre  of  arbitrary  state  power. 
The  Amendment  reads:  "No  state  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law 
which  shall  abridge  the  privileges  or  immunities  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States;  nor  shall  any  state  deprive  any  person  of  life,  lib- 
erty  or  property  without  due  process;  nor  deny  to  any  person 
within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  "48  The  de- 
mand  of  national  protection  of  individual  rights  against  the  abuse 
of  state  power,  arose  only  after  the  Civil  War.  It  was  made  clear, 
at  the  time,  that  states  were  not  able  to  protect  individual  rights. 
Actually,  the  Initial  impetus  to  the  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  was  the  fear  that  the  former  Confederate  states 
would  deny  newly  freed  persons  the  protection  of  life,  liberty  and 
property  formally  provided  by  the  state  constitutions. 
Nevertheless,  the  goals  of  the  Amendment  were  framed  in  terms 
of  more  general  application. 
Followlng  Its  Initlal  enactment,  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
served  to  protect  the  excesses  of  expanding  capital  and  Industry 
from  even  limited  control  by  the  government.  The  Supreme  Court 
rejected  the  argument  that  any  of  the  guarantees  of  the  Federal 
Bill  of  Rights  were  Included  In  the  "privileges  or  immunities  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States.  "49  However,  as  justice  Brennan  ob- 
served,  the  Court  had  not  "closed  every  door  in  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  against  the  application  of  the  Federal  Bill  of  Rights  to 
the  states.  1150  The  Court  used  the  Due  Process  Clause  to  apply  cer- 
tain  safeguards  in  the  first  eight  amendments  to  the  states.  The 
48  u.  s.  coNsT.  amend.  XIV. 
49:  Slaughter  House  Cases,  83  US.  (16  Wall)  36,79-81  (1873). 
50  W.  Brennan,  "The  Bill  of  Rights  and  the  States",  36  N.  Y.  U.  L  Rev.  761 
(1ý61)at769. 
73 Court  however,  expressly  rejected  any  suggestion  that  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  advocated  absolute  application  of  any  of 
the  first  eight  amendments  to  the  states.  The  Court  held  instead, 
that  certain  protections  in  the  Bill  of  Rights  were  "of  such  nature 
that  they  are  included  in  the  conception  of  due  process  of  law.  1151 
In  a  way  the  Court  gave  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  a  meaning  independent  of  the  liberties  safeguarded 
by  the  Bill  of  Rights  by  pinpointing  the  rights  it  regarded  to  be  "of 
the  very  essence  of  a  scheme  of  ordered  liberty.  "52 
In  the  end,  the  question  has  to  be  asked  whether  the 
existence  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  the  federal  Constitution 
contributes  to  the  efflclent  protection  of  the  rights  of  the 
American  citizen.  In  order  for  this  to  be  the  case,  the  terms  of  the 
definition  of  efficiency  must  be  met.  It  is  suggested  that,  in  the 
specific  situation  these  terms  are  complied  with.  The  specific  set 
of  norms  legislates  for  adequate  and  sufficient  remedies  for 
breaches  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  American  citizen  and 
the  state  and  federal  courts  can  provide  these  remedies  when  this 
is  asked  from  then.  The  federal  Bill  of  Rights,  then,  Is  an  efficient 
set  of  norms  fore  the  protection  of  the  American  citizens 
3.4.  Concluding  remarks 
It  can  be  seen  from  the  above  analysis,  that  there  is  a  num- 
ber  of  layers  of  effIcient  measures  available  for  the  protection  of 
the  individual  from  violation  of  its  human  rights  by  the  state,  both 
in  the  EC  and  the  USA.  What  is  noticeable,  though,  Is  that  this 
51 
'  Twining  V.  New  Jersey,  2  11  U.  S.  78,99  (1908). 
52j,  Palko  vi,  Connecticut,  302  US.  319,326  (1937). 
74 protection  materIallses  in  a  different  way  in  the  two  formations 
under  examination.  In  the  context  of  the  EC,  the  citizen  Is  pro- 
tected  in  a  fragmented  way.  The  relevant  provisions  can  be  found 
in  the  domestic  law  of  the  specific  citizen's  state,  EC  law  and  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  Any  of  these  provisions 
can  be  used  in  order  for  the  protection  of  the  European  citizen  to 
be  ensured.  The  situation  In  the  USA  Is  more  clear  cut.  The 
relevant  provisions  are  included  In  the  individual  state  consti- 
tutions  or  their  federal  counterpart,  and  the  citizens,  theoretically, 
have  a  choice  between  the  two.  The  difference  between  methods 
of  protection,  however,  does  not  mean  that  efficiency  is  under- 
mined,  as  long  as  there  is  a  judicial  remedy  for  every  breach  of 
Individual  rights.  Therefore,  If  it  can  be  presumed  that  the  norms 
exist  for  the  efficient  protection  of  the  human  rights  of  the  Indi- 
vidual  in  both  the  EC  and  the  USA,  the  choice  as  regards  which  one 
is  going  to  be  utilised  will  depend  on  the  level  of  efficiency  that 
this  norm  is  offering,  according  to  the  opinion  of  the  user. 
Conversely,  the  non-utillsation  of  a  certain  norm,  could  insinuate  a 
distrust  on  behalf  of  those  who  do  not  elect  to  use  It,  a  distrust 
that  could  be  attributed  to  hesitations  regarding  the  level  of  its 
efficiency.  On  the  other  hand,  any  problems  that  might  arise  fol- 
lowing  the  actual  application  of  the  norms  that  are  selected  as  the 
most  appropriate  to  provide  a  satisfactory  solution  to  a  problem- 
atic  situation  could  mean  one  of  two  things.  Either  that  the  inap- 
propriate  norm  was  chosen,  by  Inappropriate  meaning  that  the 
protection  level  of  the  norm  was  not  the  highest  available,  or  that 
the  appropriate  norm  was  elected,  but  for  a  number  of  reasons  Its 
efficlency  level  is  not  as  high  as  It  used  to  be.  In  the  end,  these 
two  presumptions  could  be  considered  as  two  sides  of  the  same 
75 coin,  to  the  extent  that  an  appropriate  norm  with  lowered  levels 
of  efficiency  is  rendered,  as  to  its  result  for  the  protection  of  the 
rights  of  Its  user,  inappropriate.  As  far  as  the  USA  is  concerned, 
this  is  exactly  the  point  on  which  the  arguments  of  the  proponents 
of  New  judicial  Federalism  are  based.  The  claim  that,  opting  for 
the  individual  rights  protection  afforded  by  the  federal 
Constitution  instead  of  the  one  afforded  by  the  state  constitutions 
compromises  the  efficiency  of  this  protection,  reflects,  according  to 
them,  specifically  the  problem  of  the  different  levels  of  efficiency 
outlined  above.  What  they  argue  then,  Is  that  the  uniformly, 
commonly  applied  set  of  protective  provisions  has  ended  up,  for  a 
number  of  reasons,  offering  to  the  American  citizens  a  lower  level 
of  efficiency  that  the  Individually  applied  ones.  Consequently,  the 
Inappropriate  set  of  norms  Is  being  used,  and  this  trend  has  to  be 
controlled.  Such  problems  have  not  arisen  in  Europe  as  yet. 
Whether  there  is  a  possibility  for  this  to  happen,  and  If  so,  the 
measures  that  could  be  taken  In  order  for  the  problem  to  be 
resolved,  Is  a  speculation  with  which  this  thesis  will  be 
preoccupied  In  Its  final  stages. 
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The  evolution  of  uniform  protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  the 
European  Community  and  the  United  States  of  America 
4.1. Introductory  note 
Following  the  general  consideration  of  the  available  efficient 
protective  measures  for  the  European  and  the  American  citizen  at 
all  levels,  this  discussion  will  now  concentrate  on  those  measures 
which  possess  one  further  characteristic,  that  of  being  uniformly 
applied  to  all  of  the  subjects  of  each  one  of  the  two  entitles  under 
examination.  A  uniformly  applied  norm  or  set  of  norms,  In  non- 
unitary  entities,  is  considered  one  which  binds  the  organs  of  all 
the  constituent  states  and  which  defines  the  standard  of 
protection.  As  regards  the  EC,  the  European  Convention  of  Human 
Rights  is  the  set  of  norms  which  comes  closer  to  be  considered  as 
uniformly  applied.  It  is  the  overarching  authority  in  the  area  of 
human  rights  In  the  specific  formation,  it  is  binding  on  all  the 
signatory  states  and  defines  the  standard  of  protection,  to  the 
extent  that  It  sets  the  minimum  standards  beyond  which  the 
organs  of  the  signatory  states  cannot  go.  The  fact  that  the 
European  Convention  is  simply  a  treaty  does  not  detract  from  Its 
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In  the  context  of  the  EC. 
The  discussion  concerning  the  USA  will  concentrate  on  the 
Bill  of  Rights  of  the  federal  Constitution.  This  set  of  norms 
qualifies  as  being  the  uniformly  applied  set  of  norms  in  the 
specific  formation,  since  it  complies  with  the  characteristics  of  the 
deflnition  of  uniformity  utilised  In  this  thesis.  It  is  the  overarching 
authority  in  the  area  of  human  rights  in  the  USA,  It  became 
binding  to  all  the  states  through  the  process  of  incorporation  and, 
at  the  same  time,  It  sets  the  minimum  standard  of  protection. 
one  advantage  of  this  comparison  is  the  opportunity  to 
detect  any  similarities  or  differences  between  the  two  sets  of 
norms.  Especially  as  regards  the  European  situation,  the  evalua- 
tion  of  the  functioning  and  efficiency  of  a  uniformly  applied  hu- 
man  rights  Instrument  of  constitutional  status  in  the  context  of  a 
federal  formation  like  the  USA,  could  produce  some  very  interest- 
ing  observations  as  regards  any  attempts  to  proceed  to  similar 
federal  methods  of  uniform  protection  of  the  individual  rights  of 
the  European  citizen,  In  the  near  or  far  future. 
it  must  be  pointed  out  that  there  are  inherent  difficulties  In 
engaging  in  a  comparative  exercise  regarding  these  two  sets  of 
rules,  stemming  from  the  differences  In  their  characteristics.  The 
federal  Constitution,  part  of  which  is  the  federal  Bill  of  Rights, 
enjoys  a  non-negotiable  superior  status  than  Its  state 
counterparts,  unlike  the  European  Convention,  the  status  of  which 
In  the  domestic  law  of  the  member  states,  varies  considerably. 
After  all,  the  federal  Bill  of  Rights  Is  a  set  of  constitutional  norms, 
whereas  the  European  Convention  is  just  an  international  treaty, 
with  all  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  this  might  have. 
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two  sets  of  rules  that  have  the  characteristic  of  being  efficient  at  a 
level  higher  than  the  national  or  state  one,  a  comparison  between 
them  is  deemed  appropriate.  Most  importantly,  it  will  be 
interesting  to  see  whether  the  uniformly  applied  set  of  norms  in 
the  USA  could  serve  as  a  model  for  any  European  attempts  to 
institute  a  uniformly  applied  set  of  norms  for  the  protection  of  the 
rights  of  the  European  citizens.  Initially  the  European  Convention 
will  be  discussed,  followed  by  a  general  reference  to  the  Bill  of 
Rights  of  the  American  federal  Constitution. 
4.2.  Uniformly  applied  protective  norms  in  the  European 
Community 
When  it  comes  to  the  protection  of  individual  liberties  In  the 
European  context,  the  European  Convention  for  the  Protection  of 
Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms  is  the  closest  an  In- 
strument  could  get  to  the  concept  of  a  common  pan-European 
protection  of  the  human  rights.  Its  contribution  towards  the  Im- 
provement  of  human  rights  both  at  the  regional  and  global  level 
has  been  major.  At  the  moment  more  than  half  a  billion  individu- 
als,  citizens  of  thirty  European  countries  have  the  ability  to  lodge 
a  complaint  before  the  European  Commission  of  Human  Rights  to 
the  effect  that  their  rights  are  breached. 
The  original  idea  behind  the  European  Convention  actually 
considered  it  as  an  initial  step  of  a  grand  plan  for  the  unification 
of  Europe.  Mention  of  a  common  list  of  Human  Rights  In  Europe, 
was  first  made  in  1948  In  the  Political  Resolution  which  was  the 
outcome  of  a  Congress  of  the  international  Committee  of  the 
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in  the  early  post-Second  World  War  years.  Soon  after  the  creation 
of  the  Council  of  Europe  in  1949,  a  proposal  regaýding  the  creation 
of  an  instrument,  within  the  Council,  to  guarantee  human  rights 
was  put  forward.  It  advocated  the  creation  of  a  court  and  a  com- 
mission  of  human  rights  composed  of  lawyers  which  would  deal 
with  relevant  complaints. 
The  main  problem  that  had  to  be  resolved  regarded  the  con- 
tent  of  the  rights  and  freedoms  to  be  protected.  This  was  a  task 
for  the  Committee  on  Legal  and  Administrative  Questions  which, 
after  overcoming  Innumerable  disagreements,  came  up  with  a 
draft  resolution  of  a  Convention  to  the  Committee  of  Ministers. 
This  draft  included,  In  Article  2,  twelve  rights.  It  also  established, 
in  Article  8,  a  European  Court  and  a  European  Commission  of 
Human  Rights. 
The  draft  was  rejected  by  the  Committee  of  Ministers,  mainly 
due  to  the  dilemma  having  to  do  with  the  level  of  detail  In  the 
definition  of  the  rights  Included  in  the  Convention.  In  February 
1950,  the  Legal  Committee  met  again  and  produced  another  draft 
attempting  to  overcome  the  shortcomings  of  the  previous  unsuc- 
cessful  one.  It  was  not  until  November  4,1950,  that  eventually 
the  Convention  was  signed.  After  that,  It  became  open  for  the  sig- 
natory  members  to  ratify.  It  took  quite  a  while  for  the  signatory 
states  to  engage  In  the  ratification  procedure,  something  that 
could  be  attributed  to  the  importance  that  the  Convention  would 
have,  not  only  concerning  human  rights  specifically,  but  also  as 
regards  its  perception  as  a  step  towards  European  unification  in 
general.  The  first  state  to  ratify  the  Convention,  on  March  8,1952 
was  the  United  Kingdom,  followed  by  Norway,  ten  months  later. 
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Ratifications  followed  regularly  from  then  on,  and  on  September  3, 
1953,  Luxembourg  became  the  tenth  signatory  state  to  ratify, 
something  that  allowed  the  Convention  to  come  into  force.  Eight 
months  afterwards,  the  First  Protocol  which  had  been  signed  on 
March  20,1952,  was  also  ratified  and  came  into  force. 
Since  1963,  eight  more  Protocols  have  been  concluded,  and  a 
further  one,  Protocol  10  is  awaiting  signatures.  '  Sweeping 
amendments  to  the  Convention  are  contained  In  the  latest  of  its 
additions,  Protocol  11.  It  substitutes  the  Commission  and  the  Court 
with  a  new  permanent  Court  which  will  undertake  the  whole 
spectrum  of  the  functions  of  the  "old"  institutions.  Therefore,  the 
measures  taken  on  the  basis  of  the  Convention  will  now  be  of  an 
exclusively  judicial  nature,  as  opposed  to  the  mixture  of  judicial 
and  political  procedures  which  was  the  case  before  the  addition  of 
the  new  Protocol,  Protocol  11  requires  ratification  by  all  Member 
States  before  entering  into  force. 
The  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  guarantees 
mostly  civil  and  political  rights.  These  have  been  discussed  earlier 
In  Chapter  3.  In  order  for  the  protection  of  these  rights  to  be 
guaranteed,  the  Convention  established  the  Commission  of  Human 
Rights  and  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights.  The  role  of  these 
organs  is  defined  by  Articles  24  and  25  of  the  Convention.  They 
are  meant  to  deal  with  applications  originating  from  a  signatory 
1.  Protocol  10  deals  with  the  reduction  of  the  two-thirds  majority  provided 
for  in  Article  32.  Protocol  4,  signed  in  1963,  adds  four  new  rights  and 
Protocol  another  seven.  Protocol  6  abolishes  the  death  penalty, 
complementing  thereby  the  right  to  life  contained  in  Article  2  of  the 
Convention.  These  Protocols  are  now  in  force.  Protocol  3  abolishes  the  Sub- 
Commission  and  Protocol  5  regulates  the  election  of  Commissioners  and 
judges.  Protocol  8  provides  intex  afla  for  the  formation  of  chambers  and 
Protocol  9  gives  the  applicants  the  right  to  invoke  the  Court.  Finally, 
Protocol  2  give  the  Court  the  power  to  provide  advisory  opinions,  at  the 
request  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers.  This  protocol  remains  unused. 
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provisions  of  the  Convention  (Article  24),  or  applications  from 
Individuals  regarding  any  alleged  violation  by  one  of  the  signatory 
states. 
The  Importance  of  Articles  24  and  25  is  easily  understood. 
One  particular  characteristic  of  Article  24  which  constitutes  a  re- 
markable  novelty  in  the  context  of  international  law,  is  the  con- 
cept  of  "collective  interest"  on  the  part  of  the  signatory  states.  This 
means  that  the  member  states  have  a  common  Interest  In  human 
rights  and,  therefore,  a  state  invoking  Article  24  is  not  even  re- 
quired  to  prove  legal  Interest  in  the  proceedings.  The  right  en-- 
shrined  In  Article  25  concerning  the  ability  of  individuals  directly 
to  allege  violations  of  the  Convention  before  international  organs 
is  even  more  innovative. 
The  Convention  therefore,  has  attempted  to  become  the 
European  means  of  uniform  application  of  the  legal  protection  of 
human  rights.  It  is  considered  to  be  the  most  advanced  system  of 
such  protection  In  the  world  and  it  has  become  the  model  for  a 
number  of  consequent  conventions  and  charters  of  similar  na- 
ture.  2  The  Convention  Is  considered  to  be  a  great  success,  not  only 
in  that  it  creates  a  catalogue  of  substantive  rights  that  are 
protected,  but  also  that  procedural  provisions  Instituting  a 
mechanism  for  the  consideration  of  complaints  have  been  secured. 
The  rights  in  Section  I  of  the  Convention  along  with  the  ones 
Included  in  the  Protocols,  have  acquired  substance.  It  can  easily 
be  said  that  in  its  existence  of  only  under  half  a  century,  the 
Convention  could  pride  itself  for  its  huge  achievements. 
2.  The  American  Convention  on  Human  Rights  of  1969,  for  instance,  was 
modelled  after  the  European  Convention.  It  was  also  consulted  during  the 
creation  of  the  African  Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples'  Rights. 
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The  Individual  freedoms  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States 
are  guaranteed,  apart  from  their  own  constitutions,  from  the  ten 
amendments  to  the  Federal  Constitution.  The  Bill  of  Rights  outlines 
what  is  considered  to  be  one  of  the  most,  if  not  the  most,  compre- 
hensive  protection  of  individual  freedoms  ever  written.  Mention 
of  the  Bill  of  Rights  has  been  made  earlier  In  this  work,  but  it  is 
considered  appropriate  at  this  time  to  look  at  It  from  a  historical 
point  of  view  and  refer  briefly  to  its  content. 
The  Bill  of  Rights  originally  was  not  a  part  of  the  Constitution. 
After  the  Revolution,  the  states  formed  their  own  constitutions, 
many  of  which  actually  incorporated  Bills  of  Rights.  But  the  desire 
for  the  creation  of  a  central  government  for  the  new  nation  re- 
mained  alive.  The  Articles  of  the  Confederation  were  adopted  in 
1777  by  the  Continental  Congress  and  were  ratified  by  1781. 
According  to  the  Articles,  the  states  retained  their  "sovereignty, 
freedom  and  independence,  "  unlike  the  federal  government.  In 
time  it  was  reallsed  that  this  system  of  government  could  not  face 
up  to  the  challenges  of  settling  and  maintaining  the  frontiers, 
regulating  trade  currency  and  commerce  and  merge  thirteen 
states  Into  one  union.  Consequently,  In  1787,  delegates  from 
twelve  states-Rhode  Island  was  absent-met  In  Philadelphia  with 
the  aim  of  drafting  a  new  Constitution.  The  proposal  was  for  a 
strong  national  government  which  would  replace  the  states  in 
many  of  their  previous  competencies. 
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icised  and  opposed  by  the  states  when  the  document  was  submit- 
ted  to  the  state  legislatures  for  approval.  People  were  preoccupied 
because  of  the  lack  of  protection  by  the  Constitution  of  the  l1ber- 
ties  they  had  fought  for  in  the  Revolution.  The  federal  government 
could  very  easily  disregard  them.  Those  who  were  against  the 
wide  grant  of  powers  to  the  new  federal  government  were  called 
Anti-Federalists;  Its  supporters  were  called  Federalists.  The  Anti- 
Federalists  advocated  another  convention  which  would  draft  a  Bill 
of  Rights  before  the  actual  Constitution  was  approved.  The 
Federalists  on  the  other  hand,  fearing  that  this  would  have  a 
detrimental  effect  on  the  whole  process,  insisted  on  Immediate 
ratification,  with  the  drafting  of  a  Bill  of  Rights  following  after- 
wards.  Eventually,  the  Federalists  prevailed.  By  1788,  the 
Constitution  had  been  ratified  by  eleven  states,  more  than  the 
three  quarters  needed.  However,  six  states  proposed  amendments 
which  were  principally  modelled  on  their  own  state  constitutions 
and  were  designed  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  Individuals. 
it  was  James  Madison  who,  in  1789,  having  reallsed  that  the 
public  desire  for  a  federal  Bill  of  Rights  could  not  be  Ignored  and 
after  reviewing  the  state  proposed  amendments  and  state  Bills  of 
Rights,  proposed  nine  amendments  to  be  considered  by  congress 
for  Insertion  into  the  text  of  the  Constitution.  After  consideration, 
debate  and  further  alterations,  the  House  and  Senate  voted  for  the 
addition  of  twelve  amendments  at  the  end  of  the  Constitution  and 
sent  them  to  the  states  for  ratification.  Only  ten  went  through  the 
process,  the  ones  we  collectively  know  as  the  Bill  of  Rights. 
As  ratified  in  1791,  the  Bill  of  Rights  protected  the  rights  of 
individuals  from  violation  only  by  the  federal  government.  For 
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law 
...  11.  Madison's  original  draft  had  contained  a  proposal  that 
would  have  also  impeded  the  state  governments  from  breaching 
the  Bill  of  Rights,  but  it  was  deleted  by  the  Senate. 
Therefore,  It  was  not  until  the  post-Civil  War  enactment  of 
the  Thirteenth,  Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth  amendments  that  the 
federal  government  started  to  protect  individuals  against  the 
states.  The  principal  means  by  which  this  protection  was  achieved 
has  been  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  As  it  will  be  remembered, 
the  jurisprudencial  attitude  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  USA  for 
almost  one  and  a  half  century,  dictated  that  what  protected 
citizens  from  breach  of  their  rights  by  their  state  governments 
was  the  state  bills  of  rights  and  not  the  federal  one.  Things  started 
to  change  in  1925,  when  the  Supreme  Court  In  GitlovO  adopted 
the  rationale  that  parts  of  the  federal  Bill  of  Rights  were 
important  enough  to  be  encompassed  in  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  and  consequently  become  applicable  to  all  states. 
The  Fourteenth  Amendment  which  reads,  in  part,  "No  State 
shall  ...  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due 
process  of  law",  has  been  interpreted  by  the  Supreme  Court  as  an 
obligation  on  the  state  governments  to  embrace  and  protect  the 
fundamental  liberties  In  the  Bill  of  Rights  to  the  same  extent  as 
the  federal  government.  This  is  what  has  been  called  the  process 
of  Incorporation.  Essentially,  the  application  of  the  provisions  of 
the  federal  Bill  of  Rights  to  the  states  meant  that  the  federal 
provisions  became  the  uniformly  applied  set  of  norms  which 
guaranteed  the  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  all  the 
citizens  of  the  USA.  A  second  layer  of  protection  of  the  rights  of 
3.  Gitlowv  New  York,  268  U.  S.  652  (1925). 
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provisions.  There  has  been  an  ongoing  debate  within  the  Supreme 
Court  about  the  scope  of  incorporation,  and  whether  the  entire  Bill 
of  Rights,  or  only  some  of  its  guarantees,  should  be  incorporated 
against  the  state. 
The  process  of  incorporation  did  not  begin  until  the  beginning 
of  the  twentieth  century.  The  majority  of  the  rights  were  not  in- 
corporated  until  the  1960s,  something  that  explains  why  most 
constitutional  litigation  has  taken  place  within  the  last  quarter  of 
the  century.  The  few  rights  that  are  not  incorporated  include  the 
Second  Amendment  right  to  keep  and  bear  arms,  the  Fifth 
Amendment  right  to  grand  jury  indictment,  the  Sixth  Amendment 
requirement  of  twelve  jurors  on  a  criminal  jury,  and  the  Seventh 
Amendment  right  to  a  civil  jury.  All  the  remaining  fundamental 
freedoms  enshrined  in  the  Bill  of  Rights  have  been  Incorporated 
and  should  not  be  violated  either  by  the  federal  government  or  by 
the  states. 
When  It  comes  to  the  content  of  the  rights  protected,  the 
Amendments  without  being  extremely  detailed,  ensure  that  no 
misunderstanding  can  take  place.  The  First  Amendment  protects 
the  free  exercise  of  the  freedoms  of  religion,  speech,  press  and 
assembly.  The  controversial  Second  Amendment  guarantees  the 
right  of  the  people  to  keep  and  bear  arms.  The  Third  Amendment, 
which  is  commonly  referred  to  as  the  forgotten  amendment  due  to 
the  Infrequency  of  Its  invocation,  prevents  the  government  from 
quartering  troops  in  privately  owned  homes  without  the  consent 
of  the  owner.  One  of  the  most  heavily  litigated  amendments  is  the 
Fourth  which  protects  people  from  unreasonable  searches  and 
seizures  without  the  appropriate  procedures.  The  Fifth 
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Amendment,  protects  the  right  to  have  one's  case  screened  by  a 
Grand  jury  along  with  the  very  important  guarantees  that  no 
person  will  be  in  jeopardy  for  the  same  offence  twice  and  that  no 
person  can  be  forced  in  a  criminal  case  to  testify  as  a  witness 
against  himself.  The  amendment  ends  with  a  further  guarantee  of 
no  deprivation  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of 
law.  The  Sixth  Amendment  guarantees  the  rights  of  the  accused, 
in  criminal  prosecutions,  to  a  speedy  trial,  by  an  Impartial  jury,  to 
be  able  to  confront  the  witnesses  against  him,  to  have  compulsory 
process  and  last  but  not  least,  the  right  to  have  an  attorney.  The 
Seventh  Amendment  advocates  the  right  in  suits  at  common  law 
of  trial  by  jury  and  the  Eighth  prohibits  the  Imposition  of 
excessive  bail  and  fines  as  well  the  Infliction  of  cruel  and  unusual 
punishment.  The  Ninth  Amendment  Is  the  one  that  speaks  of 
"other"  rights  that  are  to  be  protected  against  governmental 
violation.  This  has  been  considered  to  refer  to  the  right  to  privacy. 
However,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  protection  of  the  said  right  has 
been  Interpreted  to  be  guaranteed  by  other  amendments,  the 
Ninth  Amendment  appears,  for  the  moment  at  least,  to  have  no 
role  to  play.  Finally,  the  Tenth  Amendment  allocates  the  rights  not 
delegated  to  the  federal  government,  to  the  states  or  to  the 
people. 
4.4.  Concluding  remarks 
The  comparison  between  the  two  uniformly  applied  sets  of 
norms  in  EC  and  the  USA  leads  to  certain  Interesting  observations. 
The  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  and  the  Bill  of  Rights  of 
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similar  in  others.  In  the  first  place,  there  Is  a  diversity  between 
the  two  sets  of  norms  in  terms  of  status.  The  American  Bill  of 
Rights  has  constitutional  status.  The  European  Convention  on 
Human  Rights  is  a  treaty  concluded  under  public  international 
law,  the  status  of  which  varies  in  the  domestic  law  of  the 
signatory  states  that  incorporated  it  from  superiority  over 
constitutional  provisions  to  equality  with  normal  law. 
A  second  diderence  between  the  two  sets  of  norms  is  that 
whereas  the  American  Bill  of  Rights  has  been  in  a  continuous  state 
of  development  for  almost  two  centuries,  the  European  Convention 
has  only  been  in  force  for  less  than  half  a  century.  The  role,  also, 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  USA  has  been  much  more  significant 
in  the  development  of  the  American  document,  whereas  the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  has  only  lately  indicated  that  it 
can  adopt  a  dynamic  approach  to  the  interpretation  of  the 
European  Convention 
There  are  also  textual  differences  in  the  two  documents,  at 
least  superficially.  In  the  Bill  of  Rights,  rights  typically  are  stated 
briefly.  The  rights  In  the  European  Convention  are  first  stated 
broadly  and  then  qualified  by  restrictive  clauses. 
The  two  uniformly  applied  sets  of  norms  are  similar  as 
regards  the  contents  of  the  rights  protected.  Article  2  of  the 
European  Convention,  for  example,  guarantees  the  right  to  life  In 
the  same  context  as  the  Fifth  Amendment  to  the  federal 
Constitution.  The  guarantees  of  Articles  3  and  4  roughly  assimilate 
the  protection  provided  by  the  Seventh  amendment,  albeit  on  a 
wider  scale.  The  protection  of  personal  liberty  advocated  by 
Article  5  of  the  Convention  is  also  the  object  of  the  Fourth 
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enshrined  In  Article  6  is  roughly  covered  by  the  Sixth 
Amendment.  Article  8  protecting  privacy  and  family  life 
corresponds  with  the  Interpretations  provided  for  the  Ninth 
Amendment.  Finally,  Articles  9,10,  and  11  guaranteeing  freedom 
of  thought,  conscience  and  religion,  freedom  of  expression  and 
freedom  of  assembly  and  association  respectively,  are  the  mirror 
provisions  of  the  European  Convention  to  the  First  Amendment  of 
the  federal  Constitution. 
Not  surprisingly,  there  are  differences  as  well,  such  as  the 
Second  Amendment  to  the  American  document  guaranteeing  the 
right  of  the  people  to  carry  and  bear  arms,  a  provision  which 
probably  will  not  be  found  in  any  other  document  protecting 
human  rights.  However,  the  differences  in  approach  are 
understandable  and  are  due  to  the  contrast  of  experiences  in  the 
Integrative  courses  of  the  two  formations,  the  diversities  in  the 
historical  development,  as  well  as  the  attempt  to  respect  and  at 
the  same  time  preserve  the  particular  characteristics  of  the 
constituent  parts  of  each  one of  them. 
Having  observed  the  above,  and  without  prejudice  to  the 
definite  differences  between  the  various  aspects  of  the  two  docu- 
ments,  it  would  be  Interesting  to  ask  the  question  of  whether  the 
uniformly  applied  set  of  norms  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  of 
the  citizens  in  the  USA,  the  American  Bill  of  Rights,  could  serve  as 
a  model  for  any  European  attempts  to  further  integrate  in  the 
field  of  human  rights  by  creating  a  uniformly  applicable  list  of 
guarantees,  provided  such  an  attempt  is  considered  necessary. 
There  is  no  easy  answer  to  this  question,  simply  because  this  is 
not  a  simple  question.  First  of  all  we  will  have  to  decide  whether  a 
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define  the  standard  of  protection,  is  in  this  case  necessary,  taking 
into  consideration  factors  such  as  the  efficiency  of  the  already 
existing  norms,  and  then  decide  on  the  set  of  norms  that  this  new 
European  Instrument  will  have  to  be  modelled  on.  It  might 
-be 
that 
certain  rules  stemming  from  the  constitutions  of  the  Member 
States  might  be  more  appropriate  than  the  American  model, 
taking  first  of  all  into  consideration  the  proximity  of  experiences. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  a  set  of  rules  deriv- 
Ing  from  one  or  even  more  European  constitutions  will  be  the 
solution  to  the  problem.  These  problems  are  Inherent  in  a 
situation  where  an  integrative  exercise  is  attempted.  However,  if 
any  such  attempt  is  to  go  ahead,  something  that  is  questionable,  it 
could  not  afford  to  ignore,  among  others,  the  American  Bill  of 
Rights,  with  Its  two  hundred  years  of  experience  of  resolving 
human  rights  Issues. 
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The  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  as  a  choice  for  the 
efficient  protection  of  the  EC  citizen:  A  test  utilising  the  New 
judicial  Federalism  approaches 
5.1.  introductory  note 
This  part  of  the  thesis  will  attempt  to  put  to  the  test  the 
concepts  of  uniformity  and  efficiency  as  regards  the  law  protect- 
ing  the  human  rights  of  the  citizen  in  the  EC.  In  order  to  do  so,  it 
will  borrow  two  of  the  approaches  suggested  by  the  proponents  of 
New  judicial  Federalism  In  their  analysis  of  state  constitutional 
law  in  the  USA,  namely  the  primacy  and  the  interstitial 
approaches.  These  will  be  applied  to  a  country  by  country  survey, 
conducted  In  1991  by  Polakiewicz  and  Jacob-Foltzer,  '  of  the  im- 
pact  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  judgements  of  the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  national  legislation,  in  the 
countries  where  the  Convention  is  formally  Incorporated  in  their 
national  law.  The  advantage  of  utilising  the  methods  of  state 
constitutional  analysis  proposed  by  the  New  Federalists  in  the 
1.  j.  polakiewicz  &  V.  Jacob-Foltzer,  "The  European  Human  Rights 
Convention  in  Domestic  Law:  The  Impact  of  Strasbourg  Case-Law  in  States 
Where  Direct  Effect  is  Given  to  the  Convention"  12  HRIJ  65-85,125-143 
(1991). 
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offer  a  useful  comparative  tool  for  the  detection  of  the  attitude  of 
the  European  states  towards  both  the  European  Convention  and 
their  own  relevant  constitutional  provisions.  For  example,  the 
adoption  by  a  European  state  of  the  primacy  approach  in  the  way 
It  considers  the  protection  of  the  individual  rights  of  its  citizens, 
would  indicate  a  preference,  In  terms  of  that  protection,  towards 
Its  own  constitutional  provisions  over  the  ones  contained  in  the 
European  Convention.  This  choice  of  protection  Is  closely  con- 
nected  with  both  the  concepts  of  efficiency  and  uniformity.  its 
connection  with  the  former  stems  from  the  logical  presumption, 
that  a  norm  or  set  of  norms  is  preferred  over  another  because  It 
offers  higher  levels  of  protection.  The  latter  is  relevant  because 
the  European  Convention,  which  is  examined  in  this  survey,  is  the 
legislation  that  comes  closer  to  be  considered  as  uniformly  appli- 
cable  in  Europe  in  the  field  of  human  rights. 
Certain  remarks  have  to  be  made  in  relation  to  the  applica- 
tion  of  the  American  model  to  the  European  survey.  These  have  to 
do  with  both  the  nature  of  the  New  Federalist  approaches  and  the 
Information  supplied  by  the  specific  research  as  regards  the 
European  situation.  In  the  first  place,  a  straightforward  transfer  of 
the  American  methods  of  Interpretation  to  the  survey  is  unattain- 
able.  As  mentioned  earlier  in  the  thesis,  the  approaches  that  the 
New  Federalists  propose  advocate  the  active  participation  of  the 
state  constitutional  provisions  in  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  the 
citizens  of  the  specific  states.  The  primacy  approach  supports  the 
view  that,  when  the  rights  of  the  individuals  are  breached,  the 
provisions  of  the  state  constitutions  must  be  examined  first.  If  the 
remedy  provided  Is  not  efficient,  then  the  provisions  of  the 
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dictates  that  the  federal  document  is  examined  first.  If  the 
remedy  provided  falls  below  the  state  standards,  then  the  state 
constitutional  provisions  must  be  relied  upon.  The  dual 
sovereignty  approach  advocates  an  analysis  of  both  the  state  and 
federal  constitutions  and  the  provisions  that  best  protect  the  citi- 
zen  are  relied  upon.  Finally,  the  lockstep  approach  dictates  that 
the  state  constitutional  provision  is  given  the  same  meaning  with 
its  federal  counterpart,  even  when  the  wording  of  the  two 
provisions  Is  different.  Eventually,  the  federal  provision  is  relied 
upon. 
In  order,  therefore,  to  be  able  to  evaluate  the  application  of 
the  New  Federalist  approaches  In  any  case  of  breach  of  the  rights 
of  the  individual,  it  Is  necessary  to  follow  all  the  stages  of  the 
specific  judicial  procedure  and  to  consider  them  In  connection 
with  the  final  outcome.  It  is  only  then  that  it  will  become  possible 
to  come  to  a  conclusion  as  regards  the  method  that  has  been 
utillsed  to  reach  a  specific  decision.  Information  relating  only  to 
the  decision,  without  reference  to  specific  procedural  aspects, 
makes  It  impossible  to  decide  on  the  preferred  approach. 
The  above  mentioned  absence  of  Judicial  thinking  in  respect 
of  the  decisions  taken  by  the  national  courts,  when  considering 
the  provisions  of  the  European  Convention,  is  an  understandable 
limitation  of  the  Polakiewicz  and  Jacob-Foltzer  survey.  They  are 
only  concerned  with  decisions  by  European  courts  which  were  in- 
fluenced,  in  various  ways,  by  decisions  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  and  the  provisions  of  the  European  Convention. 
Whether  the  national  provisions  were  considered  before  those  of 
the  European  Convention,  after  them,  or  whether  an  analysis  of 
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preoccupation  outwith  the  scope  of  their  research.  This  presents  a 
problem  for  the  purposes  of  the  proposed  test,  which  Is  dependent 
on  the  knowledge  of  the  procedure  that  lead  to  the  specific 
decision.  In  order  to  overcome  this  obstacle,  it  Is  proposed  to 
utillse  an  expansive  interpretation  of  the  New  Federalist 
approaches.  They  could  describe  not  only  the  priorities  of  the 
judges  as  regards  the  provisions  of  his/her  national  constitution 
and  the  uniformly  applied  norms  when  considering  a  claim,  but 
they  could  also  represent  the  final  outcome.  Thus,  for  the 
purposes  of  this  test,  a  European  court  would  follow  the  primacy 
approach  If  It  decided  a  case  relying  exclusively  on  Its  national 
constitution,  Ignoring  the  provisions  of  the  European  Convention 
on  Human  Rights,  or  If  it  made  a  passing  reference  to  It.  A  court 
which  decides  a  case  on  the  basis  of  the  provisions  of  the 
European  Convention  and/or  the  judgements  of  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights,  or  it  refers  extensively  to  them  when 
deciding  a  human  rights  case,  would  follow  an  interstitial 
approach.  The  latter  approach  will  also  characterise,  for  the 
purposes  of  this  test,  any  decisions  of  the  national  courts  which 
indicate  compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the  European 
Convention  and  the  practice  of  the  European  Court  of  Human 
Rights. 
One  consequence  of  such  outcome  oriented  Interpretation  of 
the  New  Federallst  approaches  In  the  European  context,  is  that 
only  the  primacy  and  the  interstitial  approach  are  utilised.  The 
dual  sovereignty  and  lockstep  ones  are  not.  The  former,  because  it 
Is  a  procedure  oriented  approach,  the  adoption  of  which  by  a  court 
could  lead  to  a  decision  based  either  on  state,  or  federal  law.  The 
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same  outcome  as  the  Interstitial  approach,  namely  a  decision 
based  on  the  provisions  of  the  European  Convention. 
This  expansive  Interpretation  of  the  New  Federalist 
approaches  is  considered  to  be  the  most  constructive,  and  possibly 
the  only,  way  to  approach  and  evaluate  the  concepts  of  efficiency 
and  uniformity  within  the  context  of  the  Polakiewitcz  and  Jacob- 
Foltzer  survey. 
One  final  point  that  has  to  be  made,  is  that  the  proposed  test 
takes  Into  consideration  only  the  cases  mentioned  In  the 
Polakiewicz  and  Jacob-Foltzer  survey.  It,  therefore,  runs  the  risk 
of  overlooking  other,  relevant  case-law  which  the  latter  does  not 
analyse.  Indeed,  in  certain  occasions,  the  cases  mentioned  are  only 
examples  of  the  situation  in  a  specific  Member  State.  Most 
Importantly,  In  a  significant  number  of  Member  States  the  cases 
analysed  represent  the  exceptions  to  the  situation  regarding 
reliance  of  the  relevant  national  courts  on,  either  the  national 
provisions,  or  the  ones  of  the  European  Convention  for  the 
protection  of  the  rights  of  their  citizens.  Therefore,  in  certain 
occasions,  conclusions  as  regards  the  favourite  New  Federalist 
approach  of  the  court  of  a  Member  State  are  based  not  on  specific 
case-law,  but  on  any  information  provided  by  the  authors  of  the 
survey  to  that  effect.  As  regards  the  situation  in  Greece,  for 
example,  the  authors  of  the  survey  provide  evidence  which  might 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  favourite  approach  of  the  Greek 
courts  is  the  primacy  one.  No  decisions  of  Greek  courts  are  utilised 
to  come  to  that  conclusion.  Instead,  this  is  achieved  by  means  of 
references  to  the  opinions  of  Greek  scholars.  The  case-law  utilised, 
regarding  the  specific  Member  State,  only  supports  the  findings  of 
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preferred.  In  spite  of  these  limitations,  It  is  suggested,  that  the 
Information  provided  by  the  survey  can,  in  general,  be  Indicative 
of  the  attitude  of  the  Member  States  towards  the  European 
Convention  of  Human  Rights.  It  is,  therefore,  appropriate  for  the 
purposes  of  this  test. 
This  chapter  will  initially  consider  the  status  of  the 
Convention  in  the  hierarchy  of  national  law.  It  will  then  be 
followed  by  the  application  of  the  New  Federalist  approaches  to 
the  Polakiewicz  and  Jacob-Foltzer  survey. 
5.2.  Impact  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  case-law  of  the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  Member  States 
5.2.1.  BELGIUM 
5.2.1.1.  Status  of  the  European  Convention  in  the  hierarchy  of 
national  law 
Belgium  became  a  signatory  to  the  European  Convention  on 
Human  Rights  on  November  4,1950  and  ratified  It  on  June  4, 
1955.  After  publication  in  the  Official  Gazette  (Moniteur  Beige), 
the  Convention  and  the  First  Additional  Protocol  were  automati- 
cally  Incorporated  into  the  domestic  legal  system.  Belgium  made 
the  declarations  pursuant  to  Articles  25  (right  of  Individual  peti- 
tion)  and  46  (compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the  Court)  on  July  5,1955 
and  has  renewed  them  ever  since.  It  has  also  ratlfied  Protocols 
Nos.  2,3,4,5  and  8  to  the  European  Convention. 
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rules,  the  Belgian  Constitution  Is  silent.  However,  the  precedence 
of  treaties  over  all  provisions  of  domestic  law  is  undisputed  and 
that  was  confirmed  by  the  Court  of  Cassation  in  a  judgement  of 
May  27,1971,  where  it  ruled  that.  -"  When  the  conflict  is  one  be- 
tween  a  rule  of  domestic  law  and  a  rule  of  international  law  hav- 
Ing  direct  effects...,  the  rule  established  by  the  treaty  must  pre- 
vail.  ...  '12  From  then  on  national  courts  are  required  to  suspend  the 
application  of  national  law  when  It  contradicts  the  European 
Convention  of  Human  Rights. 
5.2.1.2.  Impact  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  judgements  of 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  national  jurisdiction 
The  provisions  of  the  European  Convention  and  their  Inter- 
pretation  by  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  play  an  Impor- 
tant  role  in  the  decisions  of  the  Belgian  courts  and  detailed  refer- 
ences  to  both  are  the  rule  rather  than  the  exception.  The  case-law 
of  the  Belgian  courts  has  been  influenced  by  a  number  of  judge- 
ments  of  the  European  Court.  One  of  them  Is  Le  Compte,  Van 
Leuven  and  De  Meyere73  where  the  European  Court  revised  the 
earlier  case-law  of  the  Court  of  Cassation.  that  held  that  Article  6 
para.  1  of  the  Convention,  incorporating  the  right  to  a  fair  and 
public  hearing  did  not  apply  to  disciplinary  proceedings.  The  ap- 
plicants  In  the  case  claimed  that  their  right  to  a  public  hearing  In 
accordance  with  the  guarantee  of  Article  6  para.  1  of  the 
Convention  was  breached,  when  their  right  to  practice  medicine 
2.  S_A_  Fromagerie  Franco-Suisse  "Le  Ski",  J.  T.  1971,460  Common  Market 
Law  Reports  1972,330. 
3.  Judgement  of  23/6/198  1,  Series  A  No.  43  2  HRLj  p.  349  (198  1). 
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"determinations  of  his  civil  rights  and  obligations"  covered  all  pro- 
ceedings  that  were  decisive  for  private  rights  and  obligations. 
4  Earlier  in  1978  as  a  result  of  the  K6nig  case,  the  Court  had  ruled 
that  for  a  doctor,  a  right  to  continue  his  professional  activities  was 
a  civil  right  within  the  meaning  of  the  Convention  and  that  as  a 
consequence  the  proceedings  before  a  disciplinary  tribunal  fell 
within  the  ambIt  of  Article  6  para.  1,  when  the  penalty  Imposed 
was  either  a  suspension  or  the  exclusion  from  the  right  to  exercise 
a  profession. 
When  the  Belgian  Court  of  Cassation  was  called,  In  the  cases 
of  Guchee  and  Sinunons6,  to  decide  on  the  Issue  of  the  right  to  be 
heard,  It  stated  that  "it  follows 
...  both  from  the  letter  and  the 
spirit  of  the  notion  of  disputes  in  the  determination  of  civil  rights 
and  obligations  that  by  the  very  nature  and  purpose  of  disci- 
plinary  proceedings,  the  authors  of  the  Convention 
...  could  not 
have  intended  such  proceedings  to  be  heard  publicly  In  accor- 
dance  with  Article  6  para.  1  of  the  Convention".  The  Court  in  this 
situation  relied  on  the  national  provisions,  but  It  also  entered  into 
a  discussion  regarding  the  relevant  provision  of  the  European 
Convention.  The  New  Federalist  approach  that  would  best  describe 
the  attitude  of  the  Belgian  Court  of  Cassation  in  this  case,  Is  the 
Interstitial  one. 
The  interstitial  approach  was  followed  again  by  the  Court  of 
Cassation  In  its  judgement  in  the  R.  v.  Ordre  des  Architect& 
where  it  stated,  after  analysing  both  the  national  law  and  Article 
4.  Judgement  of  28/6/1978,  Series  A  No.  27. 
5.  Guchez  v  Ordre  des  Architectes,  21  January  1982,  J.  T.  1982,438. 
6.  Simmons  v  Ordre  des  Mddecins,  21  January  1982,  R.  G.  A.  R.  1982,  No.  6458. 
7.  j.  T.  1983,607  Pas.  1983  1,903. 
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Convention  is  applicable  in  disciplinary  matters...  ".  In  January  27, 
19868  the  Brussels  Court  of  Appeals  followed  the  path  of  the  Court 
of  Cassation.  It  said  that  "The  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  had 
held  on  several  occasions  that  disciplinary  proceedings  do  not 
normally  lead  to  a  dispute  over  'civil  rights  and  obligations'  al- 
though  this  does  not  mean  that  the  position  may  not  be  different 
in  certain  circumstances,  and  that  disciplinary  proceedings  as  such 
cannot  be  characterised  as  "criminal":  nevertheless  this  may  not 
hold  good  for  certain  specific  cases  (Le  Compte,  Van  Leuven  and 
De  Meyere  judgement,  23  June  198  1,  series  A  No.  3,  para.  42); 
further,  the  European  Court  had  held  again  In  1983  that 
<<disciplinary  proceedings  do  not  ordinary  lead  to  a  dispute  over 
,  civil  rights  and  obligations',  but  that,  however,  the  position  may 
be  otherwise  in  certain  circumstances>>  (Albert  and  Le  Compte 
judgements,  10  February  1983,  Series  A  No.  . 58,  para.  25),  refer- 
ring  to  the  Court's  view  expressed  as  early  as  1976  (Engel  and 
others  Judgement,  8  June  1976,  Series  A  No.  22,  pp.  33-36,  para. 
82-85).  " 
The  Court  of  Cassation  followed  a  different  path  when  it,  de- 
cided  the  case  of  Van  Horn  v.  Ordre  des  Wdecin$.  9  This  case  In- 
volved  the  Imposition  of  a  three  month  suspension  on  a  doctor,. 
who  afterwards  considered  that  he  was  not  judged  impartially, 
because  certain  members  of  the  tribunal  had  personally  investi- 
gated  the  case  before  judging  it.  The  Court  of  Cassation  found  in 
favour  of  the  appellant,  without,  however,  basing  its  decision  on 
Article  6  para.  1  of  the  European  Convention.  The  Court  in  this 
8.  J.  T.  1987,9. 
9.  Cass.  29/5/1985  (2  Judgements),  J.  L  1985,541  and  543;  Cass.  9/10/1985  J.  T. 
1986,39. 
99 situation  chose  to  follow  the  primacy  approach,  since  it  relied  on 
domestic  law,  completely  ignoring  the  relevant  provision  of  the 
European  Convention. 
In  the  Marckx  judgement,  10  the  European  Court  ruled  that 
the  distinction  in  Belgian  law  between  legitimate  and  illegitimate 
children  breached  Articles  8  and  14  of  the  Convention.  The  Court 
of  Cassation  in  a  judgement  of  October  3,1983  11  held  that  Articles 
331  and  335  of  the  Civil  Code,  whereby  an  Illegitimate  child  can 
not  be  recognised  without  prior  authorisation  from  the  courts, 
were  not  contrary  to  Article  8  and  14  of  the  Convention.  The  Court 
did  not  mention  Marckx  The  approach  of  the  Court  In  this 
situation  is  not  clearly  defined.  The  lack  of  mention  of  the  Marckx 
ruling  could  Indicate  that  the  Belgian  court  favoured  the  primacy 
approach.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  some  reference  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Convention  was  made,  could  suggest  that  the 
chosen  approach  was  the  Interstitial  one.  It  will  all  depend  on 
whether  the  reference  to  the  Convention  was  superficial  or 
substantial.  If  the  former  applies,  then  the  primacy  approach 
should  describe  the  attitude  of  the  Court  of  Cassation  In  the  spe- 
cific  case.  If  the  latter  Is  true,  the  Court  has  favoured  the 
interstitial  approach. 
5.2.1.3.  Summary 
It  seems,  a  common  practice  for  the  Belgian  Court  of 
Cassation  not  to  rely  solely  on  Its  national  constitutional  provisions 
in  order  to  remedy  breaches  of  the  Individual  rights  of  its  citizens. 
10 
*  Judgement  13/6/1979,  Series  A  No.  3  1. 
11.  Cass.  3/10/1983,  R.  C.  J.  B.  38  (1984),  605  Pas.  1984  1108  J.  T.  1984,648. 
100 Rather,  the  latter  are  usually  accompanied  by  references  to  the 
provisions  of  the  European  Convention  and  analysis  of  the 
decisions  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights.  In  only  one  case, 
according  to  the  findings  of  this  survey,  did  the  Belgian  Court 
clearly  ignore  the  provisions  of  the  European  Convention,  and 
remedied  the  situation  on  the  basis  of  the  domestic  law  alone. 
Therefore,  It  can  be  said  that  Its  favourite  approach  is  the 
Interstitial  one.  The  following  Table  1  demonstrates  the  attitude  of 
the  Belgian  courts,  In  the  cases  analysed  In  this  survey,  towards 
the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  seen  through  the  prism 
of  the  New  Federalist  approaches: 
Table  1 
Preferred  Case  Other 
Approach  Examples  Approaches 
Interstitial  Guchez  v.  0.  des  Primacy 
Arch1tectes 
(Court  of 
Cassation,  1982) 
R.  v.  0.  des 
Archltectes 
(Court  of 
Cassation,  1983) 
Simmons  v  0. 
des  Medecins 
(Court  of 
Cassatlon,  1982) 
Case 
Examples 
Van  Horn  v  0. 
des-M6-declns  I 
(Court  of 
Cassation,  1985) 
Van  Horn  v  0. 
des  Medecins  II 
(Court  of 
Cassation,  1985) 
101 5.2.2.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
5.2.2.1.  Status  of  the  European  Convention  In  the  hierarchy  of 
national  law. 
The  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  became  a  signatory  to  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  in  November  4,1950.  This 
was  subsequently  approved  by  means  of  a  federal  law 
(Zustimmungsgesetz)  pursuant  to  Article  59  para.  2  of  the  Basic 
Law  (Grundgesetz)  In  August  1952,  rendering  thereby  the 
Convention  part  of  the  domestic  federal  law  of  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany.  The  Ratification  extended  to  the  First 
Additional  Protocol  and  Protocol  Nos.  2,3,4,5,6  and  8  to  the 
European  Convention.  After  the  accession  of  the  German 
Democratic  Republic  In  accordance  with  Article  23  of  the  Basic 
Law  In  October  3,1990,  the  Convention  became  part  of  the  law  of 
the  new  Lander  of  Brandenburg,  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Sachsen,  Sachsen-Anhalt  and  Thfiringen,  as  well  as  In  East  Berlin. 
The  fact  that  the  Convention  was  incorporated  Into  German 
domestic  law  through  a  federal  law,  necessarily  means  that  the 
former  has  the  status  of  federal  law.  Consequently  it  is  not 
awarded  priority  or  even  equality  with  the  Federal  Constitution, 
something  ascertained  both  by  judicial  practIce12  and  legal  doc- 
trine,  13  and  It  Is  subjected  to  the  lex  posterior  derogat  legi  priori 
12  Federal  Supreme  Court  (Bundesgerichtshof),  Judgement  of  12/7/1966, 
BdHSt  21,81  (84);  Berlin  Higher  Regional  Court  (Kammergericht),  Decision 
of  1/9/198  1,  FamRZ  198  2,95,  (96);  Federal  Constitutional  Court 
(Bundesgerichtshof),  Decision  of  26/3/1987,  EuGRZ  1987,203  (206). 
13 
*  G.  Ress,  "The  ECHR  and  States  Practices:  The  Legal  Effect  of  the 
judgements  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  the  Internal  Law 
and  before  Domestic  Courts  of  the  Contracting  States",  in  I.  Maier  (ed.  ), 
protection  of  Human  Rights  in  Europe  (1982),  p.  209  (255);  M.  Hilf,  "Rang 
der  EMRK  Im  deutschen  RechV,  in  Mahrenholz/Hilf/Klein,  "Entwicklung 
102 rule.  14flowever,  up  to  now,  there  seems  to  be  no  ruling  by  a 
Gennan  Court,  which,  based  on  the  lex  posterior,  accorded  priority 
of  later  law  over  the  Convention. 
In  fact,  the  German  Courts  seem  to  be  favourable  towards 
two  other  rules  of  Interpretation  that  have  a  mitigating  effect  on 
the  lex  posterior  rule.  In  the  first  place,  the  courts  attempt  to  in- 
terpret  German  statutes,  in  accordance  with  the  Federal  Republic's 
international  obligations,  when  that  Is  possible.  There  Is  a  pre- 
sumption  that  the  legislature  does  not  intend  to  infringe  Interna- 
tional  oblIgations  when  enacting  new  legislation.  The 
Constitutional  Court  has  expressly  stated  that  international  liabil- 
ity  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  arising  from  breach  of 
rules  of  public  International  law  must  be  avolded,  15  reserving 
thereby  the  power  to  scrutinise  the  Interpretation  and  application 
of  the  treaties  by  judicial  decisions,  something  already  applied  as 
regards  the  Convention.  16  In  a  decision  of  March  26,1987,  it  ruled 
that  the  provisions  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights 
should  be  given  priority  even  over  subsequent  legislation  unless  a 
contrary  will  of  the  legislator  may  be  established.  17  Secondly, 
German  courts  see  the  European  Convention,  due  to  Its  nature  as 
an  instrument  for  the  protection  of  human  rights,  as  lex  specialls, 
with  the  consequence  that  even  later  laws  need  not  take  prece- 
dence  over  the  Convention. 
der  Menschenrechte  innerhalb  der  Staaten  des  Europarates"  (1987),  p.  19 
(39). 
14  Higher  Regional  Court  Berlin  (Kammergericht),  Decision  of  1/9/1981, 
FvýýO  1982,95  (96).  The  lex  posteilor  rule  did  not  apply  in  this  case,  since 
it  was  found  the  relevant  domestic  legislation  (Art.  1705  of  the  German  Civil 
Code)  not  to  be  in  violation  of  Art.  8  or  Art.  14  ECHR. 
15 
'  Decision  of  23/6/198  1,  BVerfGE  5  8,1  (34);  10/11/198  1,  BVerfGE  59,63  (89). 
16 
'  Decisions  of  11/10/1985  -  Pakelfi  -,  EuGRZ  1985,654;  26/3/1987,  EuGRZ 
1987,203. 
17.  BVerfGE  74,3  58  EuGRZ  19  87,203  (206). 
103 5.2.2.2.  Impact  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  judgements  of 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  national  jurisdiction 
The  protection  of  fundamental  rights  and  liberties  Is  in  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  entrusted  to  the  Federal 
Constitutional  Court.  Consequently,  Its  stance  towards  the 
Convention  is  particularly  Important.  Through  the  procedure  of 
constitutional  complaint,  any  person  who  considers  any  of 
his/hers  fundamental  rights  violated  by  the  public  power  can 
seize  the  Court  (Article  93  para.  1  No  4  (a)  of  the  Basic  Law 
[Grundgesetz]).  Pursuant  to  that  procedure,  the  Court  has  consis- 
tently  decided  that  the  complaint  cannot  be  based  directly  on  an 
alleged  violation  of  the  European  Convention.  18  In  spite  of  that,  it 
managed  to  find  a  way  to  take  Indirectly  into  consideration  the 
rights  Incorporated  In  the  Convention.  A  constitutional  complaint 
can  be  based  on  the  alleged  violation  of  the  plaintIfPs  fundamen- 
tal  rights  under  Article  3  para.  1  of  the  Basic  Law  by  arbitrary 
misapplication  or  arbitrary  non-application  of  the  Convention.  19 
Frowein  has  suggested  that  the  Court  should  consider  the 
Convention  as  part  of  the  "constitutional  order"  In  the  sense  of 
Article  2  para.  1  of  the  Basic  Law.  m  This  would  allow  individuals 
to  rely  for  complaints  on  the  articles  of  the  Convention  In  combi- 
18.  Decisions  of  14/l/1960,  BVerfGE10,271  (274);  14/3/1973,  BVerfGE34,384 
(395);  13/l/1976,  BVerfGE41,126(149);  17/5/1983,  BVerfGE64,135  (157); 
13/1/1987,  BVerfGE  74,102  (128). 
19.  Decisions  of  17/5/1983,  BVerfGE  64,135  (157);  13/1/1987,  BVerfGE  74,102 
(128).  Art.  3  para.  1  ("All  men  shall  be  equal  before  the  laW')  is  interpreted 
as  a  fundamental  right  protecting  against  unreasonable  (arbitrary) 
distinctions.  The  Court  has  brought  arbitrary  misapplication  of  law  by 
courts  under  this  constitutional  provision. 
20  j.  A.  Frowein,  "Das  Bundesverfassungsgericht  und  die  EMRK",  in 
"iestschrift  far  Wolfgang  Zeidler",  Vol.  2  (1987),  pp.  1763  (1768-1772). 
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I nation  with  Article  2  para.  1  of  the  Basic  Law.  This  suggestion  has 
not  been  followed  by  the  Court  so  far. 
Despite  the  above,  the  latter  has  considered  the  case-law  of 
the  European  Court  on  a  number  of  occasions.  In  a  decision  of 
December  21,1977,21  having  to  do  with  obligatory  sexual  educa- 
tion  in  public  schools,  the  Court  used  a  reasoning  very  similar  to 
that  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  In  its  decision  in  the 
Kieldsen  case.  22  just  like  the  European  Court,  the  German  Court 
emphasised  the  duty  of  the  school  to  respect  the  religious  and 
philosophical  convictions  of  the  parents  and  to  refrain  from  any 
attempt  aimed  at  advocating  a  specific  kind  of  sexual  behaviour. 
The  fact  remains,  however,  that  an  express  reference  to  the  ju- 
risprudence  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  or  the  provi- 
sions  of  the  European  Convention  was  not  made  in  this  case.  The 
Constitutional  Court  relied  exclusively  on  the  national  provisions. 
Therefore,  Its  attitude  here  should  be  described  as  primacy. 
In  other  cases,  mainly  In  the  field  of  criminal  law,  It  is  the 
interstitial  approach  that  seems  to  describe  the  attitude  of  the 
German  Constitutional  Court.  A  three-judge  panel 
(vorpufungsausschug)  of  the  Federal  Constitutional  Court  referred 
to  the  Eckle  case23in  Its  decision  of  November  24,1984.24It  ruled 
that  criminal  courts  may  only  draw  conclusions  from  a  delay  of 
criminal  proceedings  If  they  expressly  state  the  violation  of  the 
obligation  to  have  a  speedy  trial  and  clearly  determine  the  extent 
to  which  this  circumstance  Is  to  be  taken  Into  account.  In  Its  deci- 
sion  of  May  12,1987,25  the  Court  ruled  that  the  eight  years  resi- 
21 
, 
BVerfGE  47,46  EuGRZ  1978,57. 
22 
* 
judgement  of  7/12/1976,  Series  A  No.  23. 
23  judgement  of  15/7/1982,  Series  A  No.  513  HRLJ  303  (1982). 
24:  EuGRZ  1983,3  7  1. 
25.  EuGRZ  1987,449. 
105 dence  requirement  for  the  spouse  to  be  joined  In  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  complied  with  Art.  8  of  the  European 
Convention,  referring  to  the  ruling  of  the  European  Court  in  the 
Abdulaziz  case.  26  In  another  case,  the  Court  declared  that  the  right 
of  everyone  charged  with  a  criminal  offence  to  be  assisted  by  an 
Interpreter  at  least  during  oral  proceeding  if  he/she  cannot  un- 
derstand  or  speak  the  language  used  in  court  is  a  universally 
recognised  principle  of  international  law  in  accordance  with  Art. 
25  of  the  Basic  Law.  271n  this  last  instance  the  European 
Convention  was  not  specifically  mentioned.  It  can  be  seen,  though, 
that  an  analysis  of  provisions  other  than  the  national  ones  was 
conducted,  in  order  for  the  Constitutional  Court  to  reach  a  decision. 
it  is  suggested  that  In  this  occasion  adopted  an  interstitial 
approach. 
As  Interstitial  can  be  described  the  attitude  of  the 
Constitutional  Courtin  its  decision  of  March  26,1987.28  There  the 
complainant  had  alleged  the  violation  of  the  principle  of  pre- 
sumption  of  Innocence  because  he  was  charged  with  costs  and  ex- 
penses,  although  his  guilt  had  not  been  proven.  The  Court  found  a 
violation  of  Article  2  para.  1  of  the  Basic  Law  read  together  with 
the  principle  of  the  rule  of  law.  It  stated  expressly  that  there 
should  be  an  interpretation  of  the  Basic  Law  In  the  light  of  the 
European  Convention.  Consequently,  the  practice  of  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights  could  play  a  role  as  a  supplementary 
means  of  Interpretation  In  order  to  determine  the  scope  of  the 
26  Judgement  28/5/1985,  Series  A  No.  94. 
27:  Decision  of  21/5/1987,  NJW  1988,1462. 
28.  BVerfGE74,358  EuGRZ  1987,203;  confirmed  by  Decision  of  29/5/1990, 
EuGRZ  1990,329. 
106 fundamental  rights  incorporated  in  the  Basic  Law.  It  referred  in- 
ter  alla  to  the  Minelli  case.  29 
Other  German  courts  seem  also  to  prefer  the  interstitial 
approach.  The  field  where  the  Influence  of  Strasbourg  case-law 
has  been  particularly  significant  Is  that  of  criminal  procedure 
(Article  5  and  6  of  the  European  Convention).  When  it  comes  to 
Article  6  para.  3  (c),  a  number  of  German  courts  had  referred  to 
the  reports  of  the  European  Commission  of  Human  Rights  in  the 
case  of  Luedicke,  Eelkacem  and  KdC  30  After  the  interpretation  of 
the  Commission  had  been  confirmed  by  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights,  Its  ruling  was  relied  upon  by  other  courts  when 
interpreting  the  appropriate  provisions  of  the  European 
Convention.  31  Despite  that  judgement,  the  Higher  Regional  Court 
(Oberlandesgericht)  at  Hamm,  has  at  least  once  ignored  the 
provisions  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  specific  decision  of 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  following,  thus,  a  primacy 
approach.  32 
The  right  of  everyone  with  a  criminal  charge  against  him  to 
be  judged  within  a  reasonable  time  (Article  6  para.  1  of  the 
European  Convention)p  concerned  a  significant  number  of  cases. 
Even  before  the  Court's  ruling  in  the  K6n!  g  case,  33  the  German 
courts  considered  that  an  Infringement  of  this  right  because  of 
prolonged  legal  proceedings  should  only  contribute  to  the 
29  Judgement  of  25/3/1983,  Series  A  No.  62  4  HRIJ  215  (1983). 
30  Regional  Court  (Landgericht)  Frankfurt,  JurBilro  1987,1687;  Regional 
Court  (Landgericht)  Bonn,  JurBflro  1978,1849;  Lower  Regional  Court 
(Amtsgericht)  Berlin-Tiergarten,  NJW  1978,2462,  Comp.  Ress  (note  6),  p. 
260. 
31  E.  g..  Higher  Regional  Court  (Oberlandesgericht)  Ddsseldorf  21/3/1985, 
NýtZ  1985,370. 
32.  Decision  of  16/6/1978-1  Ws  26/78. 
33.  Judgement  of  28/6/1978,  Series  A  No.  27. 
107 mitigation  of  the  punishment.  34  This  practice  was  criticised  by  the 
Federal  Constitutional  Court  In  its  ruling  of  November  24,1983.35 
The  Court  found  that  there  may  be  an  obligation  to  discontinue 
proceedings  under  the  principle  of  the  rule  of  law,  especially 
when  the  guilt  of  the  accused  is  only  of  minor  Importance. 
Following  this  decision  and  the  judgement  of  the  European  Court 
of  Human  Rights  In  the  cases  K6n1g,  Eckle  and  Zfmmermann  and 
Steiner,  36  the  Regional  Court  (Landgericht)  of  Dilsseldorf  in  a 
recent  ruling  actually  quashed  proceedings  in  accordance  to 
Article  6  para.  1,  following,  thus,  an  Interstitial  approach.  37  This 
was  not  the  case  for  the  Federal  Supreme  Court  which,  in  Its 
decision  of  December  9,1987,38followed  the  primacy  approach  by 
not  referring  expressly  to  Strasbourg  case-law.  In  its  judgement  of 
March  15,1988,  the  Federal  Supreme  Administrative  Court  cited 
the  Dudgeon  case39  In  order  to  demonstrate  that  certain 
restrictions  on  homosexual  behaviour  are  admissible  in  a 
democratic  society-40  In  this  situation  the  Interstitial  approach  was 
followed. 
5.2.2.3.  Summary 
It  can  be  said  that  references  to  judgements  of  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights  and  to  decisions  of  the  European 
Commission  of  Human  Rights  have  become  more  frequent.  The 
34  Federal  Supreme  Court  (Bundesgerichtshof),  BGHSt  24,239.  Also 
juýgements  of  20/1/1987,  JZ  1987,528;  6/9/1988,  NStZ  1988,552. 
35 
*  EuGRZ  1984,94. 
36 
*  judgement  of  13/7/1983,  Series  A  No.  66  4  HRIJ  363  (1983). 
37 
*  Decision  of  26/8/1987,  NStZ  1988,427. 
38 
,  BGHSt35,137- 
39 
*,  judgement  of  22/10/1981,  Series  A  No.  45. 
40.  JZ  1988,209. 
108 fact,  however,  that  the  German  Constitution  contains  a  detailed  list 
of  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms  seems  to  prevent  a  wide 
consideration  of  the  rights  contained  in  the  Convention.  It  is 
mainly  the  field  of  criminal  law  that  the  case-law  of  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights  has  had  a  significant  influence  on  German 
judicial  practice.  There,  the  Interstitial,  seems  to  be  the  approach 
that  both  the  Constitutional  and  the  other  German  Courts  seem  to 
favour.  The  preferred  approaches  of  the  German  courts  when 
deciding  the  cases  mentioned  In  the  Polakiewicz  an  Jacob-Foltzer 
survey  are  demonstrated  -in  Table  2: 
Preferred  Case 
Approach  Examples 
Primacy  Decision  of 
21/12/77 
(Constitutional 
Court) 
Table  2 
Other  Case 
Approaches  Examples 
interstitial  Decision  of  1978 
(Regional  Court 
ofBonn) 
Decision  of  Decision  of 
16/6/1978  24/11/1983 
(Higher  Reg.  (Constitutional 
Court  of  Hamm)  Court) 
Decision  of  Decisionof 
9/12/1987  24/12/1984 
(Federal  (Constitutional 
Supreme  Court)  Court) 
Decision  of  1987 
(Regional  Court 
of  Frankfurt) 
Decision  of 
26/3/1987 
(Constitutional 
Court) 
109 Decision  of 
12/5/1987 
(Constitutional 
Court) 
Decision  of 
21/5/1987 
(Constitutional 
Court) 
Decision  of 
15/3/1988  (Fed. 
Supreme  Admin. 
Court) 
5.2.3.  FRANCE 
5.2.3.1.  Status  of  the  European  Convention  in  the  hierarchy  of 
national  law 
France  ratified  the  European  Convention  on  May  3,,  1974  and 
recognised  by  declaration  the  right  of  Individual  petition  in  1981. 
These  declarations  relate  to  all  the  rights  guaranteed  In  the 
Convention  and  the  Protocols  No.  1,4  and  6. 
The  Convention  was  Incorporated  Ipso  jure  into  the  domes- 
tic  legal  system  following  publication  In  the  joumal  Officiel.  In 
Article  55  of  the  Constitution  of  October  4,1958,  It  is  provided  as 
regards  the  status  of  treaties  in  domestic  law  that: 
"Treaties  or  agreements  duly  ratified  or  approved  shall,  upon 
their  publication,  have  an  authority  superior  to  that  of  laws,  sub- 
ject,  for  each  agreement  or  treaty,  to  its  application  by  the  other 
partyll. 
110 The  expression  "authority  superior  to  that  of  laws"  has 
caused  numerous  problems,  as  to  the  power  of  the  French  courts 
not  to  apply  legislation  contrary  to  the  Convention  if  the  provision 
is  more  recent  than  the  Convention.  The  Conseil  Constitutionnel 
does  not  examine  laws  for  their  conformity  with  treaties,  leaving 
it  for  other  courts  to  decide.  When,  for  Instance,  it  was  asked  to 
judge  on  the  conformity  of  the  Voluntary  Termination  of 
Pregnancy  Act  with  the  European  Convention,  41  it  ruled  that: 
11...  though  [the]  provisions  [of  Article  55  of  the  Constitution]  accord 
to  the  Treaties  ...  an  authority  superior  to  that  of  laws,  they  nei- 
ther  prescribe  nor  imply  that  this  provision  should  be  enforced  as 
part  of  the  supervision  of  the  conformity  of  laws  with  the 
Constitution  ...  ;  ...  the  fact  that  a  law  Is  contrary  to  a  treaty  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  It  is  to  the  Constitution;  ...  thus  the  supervi- 
sion  of  compliance  with  the  principle  set  out  in  Article  55  may  not 
be  exercised  as  part  of  the  examination  provided  for  in  Article  61, 
on  account  of  the  difference  in  nature  between  the  two  supervl- 
sory  procedures;  ...  this  being  so,  It  does  not  lie  with  the  Conseil 
Constitutionnel,  when  a  case  Is  referred  to  It  in  pursuance  of 
Article  61  ...  ,  to  consider  the  conformity  of  a  law  with  the  provi- 
sions  of  an  International  treaty  or  agreement...  ". 
The  Court  of  Cassation  on  the  other  hand,  does  not  seem  to 
share  the  opinion  of  the  Conseil  Constitutionnel,  as  Its  decision  In 
the  Soci&6  des  CaMs  Jacques  Vabre,  42  a  case  having  to  do  with  the 
EEC  Treaty,  indicates. 
41.  Decision  No.  74-75  DC  of  15/l/1975,  Reccueil  des  d6cisions  du  C.  c.  1975, 
19. 
42.  Cass.  Chambre  mixte  24/5/1975,  Dafloz  1975,497,  submissions  of  W 
Touffait  JCP  1975  fl,  18180  AJDA  1975,567,  with  note  by  Boulouls 
ill 
h- "  Whereas  the  Treaty  of  25  March  1957  when  by  virtue  of  the 
above  mentioned  Article  of  the  Constitution  had  an  authority  su- 
perior  to  that  of  laws,  Instituted  a  legal  order  of  Its  own  integrated 
Into  the  orders  of  the  member  States,  and  as,  therefore,  the  legal 
system  it  had  set  up  was  directly  applicable  to  the  nationals  of 
those  States  and  was  binding  on  their  courts,  the  Court  of  Appeal 
had  acted  correctly  and  within  Its  powers  in  deciding  that  Article 
95  of  the  Treaty  should  be  applied  In  the  case  under  considera- 
tion,  to  the  exclusion  of  article  265  (c)  of  the  Customs  Code,  even 
though  the  latter  text  was  more  recent".  The  attitude  of  the  French 
court  here,  despite  the  fact  that  the  case  did  not  Involve  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  reveals  definite  Interstitial 
elements. 
This  case  law  has  been  consistently  followed  by  trial  judges. 
One  example,  is  the  judgement  of  January  27,1987  of  the  Paris 
Regional  Court  In  the  Laboratories  Galeniques  Vernin  v.  Assedic  de 
Paris  43  case  where  it  was  held  that  a  subsequent  provision 
(Article  L.  122-14-4  of  the  Labour  Code)  was  Inapplicable  because 
of  Incompatibility  with  Articles  6,7  and  14  of  the  Convention  and 
Article  1  of  the  First  Protocol.  The  New  Federalist  approach 
followed  here  was  again  the  Interstitial  one. 
The  Conseil  d'Etat,  on  the  other  hand,  has  declined  for  a  long 
time  the  precedence  of  Community  Law  over  French  law,  as  Its 
judgement  of  March  1,1968  In  the  case  of  Syndicat  General  des 
fabricants  de  semoules  de  France44  indicated.  The  problem  re- 
garded  a  legislative  order  of  September  19,1962  which  kept  In 
force  for  a  provisional  period  between  France  and  Algeria  the 
43 
*  Tribunal  de  grande  instance  Paris  27/1/1987,  Droit  social  1987,469. 
44.  C.  E.  Section  1/3/1968,  Dalloz  1968,235,  submissions  of  Mrs.  Questiaux 
112 customs  arrangements  that  had  been  applicable  prior  to  the  lat- 
ter's  independence.  This  order  was  in  conflict  with  Regulation  No 
19  of  the  Community.  The  Conseil  d'Etat  found  in  favour  of  the 
national  law,  implicitly,  declaring  inapplicable  Article  55  of  the 
Constitution: 
11...  for  the  court  may  engage  in  any  assessment  of  the  consti- 
tutionality  of  the  act  declaring  it  Inapplicable  in  favour  of  a 
Community  provision.  " 
This  position  of  the  Conseil  d'Etat  was  confirmed  in  two 
Assembly  judgements  of  October  22,197945,  which  held  that  In 
the  event  of  a  conflict  between  a  treaty  or  an  International 
agreement  and  a  subsequent  law  it  would  afford  precedence  to 
the  law,  since  to  do  otherwise  would  be  to  judge  the  law's  con- 
formity  with  the  Constitution. 
The  Conseil  d'Etat  only  departed  from  that  case  law  in  an 
Assembly  judgement  of  October  20,198946having  to  do  with 
electoral  litigation.  The  Court  was  asked  If  citizens  from  Overseas 
Departments  and  Territories  had  the  right  to  vote  and  to  be 
elected  to  the  European  Parliament  in  the  June  1989  elections.  By 
declaring  that  the  1977  law  concerning  the  elections  to  the 
European  Parliament  was  not  incompatible  with  the  1957  Treaty 
of  Rome,  the  Conseil  d'Etat  affirmed  its  authority  to  examine  the 
compatibility  of  a  law  with  a  previous  treaty,  thereby  acknowl- 
edging  that  an  International  treaty  may  overrule  a  posterior  inter- 
nal  law  which  opposes  It.  Although  this  case  has  been  decided 
with  regard  to  the  Treaty  of  Rome  the  submissions  of  the 
45.  C.  E.  Ass.  22/10/1979  -  UDT,  AJDA  1980,39  RDP  1980,541,  submissionsof 
Mrs.  Hagelsteen,  and  C.  E.  Ass.  22/10/1979  Election  des  repr6sentants  a  1, 
Assembl6e  des  Conununaut6s  europdennes,  AJDA  1980,40  RDP  1980,541, 
submissions  of  Mr.  Morisot. 
46.  C.  E.  Ass.  20/10/1989  -  Nicolo,  JCP  198911,21371  RUDH  1989,262. 
113 Commissaire  du  Gouvemement,  Mr  Frydman,  clearly  indicate  that 
the  same  reasoning  would  apply  to  other  international  agree- 
ments,  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  Included. 
One  last  thing  that  has  to  be  mentioned  Is  that  the  French 
courts  have  recognised  the  direct  applicability  of  the  provisions  of 
the  Convention  and  the  protocols,  even  though  this  is  not  always 
the  case.  For  example,  the  Paris  Court  of  Appeal  considered  on 
February  2  9,19  8  0,  that: 
"...  such  provisions  [Articles  6,13  and  14  of  the  Convention],  which 
are  very  general  in  their  wording,  are  merely  guidelines  for  the 
legislation  of  the  various  signatory  States.  " 
This  judgement  disagrees  with  the  case-law  of  the  criminal 
chamber  of  the  Court  of  Cassation  which,  onjune  30,1976,47and, 
on  December  5,1978,48  examined  the  provisions  of  Articles  6  and 
13  of  the  Convention. 
5.2.3.2.  Impact  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  Judgements  of 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  national  jurisdiction 
The  provisions  of  the  Convention  and  of  the  Protocols  were 
held  In  low  esteem  by  French  judges.  In  1987,  for  instance,  a 
Court  of  Appeal  denied  that  the  European  Convention  had  any  di- 
rect  applicability  In  French  law,  a  decision  though,  which  did  not 
have  further  consequences.  49  In  this  case,  the  Bordeaux  Court  of 
Appeal,  held  In  its  judgement  of  March  27,1987,  that  Article  55 
of  the  Constitution  did  not  confer  on  International  conventions 
concluded  by  the  French  State  an  authority  superior  to  that  of 
47 
,  Cass.  crim.  30/6/1976  -  Glaeser-Touvier,  JCP  1977  11,12  18435. 
48.  Cass.  crim.  5/12/1978-Baroum  Ch6rif,  Daum  1979,50. 
49.  C.  A.  Bordeaux  27/3/1987,  Gaz.  Pal.  of  11/7/1987. 
114 domestic  laws  unless  each  one  was  applied  by  the  party;  this  was 
not  the  case  with  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights, 
which  constituted  only  a  declaration  by  the  States  of  their  inten- 
tion  to  bring  their  domestic  legislation  into  line  with  the 
Convention's  general  principles. 
The  Court  of  Cassation,  in  the  first  place,  still  takes  little 
consideration  of  the  law  of  the  Convention.  Very  often,  the  Judges 
will  consider  a  purely  formal  reference  to  the  Convention  ade- 
quate  and  make  very  little  reference  to  the  specific  judgements  of 
the  Court  or  the  reports  of  the  Commission.  Its  preferred  general 
approach,  then,  could  be  described  as  being  the  primacy  one. 
However,  In  connection  with  disciplinary  proceedings 
against  lawyers,  the  first  Civil  Chamber  of  the  Court  expressly  re- 
ferred  on  January  10,1984  to  the  Le  Compte  judgement  of  June 
23,198150  in  order  to  justify  the  Interpretation  of  a  provision  of 
the  Convention  relied  upon  before  it: 
"...  although  Article  6  para.  1  of  the  European  Convention  for 
the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms,  as 
interpreted  by  a  judgement  of  the  European  Court  of  Human 
Rights  of  23  June  1981,  accords  a  lawyer  against  whom  disci- 
plinary  proceedings  have  been  brought  before  the  Court  of  Appeal 
the  right  to  have  his  case  heard  publicly  and  to  have  the  judge- 
ment  In  the  case  delivered  at  a  public  hearing,  this  is  on  condition 
that  the  said  right  has  been  claimed  before  the  court.  " 
This  was  the  first  time  that  a  French  court  of  last  Instance 
had  expressly  referred  to  the  case  law  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights.  Subsequently  the  first  Civil  Chamber  has  reaf- 
firmed  that  Article  6  para.  1  could  be  applicable  in  disciplinary 
50.  Cass.  civ.  10/l/1984,  JCP  1984  H,  20210,  SUbnliSsions  of  W.  Gulphe. 
115 proceedings  concerning  lawyers,  officially-appointed  members  of 
certain  professions  (officiers  ministeriels)  and  legal  experts.  51  In 
these  Instances  the  French  court  clearly  followed  an  interstitial 
approach. 
The  interstitial  approach  was  again  followed  by  the  Court  of 
Cassation  in  its  judgement  of  May  18,1989.  There  it  held  that 
judicial  impartiality  according  to  Article  6  para.  1  of  the  European 
Convention  has  to  be  established  objectively.  52  Thereby  the  Court 
of  Cassation  complied  with  the  practice  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights.  53 
In  its  Kruslin  judgement  of  June  23,1985,54  the  Criminal 
Chamber  clearly  followed  an  interstitial  approach  when  it  found, 
that  telephone  tapping  carried  out  at  the  request  of  the  In- 
vestigating  judge'was  legal,  and  dismissed  the  appeal  in  so  far  as 
it  claimed  a  breach  of  Article  8  of  the  Convention.  It  argued  that 
under  the  provisions  of  that  article  only  a  law  which  meets  the 
requirement  of  being  necessary  for  the  prevention,  of  disorder  or 
crime  could  justify  Interference  by  a  public  authority  with  the  ex- 
ercise  of  the  right  of  every  Individual  to  respect  for  his  private 
life  and  correspondence.  Pointing  out  that  Article  81  of  the  Code  of 
Criminal  Procedure  authorises  telephone  tapping  and  that  Article 
151  of  the  same  Code  sets  certain  limits  on  such  a  practice  the 
Criminal  Chamber  distanced  itself  from  the  interpretation  of 
Article  8  as  given  by  the  European  Court  which,  equating  a  tele- 
phone  communication  with  correspondence,  insisted  that  such  a 
51.  Cass.  civ.  10/3/1987,  Gaz.  Pal.  of  10-11/6/1987;  Cass.  civ.  10/12/1985;  Gaz. 
Pal.  of  4-5/5/1986;  Cass.  civ.  20/l/1987,  Gaz.  Pal  of  20-21/5/1987. 
52.  Cass.  civ.  18/5/1989,  Dalloz  1990,113. 
53.  Piersack  case,  judgement  of  1/10/1982,  Series  A  No.  53  =4  HRU  207 
(1983);  De  Cubber  case,  judgement  of  26/10/1984,  Series  A  No.  86. 
-54.  Cass.  crim.  23/7/1985,  Dafloz  1986,  pp.  61. 
116 communication  should  not  be  intercepted  In  the  absence  of  a  law 
free  from  obscurity  and  carrying  conditions  designed  to.  reduce 
the  effect  of  the  measure  to  a  minimum.  55 
"  Whereas,  secondly,  It  follows  from  Article  81  and  15  1  (c) 
of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  that  an  investigating  judge  may 
not  call  for  telephone  tapping  unless  there  is  presumption  of  a 
specific  offence  which  has  led  to  the  opening  of  the  investigation 
he  is  conducting,  and  that  these  measures  may  not  be  aimed  at  a 
whole  category  of  offences; 
whereas,  moreover  any  tapping  that  is  ordered  must  be 
carried  out  under  the  supervision  of  the  Investigating  judge, 
without  the  use  of  any  artifice  or  stratagem  and  without  prejudice 
to  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  a  fair  hearing; 
whereas  these  provisions  governing  recourse  by  an 
Investigating  judge  to  telephone  tapping,  from  which  no  departure 
has  been  shown  to  have  occurred  in  the  present  case,  meet  the 
requirements  of  Article  8  of  the  European  Convention  of  Human 
Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms;  accordingly  the  claim  put 
forward  must  be  rejected.  " 
This  reasoning  did  not,  however,  convince  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights.  In  Its  Kruslin  judgement,  the  Court  found 
that  there  had  been  a  violation  of  Article  8  of  the  Convention. 
According  to  the  Court,  French  law  on  telephone  tapping  did  not 
provide  adequate  safeguards  against  possible  abuses  because  the 
scope  and  manner  of  exercise  of  the  relevant  discretion  conferred 
on  the  public  authorities  had  not  been  proved  with  reasonable 
clarity. 
55  Klass  case,  judgement  of  6/9/1978,  Series  A  No.  28;  Malone  case, 
juýgement  of  2/8/1984,  Series  A  No.  82  5  HRIJ  319  (1984). 
117 For  the  first  time  a  judgement  has  precisely  defmied  the  dis- 
tinction  between  the  term  "reasonable  time"  appearing  in  Article 
5  para.  3  of  the  Convention,  concerning  the  length  of  judicial  in- 
vestigations,  and  the  term  "speedily"  used  in  Article  5  para.  4 
which  refers  to  the  examination  by  the  court  of  the  lawfulness  of 
detention.  The  judgement  in  question,  of  September  29,1988,56 
reads  as  follows: 
"The  concept  of  "reasonable  time"  within  which  an  Individ- 
ual  has  the  right  to  be  tried  under  Article  5  para.  3  of  the 
European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  is  necessarily  indissociable 
from  the  overall  context  of  the  case  being  tried  and  depends 
mainly  on  an  objective  examination  of  the  facts  of  the  case. 
The  requirement  in  Article  5  para.  4  of  the  European  Human 
Rights  Convention  that  a  request  for  release  should  be  decided 
"speedily"  means  that  the  time  taken  to  reach  such  a  decision 
should  not  exceed  the  time  strictly  necessary  for  submitting  the 
request  to  the  competent  court,  independently  of  Investigation 
pending  on  the  charges  concerned.  " 
The  approach  that  was  followed  here,  seems  again  to  be  the 
interstitial  one. 
The  Conseil  Constitutionnel  adopted  Interstitial  thinking 
when  It  ruled,  on  October  21,1988,  on  the  compatibility  of  the 
voting  system  in  use  regarding  the  elections  of  5  and  12  June 
1988,  with  Article  3  of  the  First  Protocol.  It  said:  57 
"Whereas  under  the  terms  of  Article  3  of  the  above-mentioned 
Protocol,  'the  High  Contracting  Parties  undertake  to  hold  free  elec- 
tions  at  reasonable  Intervals  by  secret  ballot,  under  conditions 
56.  C.  A.  Paris  29/9/1988,  Dalloz  1986,43. 
57.  Decision  No.  88-1082,1117  (21/10/1988) 
,  Recueil  des  D6sicions  du  C.  C. 
1988,183. 
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In  the  choice  of  the  legislature';  whereas  the  provisions  of  Act  No. 
86-825  of  11  July  1986,  which  determine  the  voting  system  used 
for  the  election  of  deputies  to  the  National  Assembly,  are  not, 
taken  as  a  whole,  Incompatible  with  the  provisions  of  Article  3  of 
the  First  Additional  Protocol  to  the  European  Convention  for  the 
Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms;  Whereas 
it  consequently  lies  with  Conseil  Constitutionnel  to  apply  the 
above-mentioned  Act.  " 
The  Conseil  d'Etat  seems  to  follow  the  Interstitial  approach, 
In  Its  decisions  regarding  the  application  of  Article  6  para.  1  of  the 
European  Convention  to  disciplinary  proceedings  against  doctors, 
architects,  dentists  and  pharmacists.  In  Its  Debut  decision,  58  after 
analysing  its  national  law,  decided  that  the  above  mentioned 
Article  only  applied  to  civil  and  criminal  courts,  disciplinary 
tribunals  excluded.  Subsequently  this  position  has  been  applied  to 
disciplinary  tribunals  of  every  profession.  59  During  the  Subrini 
case  the  Commisaire  du  Gouvernement  asked  the  Conseil  d'  Etat  to 
abide  by  the  European  Court's  case  law  regarding  application  of 
Article  6  para.  1  of  the  Convention  to  disciplinary  proceedings  re- 
garding  doctors.  The  Conseil  d'  Etat,  however,  reconfirmed  its  ear- 
lier  case  law  and  decided  that  the  provisions  of  Article  6  para.  1  of 
the  European  Convention  did  not  apply  to  disciplinary  tribunals.  It 
said: 
"Whereas  on  the  one  hand,  by  finding  that  the  fees  charged 
by  Mr.  Subrini  were  excessive  and  that  he  failed  in  his  obligation 
to  set  them  In  a  tactful  and  moderate  fashion,  the  disciplinary 
58.  C.  E.  section  27/10/1978,  Rec.  1978,395. 
59.  C.  E.  3/4/1980  (Ordre  des  Architectes),  Rec.  1980,181;  C.  E.  0  14/1/1981 
(Ordre  des  Pharmaciens),  JCP  1981  IT,  No.  19650;  C.  E.  28/l/1981,  No.  55. 
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equate  grounds  for  its  decision  on  this  matter;  whereas,  on  the 
other  hand,  although  Article  6  para.  1  of  the  European  Convention 
for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms, 
ratified  by  France  by  virtue  of  the  Act  of  31  December  1973  and 
published  in  the  journal  Officiel  by  decree  of  3  May  1974,  pro- 
vides  that:  'In  the  determination  of  his  civil  rights  and  obligations 
or  of  any  criminal  charge  against  him,  everyone  is  entitled  to  a 
fair  and  public  hearing  within  a  reasonable  time  by  an  indepen- 
dent  and  Impartial  tribunal  established  by  law',  disciplinary  tri- 
bunals  do  not  determine  disputes  (contestations)  concerning  civil 
rights  and  obligations;  whereas,  therefore,  the  above  mentioned 
provisions  of  Article  6  para.  1  of  the  said  European  Convention  do 
not  apply  to  them.  "60  The  approach,  then,  adopted  by  the  Conseil 
d'Etat  was  again  the  interstitial  one. 
5.2.3.3.  Summary 
The  Polakiewicz  and  Jacob-Foltzer  survey  indicates  that  the 
French  judges  have  started  to  change  their  opinion  about  the  role 
that  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  can  play  In  the 
protection  of  the  rights  of  the  French  citizens.  Proof  to  that  Is,  that 
references  to  the 
-Convention 
and  the  decisions  of  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights  have  become  more  frequent.  It  must  be 
conceded,  that  the  law  of  the  Convention  usually  takes  second 
place  to  the  national  protective  provisions,  something  Indicated 
especially  by  the  practice  of  the  Court  of  Cassation.  It  should  be 
noticed,  however,  that  there  is  utilisation,  on  a  regular  basis,  of 
60.  c.  E.  Ass.,  Rec.  1984,259  DaUoz  1985,150)  submissions  of  W.  Genevois. 
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well  as  the  Conseil  Constitutionnel  and  the  Conseil  d'Etat,  by 
means  of  references  to  the  Convention,  in  regard  to  specific  kinds 
of  cases.  This  suggests  that  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  have 
started  to  gain  the  trust  of  the  French  courts. 
The  following  Table  3  summarises  the  New  Federalist 
approaches  adopted  by  the  French  courts  when  deciding  the  cases 
mentioned  In  this  survey: 
Table  3 
lob 
Preferred  Case 
Approach  Examples 
Other 
Approaches 
Case 
Examples 
Primacy  Decision  of 
27/3/1987  (C.  A.. 
Bordeaux) 
Interstitial  Decision  of 
10/l/1984 
(Court  of 
Cassation) 
Decision  of 
10/3/1987 
(Courtof 
Cassation) 
Decision  of 
18/5/1989 
(Courtof 
Cassation) 
Decision  of 
23/7/1985 
(Court  of 
Cassation) 
Decision  of 
29/9/1988 
(C.  A.  Paris) 
121 Decision  No.  88- 
1082  of 
21/10/1988 
(Consell 
Constitutionnel) 
Decision  of 
27/10/1978 
(Conseil  d'Etat) 
Decision  of 
3/4/1980 
(Conseil  d'Etat) 
Decision  of 
14/1/1981 
(Conseil  d'Etat) 
Decision  of 
28/1/1981 
(Conseil  d'Etat) 
Rec.  1984 
(Consell  d'Etat) 
122 5.2.4.  GREECE 
5.2.4.1.  Status  of  the  European  Convention  in  the  hierarchy  of 
national  law 
The  Convention  was  signed  by  Greece  on  November  28, 
1950.  It  was  approved  by  Parliament  and  brought  Into  force  do- 
mestically  by  means  of  Act  No.  2329  of  March,  18  1953.  It  was 
first  ratified  together  with  the  First  Protocol  on  March  28,1953. 
During  the  Colonels'  dictatorship,  the  country  resigned  from  the 
Council  of  Europe  and  denounced  the  Convention.  61  Following  the 
restoration  of  democracy,  Greece  reratified  the  Convention  and  the 
First  Additional  Protocol  on  November  28,1974.  The  compulsory 
jurisdiction  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  under  Article 
46  of  the  European  Convention  was  accepted  on  January  30,1979 
but  the  competence  of  the  Commission  to  receive  Individual  peti- 
dons  under  Article  25  of  the  European  Convention,  did  not  become 
a  reality  until  November  20,1985.  From  that  point  onwards,  both 
have  been  renewed.  Protocols  Nos.  2,3,5,7  and  8  to  the 
Convention  have  also  been  ratified  by  Greece. 
The  Greek  Constitution  Incorporates  In  Article  28  para.  1  an 
express  provision  regarding  the  relationship  between  Interna- 
tional  and  domestic  law. 
"The  generally  acknowledged  rules  of  international  law,  as  well  as 
international  conventions  as  of  the  time  they  are  sanctioned  by 
law  and  become  operative  according  to  the  conditions  therein 
61.  See  H.  D.  Coleman,  "Greece  and  the  Council  of  Europe",  Israel  Yearbook 
on  Human  Rights  2  (1972),  pp.  121  ff. 
123 shall  be  an  integral  part  of  domestic  Greek  law  and  shall  prevail 
over  any  contrary  provision  of  law.  " 
This  provision  institutes  a  practice  that  contradicts  previous 
behaviour  dictating  that  international  agreements  could  only  have 
the  same  legal  force  as  of  that  of  regular  acts  of  Parliament  This 
necessarily  meant  that  the  rule  lex  posterior  deroga  t  priori  was  In 
principle  applicable  to  these  agreements  with  all  the  implications 
connected  to  the  above  rule.  62  Under  the  new  Constitution,  the 
substantive  provisions  of  international  treaties  such  as  the 
Convention  are  given  precedence  over  domestic  legislation  en- 
acted  both  prior  and  subsequent  to  the  entry  of  the  force  of  the 
Treaty.  63Under  Article  28  para.  1  of  the  Constitution,  Greek  judges 
faced  with  situations  relating  to  conflicts  between  domestic  and 
international  law  should  expressly  apply  the  latter.  When  It  comes 
to  the  Convention,  Its  primacy  over  domestic  law  has  been  ex- 
plicitly  confirmed  by  Greek  courts,  the  Court  of  Cassation  (Arejos 
Pagos)  included-64 
5.2.4.2.  Impact  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  Judgements  of 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  national  jurisdiction 
Despite  the  fact  that  all  substantive  provisions  of  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  were  guaranteed  superior- 
62.  A.  A.  Fatouros,  "International  Law  in  the  New  Greek  Constitution",  AJIL 
70  (1976),  p.  492  (501);  A.  Cannone,  "Ladattamento  di  diritto  interno  al 
diritto  internazionale  nella  Costituzione  greca  del  1975",  RDI 65  (1982),  p. 
288(295). 
63.  Fatouros  ibid  p.  503;  Cannone  ibid.. 
64.  Court  of  Cassation,  Decision  No.  967/1982,  Poinika  Chronik-a  33  (1983), 
289;  Council  of  State,  Decision  No.  1802/86,  To  Syntagma  13  (1987),  341; 
Council  of  State,  Decision  No.  5040/87,  To  Syntagma  13  (1987),  727; 
Permanent  Court  Martial  of  Thessaloniki,  Decision  No.  38/1987,  To  Syntagma 
13  (1987),  744. 
124 Ity  over  domestic  law  by  the  Constitution,  Greek  Courts  have  not, 
until  recently,  demonstrated  a  willingness  to  award  full  effect  to 
them.  65  This  attitude  was  described  by  Vegleris  as  a  corps 
etrangei-.  "Ignored  If  its  existence  is  not  recalled  to  the  Judges, 
misunderstood  and  Inoperative  if  it  Is".  66  It  seems  though,  that  the 
situation  is  slowly  but  steadily  improving.  Following  the  recogni- 
tion  by  Greece  In  1985  of  the  right  of  individual  petition,  the 
judges,  fearing  challenges  to  their  decisions  before  the 
Commission,  started  to  pay  more  attention  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Convention.  67  Notwithstanding  this  development,  express  refer- 
ences  to  either  decisions  of  the  Commission  or  Judgements  of  the 
Court  are  still  not  common.  Therefore,  from  the  New  Federalist 
point  of  view,  the  approach  that  the  Greek  courts  favour  Is  the 
primacy  one. 
The  Interstitlal  approach  was  utillsed  by  the  Court  of 
Cassation(Arelos  Pagos)  in  Decision  No.  427/86.  What  was  under 
consideration  was  whether  the  exclusion  of  the  accused  from  the 
court  hearing  of  a  cassation  appeal  In  the  interest  of  the  law  was 
compatible  with  Article  6  para.  1  of  the  European  Convention.  68 
The  Court  Insisted  on  the  fact  that  this  appeal  could  not  have  any 
detrimental  consequences  for  the  accused.  It  decided  that  Article 
6  para.  1  could  only  be  applied  in  appeal  procedures  that  brought 
65.  P.  Vegleris,  "Statut  de  la  Convention  des  droit  de  11homme  dans  le  droit 
k  ec",  in  M61anges  d6dids  A  R.  Pelloux:  (1980),  pp.  299-318. 
Ibid  p.  3  18. 
67 
,  A.  Yotopoulos-Marangopoulos,  "The  Hellenic  experience  conceming  the 
protection  of  human  rights  and  particularly  the  implementation  of  the 
rights  and  freedoms  embodied  in  the  European  Convention"  in  "The 
implementation  in  National  Law  of  The  European  Convention  on  Human 
Rights,  Proceedings  of  the  Fourth  Copenhagen  Conference  on  Human 
Rights"  (28  and  29  October  1988)  (1989),  pp.  62-66. 
68.  To  Syntagma  13  (1987),  528. 
125 the  case  Into  a  new  instance  and  could  lead  to  a  new  decision  that 
may  rebound  on  the  position  of  the  person  concerned. 
The  Greek  Military  Criminal  Code  does  not  provide  for  the 
suspension  of  pre-trial  detention  on  condition  that  other  guaran- 
tees  are  available  that  will  ensure  the  appearance  of  the  accused 
for  trial.  The  Permanent  Court  Martial  of  Thessaloniki,  in  its  deci- 
sion  No.  38/87,  applied  the  general  Code  of  Penal  Procedure,  in 
order  to  fill  the  vacuum.  69  In  justifying  its  decision  the  court  said 
that  the  Military  Penal  Code  was  significantly  limited  as  regards 
the  rights  of  the  accused,  something  that  had  to  be  remedied  by 
means  of  this  analogous  application,  as  commanded  by  Article  5 
para.  3  of  the  European  Convention.  It  should  be  noted  however, 
that  the  subsidiary  application  of  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of 
Penal  Procedure  Is  provided  for  by  the  Military  Criminal  Code 
(Article  434).  Despite,  this  last  remark,  the  Greek  court  seemed  in 
this  case  to  adopt  an  Interstitial  approach  Instead  of  the  primacy 
one. 
It  Is  not  a  common  occurrence  that  Greek  courts  find  na- 
tional  law  to  contravene  the  European  Convention  of  Human 
Rights.  A  rare  example,  which  at  the  same  is  an  adoption  of  the 
interstitial  approach,  Is  Decision  No.  1802/86  of  the  Third 
Chamber  of  the  Council  of  State(Symvoulio  tis  Epikrateias),  70  the 
highest  administrative  court  of  the  country  which  is  very  similar, 
as  far  as  functions  and  organisation  are  concerned,  to  the  French 
Conseil  d'Etat.  Certain  disciplinary  regulations  of  the  Greek  air- 
force  prohibiting  servicemen  from  making  statements  to  the  press 
or  publishing  anything  without  the  prior  consent  of  the  Ministry 
69 
,  To  Syntagma  13  (1987),  744  POinika  ChrOnika  37  (1987),  472. 
70.  To  Syntagma  13  (1987),  341. 
126 of  Defence,  were  declared  to  violate  both  the  Greek  Constitution 
and  Article  10  of  the  European  Convention. 
The  Interstitial  approach  was  also  adopted  In  the  decision  of 
the  Council  of  State  on  another  occasion,  when  It  considered 
whether  the  legislation  establishing  a  State  monopoly  on  broad- 
casting  and  television  enterprises  (Law  No.  23/75)  was  In  compli- 
ance  with  the  European  Convention.  A  decision  given  by  the 
Assembly  of  the  Council  of  State7l  had  decided  that  the  situation 
regarding  whether  broadcasting  and  television  enterprises  should 
be  public  or  private  entities  or  whether  there  should  be  one  or 
more  of  these  enterprises,  was  not  regulated  by  Article  10  of  the 
European  Convention.  Regulation  In  this  area  was  left  to  the  dis- 
cretion  of  the  national  legislator,  therefore  Law  230/75  was  con- 
sidered  to  contradict  neither  the  Constitution  nor  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights.  There  was  one  dissenting  voice, 
declaring  that  the  last  sentence  of  Article  10  para.  1  of  the 
European  Convention  expressly  indicated  that  the  maximum  State 
intervention  allowed  under  the  Convention  was  a  licensing  sys- 
tem,  something  that  rendered  a  rigid  State  monopoly  Inadmissi- 
ble.  72 
71  Decision  5040/87,  To  Syntagma  13  (1987),  727,  See  also  the  previous 
DLcision  990/87  [To  Syntagnia  13  (1987),  730]  by  the  Fourth  Chamber  of  the 
Council  of  State  which  came  to  the  same  conclusions. 
72.  The  practice  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  also  points  towards 
that  direction.  In  the  Autronic  AG  case  (judgement  of  22/5/1990,  Series  A 
No.  178,  para.  61),  it  held  that  State  interference  with  the  exercise  of  the 
rights  and  freedoms  guaranteed  in  AM  10  para.  1  of  the  European 
Convention  is  subject  to  a  Strict  Supervision  by  the  Court. 
127 5.2.4.3.  Summary 
The  provisions  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  decisions 
of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  have  started  to  be 
seriously  considered  by  the  Greek  judges  only  after  1985.  Until 
then,  the  primacy  approach  characterised  their  attitude  towards 
the  law  of  the  Convention.  Whereas,  though,  primacy  is  still  the 
favourite  approach  of  the  Greek  judges,  there  are  Indications  that 
interstitial  thinking  is  creeping  into  the  decisions  of  the  Greek 
courts  as  the  survey  indicates.  Table  4  summarises  the  attitude  of 
the  Greek  courts  when  deciding  the  cases  mentioned  in  the 
survey: 
Table  4 
Preferred  Case  Other  Case 
Approach  Examples  Approaches  Examples 
Primacy  Interstitial  Decision  427/86 
(Court  of 
Cassation) 
Decision 
1802/86 
(Council  of  State) 
Decision  990/87 
(Council  of  State) 
Decision  38/87 
(Penn.  Court 
Martial  of 
Thessaloniki) 
Decision 
5040/87 
(Council  of  State) 
128 5.2.5.  ITALY 
5.2.5.1.  Status  of  the  European  Convention  in  the  hierarchy  of 
national  law 
Italy  signed  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  on 
November  4,1950  and  ratified  It  on  October  26,1955  together 
with  the  First  Protocol  to  the  Convention.  However,  the  right  of 
individual  petition  before  the  Commission  and  the  compulsory  ju- 
risdiction  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  were  not  ac- 
cepted  until  August  1,1973.  The  declaration  under  Articles  25 
and  46  has  been  renewed  ever  since.  Italy  has  also  ratified 
Protocols  No.  2,3,4,5,6  and  8  to  the  European  Convention. 
The  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  on  was  incorpo- 
rated  Into  Italian  domestic  law  by  Act  No.  848  of  August  4,1955. 
The  rights  guaranteed  by  the  Convention  on  Human  Rights  was  in- 
corporated  through  an  ordinary  law,  the  judicial  practice  of  both 
the  Constitutional  Court,  and  the  Court  of  Cassation2,  as  well  as  one 
legal  opin1on3  have  accorded  it  the  force  and  status  of  an  ordinary 
law.  However,  certain  judicial  decisions  and  a  number  of  legal 
writers  ascribe  constitutional  or  quasi-constitutional  weight 
1.  Corte  cost.  22/12/1980,  No.  188,  Giur.  Cost.  1980,1,1612;  14/4/1986,  No.  91, 
Giur.  cost.  1986,1,518. 
2.  Cass.  pen.  9/7/1982,  Giust.  pen.  1983,111,461;  9/7/1982-Signiorelfi,  Cass. 
pen.  1984,1463;  3/12/1982-Strapoladni,  Cass.  pen.  1984,1464;  27/10/1984- 
Venditti,  Giust.  pen.  1985  111,601;  13/7/1985-Buda,  Giur.  it.  1986,11,72. 
3.  A.  Nocerino  Grisoti,  Walore  ed  efficacia  della  CEDU  nell'  ordinamento 
italiano",  in:  G  Biscottini  (ed.  ),  "La  CEDU  nell'  applicazione 
giurisprudenziale  in  Italia"  (1981),  p.  123  (129). 
129 to  the  Convention  by  reason  of  the  terms  of  Article  10  para.  1  of 
the  Italian  Constitution: 
"The  Italian  legal  system  shall  conform  to  the  generally 
recognised  principles  of  international  law.  " 
The  theory  that  the  rules  of  the  Convention  are  "constitu- 
tionallsed"  by  virtue  of  Article  10  para.  1  of  the  Italian 
Constitution  and  the  principle  pacta  sun  t  servanda  has  been  up- 
held  by  the  Court  of  Audit76,  and  by  certain  judgements  of  the 
Court  of  Cassation77  as  well  as  by  some  lower  courts.  78  The 
Constitutional  Courtp  on  the  other  hand,  has  always  denied  that  the 
Convention  has  any  constitutional  status.  Consequently,  the  rules 
of  the  Convention  have  abrogatory  force  only  In  respect  of  do- 
mestic  legislation  enacted  prior  to  its  ratIfication.  79 
5.2.5.2.  Impact  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  judgements  of 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  national  jurisdiction 
The  case-law  of  the  Italian  courts  contains  so  far,  few  refer- 
ences  to  decisions  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights.  Some 
Italian  writers  have  even  spoken  of  a  certain  "case-law  absen- 
teeism"  concerning  the  International  obligations  of  the  Italian 
State.  80  This  attitude  is  now  slowly  changing. 
76.  Corte  dei  Conti,  sezione  riunite  27/3/1980,  Foro  it.  1980  111,352. 
77.  E.  g..  Cass.  pen.  23/3/1972,  Giust.  pen.  1973,111,259. 
78.  See  for  example:  Trib.  Roma  28/2/1974,  Riv.  it.  dir.  proc.  pen.  1975,586, 
with  note  by  Mazzacuva;  Pret.  Ragusa  10/7/1975,  Giur.  Cost.  1976,11,339. 
79.  Consiglio  Superiore  della  Magistratura,  sezione  discipUnare  5/7/1985, 
Foro  it.  1986,111,43,  with  note  by  Pizzorusso. 
80.  p.  Mori,  "CEDU,  Patto  delle  Nazioni  unite  e  costituzione  italiana",  RDI  66 
(1983),  p.  306,  with  further  references.  See  also  D.  Rinoldi,  "La  CEDU  neill 
applicazione  giurisprudenziale  in  Italia:  in  margine  ad  un  recente  raccolta 
di  decisioni",  Diritto  comunitario  e  degli  scambi  internazionali  21  (1982),  p. 
790. 
130 The  Constitutional  Court,  in  the  first  place,  does  not  accord 
constitutional  rank  to  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights, 
it  does  not  seem  possible  to  base  a  plea  of  unconstitutionality  on  a 
breach  of  the  Convention.  Hitherto  the  Constitutional  Court  has 
resisted  all  attempts  by  legal  writers  to  "constitutionallse"  the 
rules  of  the  Convention.  It  has,  for  example,  maintained  that  the 
provisions  of  the  Convention  could  acquire  constitutional  status  by 
the  operation  of  Article  10  para.  1  of  the  Italian  Constitution  and 
by  virtue  of  the  principle  paaa  sun  t  servanda.  However,  It  is  now 
the  established  practice  of  the  Constitutional  Court  to  consider  that 
"Article  10  para.  1  of  the  Constitution  Is  aimed  at  the  auto- 
matic  conformity  (of  the  Italian  legal  system)  only  to  interna- 
tional-law  rules  of  a  customary  nature,  not  to  those  of  treaty  orl- 
gin. 
1181 
Alternatively,  It  has  been  proposed  that  the  Convention 
could  be  "constitutionalised"  by  means  of  Article  2  of  the  Italian 
Constitution  which  recognises  the  protection  of  "Inviolable  human 
rights".  The  rights  protected  by  the  European  Convention  on 
Human  Rights  should  "be  deemed  covered  by  this  general  clause 
and  raised  to  the  status  of  rules  of  the  Constitution".  82  It  is  proba- 
bly  with  this  in  mind  that  the  Constitutional  Court  has  sometimes 
maintained  the  special  importance  of  the  European  Convention  in 
Its  interpretation  of  Article  2  of  the  Italian  Constitution.  For  ex- 
ample,  it  Is  held  that  the  renewable  nature  of  the  right  to  Institute 
judicial  proceedings  within  the  context  of  inviolable  human  rights 
81.  Corte  Cost.  6/3/1987,  No.  153,  Foro  it.  1987,1,1965;  22/12/1980,  No.  188, 
Foro  it.  1987,1,318. 
82 
*  F.  Bricola,  "Prospetive  e  limid  della  tutela  penale  deRa  riservatezza",  Riv. 
it.  dir.  proc.  pen.  10  (1967),  p.  1079  (1099). 
131 may  "also  be  deduced  from  the  consideration  accorded  to  It  by 
Article  6  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights".  83 
in  general,  however,  the  European  Convention  on  Human 
Rights  does  not  play  a  major  role  in  Italian  constitutional  case-law. 
The  approach  that  the  Italian  courts  seem  to  favour,  from  the  New 
Federalist  point  of  view,  Is  clearly  the  primacy  one.  The 
Constitutional  Courts  judgement  on  February  1,198284  is  highly 
significant  in  this  respect.  Here,  the  Court  was  required  to  examine 
the  constitutionality  of  Act  No.  15  of  February  1980,  which  ex- 
tended  the  maximum  period  of  pre-trial  custody  under  anti-ter- 
rorist  legislation.  After  reaffirming  that  the  rules  of  the  Human 
Rights  Convention  had  the  force  of  an  ordinary  Act,  the  Court 
avoided  the  question  of  whether  the  rules  at  issue  were  in  accor- 
dance  with  the  Convention  and  disregarded  the  abundant  case- 
law  of  the  Strasbourg  organs.  The  court  concluded  that  the  terms 
of  Italian  legislation  were  not  unreasonable  in  view  of  the  serious 
threat  posed  by  terrorist  attacks. 
One  of  the  few  examples  of  interstitial  thinking,  by  means  of 
an  express  reference  by  the  Constitutional  Court  to  the  case-law  of 
the  Strasbourg  organs  (in  this  case,  the  Commission)  is  the 
judgement  of  December  22,1980,85  where  the  Court  held  that 
Article  6  para.  3  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  did 
not  require  member  States  to  acknowledge  the  right  of  accused 
persons  to  defend  themselves  and  did  not  preclude  the  application 
of  a  different  system  of  rules,  provided  the  system  had  been 
adopted  in  the  interests  of  the  proper  administration  of  justice. 
83.  Corte  Cost.  27/12/1965,  No.  98. 
84.  No.  15,  Foro  it.  1982,  L  213  1,  with  note  by  NobW. 
85.  No.  18  8,  Foro  it.  198  1,1,3  18. 
132 Contentions  of  violation  of  the  European  Convention  on 
Human  Rights  brought  before  other  Italian  courts  have  mostly 
been  related  to  criminal  procedure.  86  The  case-law  of  the  Court  of 
Cassation  In  criminal  matters  is  particular  important.  It  should  be 
noted,  however,  that  in  spite  of  repeated  judgements  against  the 
Italian  State  particularly  In  cases  concerning  the  conformity  of 
Italian  criminal  procedure  to  the  requirements  or  Articles  5  and  6 
of  the  European  Convention,  87  this  case-law  shows  little 
receptiveness  to  Influence  from  Strasbourg.  In  criminal  matters, 
then,  the  favourite  approach  of  the  Court  of  Cassation  Is  still  the 
primacy  one. 
Although  the  Court  of  Cassation  has  recognised  In  principle 
that  the  rules  of  the  European  Convention  are  directly  applicable 
in  the  Italian  legal  system,  many  of  its  judgements  maintain  that 
these  rules  are  merely  programmatic.  88  The  principles  of  the 
Convention,  it  holds,  are  intended  simply  for  the  guidance  of  the 
legislature;  they  are  mandatory  only  between  the  "High 
Contracting  Parties",  not  vis-a-vis  their  respective  nationals.  89  The 
Commission's  activity,  It  claims,  Is  of  a  purely  administrative  na- 
ture,  and,  in  any  event,  the  decision  of  the  European  Court  and  by 
86.  See  A  Chiavario,  "La  CEDU  ed  il  SuO  contributo  al  rinnovamento  del 
processo  penala  italialo",  RDI  57  (1974),  pp.  454  ff. 
87.  See  the  following  cases:  Artico,  Judgement  of  13/5/1980,  Series  A  No.  37; 
Guzzardi,  Judgement  of  6/11/1980,  Series  A  No.  39  1  HRIJ 257  (1980);  Fod  e. 
a.,  judgement  of  10/12/1982,  Series  A  No.  56  3  HRIJ  335  (1982);  Corigiiano, 
Judgement  of  10/12/1982,  Series  A  No.  57  3HRIJ  322  (1982);  Luberti, 
judgement  of  23/2/1984,  Series  A  No.  75  6  HRIJ 242  (1985);  Goddi,  judgement 
of  9/4/1984,  Series  A  No  76  5  HRLJ  311  (1984);  Colozza,  judgement  of 
12/2/1985,  Series  A  No.  89;  Bagetta  et  Milasi,  judgement  of  25/6/1987,  Series 
A  No.  119;  Ciulla,  Judgement  of  22/2/i989,  Series  A  No.  148. 
88.  E.  g.  Cass.  pen.  29/3/1979,  Giust.  pen.  1980,111,137;  12/2/1982-De  Fazio, 
Giust.  pen.  1983,111,20. 
89.  E.  g.  Cass.  pen.  23/3/1983-Fignanani,  Cass.  pen.  1984,1453;  23/12/1983- 
Bonnazzi,  Cass.  PerL  1985,298;  18/12/1986-Di  Mauro,  RIDU  1  (1988),  122. 
133 the  "Committee  of  Ministers  have  "no  domestic  coerciveness"  90  The 
applicability  of  decisions  of  the  Commission  and  the  European 
Court  is  limited  to  specific  cases,  and  has  no  subsequent  implica- 
tions.  91 
In  view  of  this  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Supreme  Court  In 
criminal  matters  it  is  not  surprising  that  very  few  explicit  refer- 
ences  are  to  be  found  to  the  case-law  of  the  Strasbourg  Court.  One 
notable  exception  of  such  interstitial  thinking,  is  the  Court  of 
Cassation's  criminal  judgement  of  July  14,1982,  which  expressly 
applied  the  European  Court's  case-law  in  the  Deweer  case.  92  The 
Court  of  Cassation  recalled  that  the  Strasbourg  Court  had  clarified 
that,  in  view  of  the  Importance  of  the  right  to  a  fair  hearing  In 
democratic  society,  a  "substantive"  rather  a  "formal"  view  must  be 
taken  of  the  fair  trial  requirement  In  Article  5  of  the  Convention, 
so  as  to  enable  a  person  undergoing  an  offlcial  Investigation  to 
defend  himself  effectively  and  appropriately.  In  this  case,  the 
Court  applied  the  criteria  laid  down  in  the  Deweer  judgement  to 
Interpret  a  provision  of  the  Italian  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure 
which  is  not  In  conflict  with  the  Convention. 
The  interstitial  approach  was  also  adopted  In  judgement  of 
September  27,198593  In  which  the  Court  of  Cassation  referred  to 
the  Colozza  case  to  show  that  criminal  proceedings  may  take  place 
In  the  absence  of  the  accused  without  breaching  Article  6, 
provided  that  the  summons  to  appear  has  actually  been  served  on 
the  accused. 
90.  Cass.  pen.  24/10/1983-BonnazzL  Cass.  pen.  1985,2056,  with  note  by 
Pittaro. 
91.  Cass.  pen.  31/l/1987-Corigliano,  RiDu  1  (1988),  12S. 
92.  Cass.  pen.  14/7/1982-laglietti,  Giust  pen.  1983,  IH,  3  RDI  69  (1986),  142. 
93.  Cass.  pen.  27/9/1985-De  Fusco,  RIDU  1,  (1988),  180.  See  also  Cass.  pen. 
11/5/1987-Sabit,  RIDU  2  (1989),  358. 
134 In  the  current  case-law  of  the  Court  of  Cassation,  the  provi- 
sions  of  the  Convention  do  not  play  a  major  role.  At  the  most,  they 
serve  as  criteria  for  interpreting  domestic  law  or  as  correctives  to 
Its  application,  without  bringing  about  any  spectacular  reversals 
of  case-law.  94  The  judgement  of  October  27,1984  (Venditti)  may 
be  cited  by  way  of  example:  95 
"The  accused's  right  to  fair  hearing,  and  in  particular  the  C7 
rights  specifically  protected  by  Article  6  para.  3  of  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights,  are  -  in  general,  and  subject  to  veri- 
fication  cases  guaranteed  within  our  criminal  procedure  by  a 
number  of  sometimes  scattered  provisions  of  the  Italian  Code  of 
Criminal  Procedure,  which  have  been  reinterpreted  in  the  light  of 
the  principles  of  the  Convention  and  which  constitute  valid  crite- 
ria  for  the  interpretation  of  domestic  law  and  provide  the  pa- 
rameters  for  judging  whether  or  not  a  hearing  is  fair" 
one  last  example  of  interstitial  thinking,  is  a  decision  of  July 
5ý  1985  by  the  Council  of  the  judiciary  (Consiglio  Superlore  della 
Magistratura).  96  The  Council  had  been  called  upon  to  decide 
whether  the  principle  of  public  hearings  as  enshrined  In  Article  6 
para.  1  of  the  European  Convention  is  also  applicable  to  disci- 
plinary  proceedings.  It  declared  that  the  legal  rule  which  provided 
for  hearings  In  camera  had  been  tacitly  cancelled  by  Article  6 
para.  1  of  the  Convention.  In  reaching  this  decision,  the  Council 
specifically  cited  the  European  Court's  judgement  in  the  Le 
compte,  Van  Leuven  and  De  Meyere  case.  97 
94 
*  See  for  example  Cass.  pen.  13/7/1985,  Giur.  it.  1986,  H,  72;  21/4/1986, 
Giur.  it.  1987,19,265. 
95.  Cass.  pen.  27/10/1984-Venditti,  Giusti.  pen.  1985  E[[,  601. 
96.  Consiglio  Superiore  della  Magistratura,  sezione  disciplinare,  5/7/1985, 
Foro  it.  1986,  IH,  43,  with  note  by  Pizzorusso. 
97.  judgement  of  23/6/1981,  Series  A  43  2  HRIJ  349  (1981). 
135 5.2.5.3.  Summary 
If  there  is  one  Member  State  where  the  European 
Convention  has  failed  to  make  almost  any  impact  at  all,  that  is 
Italy.  Italian  judges  demonstrate  perfectly  how  the  primacy 
approach  should  be  followed.  Even  in  the  field  of  criminal  law, 
where  the  Convention  and  the  decisions  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  have  admittedly  exerted  significant  influence  in  the 
thinking  of  European  judges,  Italian  courts  still  choose  to  rely, 
almost  exclusively,  on  their  national  provisions.  The  few  existing 
exceptions  of  Interstitial  thinking  do  not  seem  to  alter  the  overall 
picture  of  a  state  whose  courts  overwhelmingly  favour  the 
primacy  approach.  Table  5  summarises  the  decisions  of  the  Italian 
courts  In  the  cases  included  In  the  Polakiewicz  and  Jacob-Foltzer 
survey: 
Table  5 
Preferred  Case  Other  Case 
Approach  Examples  Approaches  Examples 
Primacy  Decision  No  15  of  Interstitial  Decision  No  180 
1/2/1982  of22/12/1980 
(Constitutional  (Constitutional 
court)  Court) 
Decision  of 
29/3/1979 
(Court  of 
Cassation) 
Decision  of 
14/7/1982 
(Court  of 
Cassation) 
Decision  of 
12/2/1982 
(Court  of 
Cassation) 
Decision  of 
27/9/1985 
(Court  of 
Cassation) 
136 Decision  of  Decision  of 
23/3/1983  27/10/1984 
(Court  of  (Courtof 
Cassation)  Cassation) 
Decision  of  Decision  of 
23/12/1983  5/7/1985 
(Courtof  (Council  of  the 
Cassation)  judiciary) 
Decision  of 
18/12/1986 
(Court  of 
Cassation) 
Decision  of 
31/1/87  (Court 
of  Cassation) 
5.2.6.  LUXEMBOURG 
5.2.6.1.  Status  of  the  European  Convention  In  the  hierarchy  of 
national  law 
Luxembourg  became  a  signatory  to  the  European  Convention 
on  November  4,1950.  Both  the  Convention  and  Its  first  Additional 
Protocol  were  ratified  on  September  3,1953.  Luxembourg  recog- 
nised  the  competence  of  the  Commission  to  receive  individual 
petitions  (Article  25  of  the  Convention)  and  the  compulsory  juris- 
diction  of  the  European  Court  (Article  46  of  the  Convention)  on 
April  28,1958.  They  were  both  renewed  on  April  28,1986  for  a 
period  of  5  years  something  that  also  applies  to  Articles  1  to  4  of 
protocol  No.  4  and  Articles  1  to  5  of  Protocol  No.  7  respectively.  In 
137 addition,  Luxembourg  ratified  Protocols  No.  2,3,5,6  and  8  to  the 
European  Convention. 
Article  37  para.  1  of  the  Luxembourg  Constitution  Is  the 
authority  as  regards  the  making  of  treaties.: 
"  The  Grand  Duke  shall  make  treaties.  These  shall  not  come 
into  effect  until  they  have  been  sanctioned  by  law  and  published 
In  the  manner  laid  down  for  the  publication  of  laws.  " 
The  Constitution  does  not  contain  any  specific  provisions  on 
the  relationship  between  International  treaty  law  and  domestic 
law.  It  was  up  to  the  Luxembourg  courts  to  fill  In  the  vacuum. 
It  was  as  early  as  1950  that  the  courts  conflmed  the  prece- 
dence  of  treaty  law  over  domestic  law.  In  the  case  of  Huberty  v. 
Minist&e  Public  of  June  8,1950,  the  Court  of  Cassation  (Cour  de 
Cassation)  declared: 
"that  In  the  case  of  a  conflict  between  the  provisions  of  an 
international  treaty  and  those  of  a  subsequent  domestIc  law,  the 
International  law  must  prevail  over  the  domestic  law"98 
This  line  was  followed  by  the  Conseil  d'Etat99  and  reaffirmed 
by  the  Court  of  Cassation  In  its  famous  Paganj  judgement  of  14 
July  1954.100 
"...  whereas  ,  If  it  Is  true  that,  In  principle,  the  effect  of  suc- 
cessive  law  depends  on  the  date  of  their  entry  Into  force,  the 
provisions  contrary  to  the  prior  laws  repealing  the  latter,  this 
could  not  be  so  if  the  two  laws  are  of  an  unequal  force,  that  Is  to 
say  if  one  of  the  laws  is  an  international  treaty  incorporated  Into 
the  Internal  legislation  by  a  law  of  approval;  that  actually  such  a 
treaty  Is  law  of  superior  nature  (essence)  having  a  superior  origin 
98  *  pas.  lux.,  Vol.  15,41. 
99  judgement  of  28/7/1951,  Pas.  lux.,  Vol.  15,261. 
1(ý:  pas.  Itm.,  Vol.  16,151  J.  T.  1954,694. 
138 than  the  will  of  an  internal  organ;  that  in  consequence  in  case  of  a 
conflict  between  the  provisions  of  an  International  treaty  and 
those  of  subsequent  domestic  law,  the  international  law  must  pre- 
vail  over  the  domestic  law.  " 
5.2.6.2.  Impact  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  decisions  of 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  national  jurisprudence 
In  general,  the  preferred  approach  of  the  Luxembourg 
courts  is  the  Interstitial  one.  The  provisions  of  the  Convention  are 
considered  self-executing  by  the  Luxembourg  courts  and  are 
frequently  Invoked  before  them.  Less  frequent,  though,  are  the 
express  references  to  the  case  law  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights.  One  important  example  that  can  be  mentioned 
here,  is  the  judgement  of  November  10,1980,  of  the  District  Court 
(Tribunal  d"arrondissement)  of  Luxembourg,  which  declared 
Articles  756  ff.  of  the  Civil  Code  contrary  to  Articles  8  and  14  of 
the  European  Convention.  This  decision  was  confirmed  by  the 
Court  of  Appeal  (Court  Supdrieure  de  justice)  on  November  28, 
1983.101 
5.2.6.3.  SummarY 
Table  6  summarises  the  preferred  New  Federalist  approach 
of  the  District  Court  of  Luxembourg  in  the  one  case  that  was  made 
avallable  from  the  Polakiewicz  and  Jacob-Foltzer  survey: 
101.  The  Court  of  Cassation  rejected  the  appeal  against  this  judgement  on 
January  17,1985  (No.  2/85). 
139 Table  6 
Preferred  Case 
Approach  Examples 
Interstitial  Decision  of 
10/11/1980 
(District 
Court  of 
Luxembourg) 
5.2.7.  PORTUGAL 
5.2.7.1.  Status  of  the  European  Convention  in  the  hierarchy  of 
national  law 
Portugal  became  a  signatory  of  the  European  Convention  on 
Human  Rights  on  September  22,1976.  On  November  9,1978  and 
after  legislative  approval,  the  Convention  and  the  first  two 
Protocols  were  ratified.  In  ratifying  the  Convention,  Portugal  also 
recognised  the  competence  of  the  European  Commission  of  Human 
Rights  to  receive  Individual  petitions  and  the  compulsory  jurisdic- 
tion  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  and  these  commit- 
ments  have  been  renewed  ever  since.  Portugal  also  ratified 
Protocols  Nos.  2,3,4,5,6,  and  8  to  the  European  Convention.  No 
declarations  under  Art.  63  European  Convention  were  made. 
Portugal  formulated  reservations  In  respect  of  Articles  4,5,7,10 
and  11  of  the  Convention  and  Articles  1  and  2  of  the  First 
protocol.  Most  of  these  reservations  were  withdrawn  on  May  11 
1987. 
Art.  8  para.  1  of  the  Portuguese  Constitution,  providing  for 
the  status  of  International  treaties  in  domestic  law,  declares  that: 
140 "rules  deriving  from  international  conventions  duly  ratified 
or  approved  shall,  following  their  official  publication,  apply  In 
municipal  law  in  so  far  as  they  are  Internationafly  binding  on  the 
Portuguese  State" 
This  provision  is  not  very  clear  as  regards  the  position  of 
treaty  law  within  Portuguese  domestic  law.  However,  it  has  been 
given  such  a  meaning  by  the  Constitutional  Court,  that  the  pri- 
macy  of  the  treaty  law  over  national  legislation,  seems  to  be  a 
fact.  102  The  Supreme  Court  has  also  supported  this  view,  103  which 
additionally  is  In  accordance  with  the  drafting  history  of  the 
Portuguese  Constitution.  The  question  of  primacy,  however,  Is  di- 
viding  the  legal  scholars.  Miranda'04,  for  instance  argues  In  its 
favour.  J.  J.  Gomes  Canotlhlo  and  Vital  Moreira.  105  support  the  op- 
posite  view.  Despite  that,  the  Judicial  findings  ascertain  that  the 
Constitution  takes  precedence  over  treaty  law.  It  follows  that  the 
European  Convention  Is  directly  applicable  In  the  Portuguese  legal 
system  and  takes  precedence  over  national  legislation. 
5.2.7.2.  Impact  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  judgements  of 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  national  jurisdiction. 
The  Constitutional  Court,  in  the  first  place,  did  not  have 
much  opportunity  to  consider  the  European  Convention  on  Human 
Rights.  This  Is  because  a  detailed  catalogue  of  fundamental  rights 
102.  Tribunal  Constitucional  (T.  Q,  Ac6rdaos  67/85,  D.  R.  1985  H.  pp.  5945 
(5500);  24/85,  D.  R.  1985  11,  pp.  4698  (4703). 
103.  Supremo,  Tribunal  de  Justii;  a,  judgement  of  11/1/1977,  Boletim  do 
minist6rio  da  justica  No.  263  (February  1977),  p.  195;  27/5/1986,  Boletim  do 
Mnist6ho  da  justiýa  No.  357  (June  1986),  p.  182. 
104.  j.  Miranda,  "A  Constitui0o  de  1976"  (1978),  p.  297. 
105.  J.  J.  Gomes  Canotilho/Vital  Moreira,  "ConstituiýOLo  da  Repfiblica 
portuguesa  Anotada",  Vol.  I  (2nd  ed.  1984).  Article  8  note  IV. 
141 and  freedoms,  the  extent  of  which  often  goes  beyond  that  of  the 
rights  included  In  the  Convention,  is  contained  in  the  Portuguese 
Constitution.  It  should  also  be  mentioned  that  the  two  chambers 
(Secqdoes)  of  the  Court  are  divided  as  regards  the  question  of 
whether  national  legislation  violating  International  treaty  law  is 
unconstitutional  or  illegal.  The  first  chamber  of  the  Court,  consid- 
ers  unconstitutionality  more  important  than  Megality.  106  The  op- 
posing  view  argues  that  the  violation  of  treaty  law  only  entails  in- 
ternational  responsibility,  the  question  of  unconstitutionality  be- 
ing  Irrelevant.  107  The  principles  of  the  Convention  are  therefore 
only  considered  as  "auxiliary  elements  clarifying  the  sense  and 
scope  of  constitutional  norms  and  principles"  and  have  so  far 
never  been  applied  by  this  Court.  Therefore,  the  approach 
favoured  by  the  Portuguese  Constitutional  Court  Is  the  primacy 
one. 
one  example  of  this  approach  is  the  decision  of  March  23, 
1988108  of  the  Constitutional  Court  which  considered  the  question 
of  the  length  of  pre-trial  confinement.  The  complainant  demanded 
his  provisional  release  from  custody  after  having  been  Imprisoned 
for  nearly  two  and  a  half  years,  referring  In  ter  alia  to  Article  5 
para.  3  of  the  European  Convention.  The  Court  after  examining  the 
case  exclusively  under  Portuguese  constitutional  law,  referred 
briefly  to  the  Wemhoft'09  judgement  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  for  the  statement  that  the  speeding  of  proceedings 
106.  See  for  example,  T.  C.  Ac6rddos  27/84,  D.  R.  1984  H,  p.  5  884;  62/84,  D.  R. 
1984  11,  p.  11681. 
107.  See  for  example,  T.  C.  Ac6rdaos  47/84,  D.  R.  1984  11,  p.  6281;  88/84,  D.  R. 
198s  Ii,  p.  1164. 
108 
*  Ac6rdao  No.  69/88,  D.  R.  1988  H,  p.  7596. 
109.  judgement  of  27/6/1968,  Series  A  No.  7. 
142 must  not  be  achieved  at  the  expense  of  the  search  for  material 
truth,  declared  the  action  inadmissible. 
Also,  on  February  9,1988110  the  Court  while  deciding  on  the 
constitutionality  of  legislation  concerning  compensation  for  the 
post.  1975  nationallsations  made  a  passing  reference  to  Article  1 
of  the  First  Additional  Protocol  to  the  European  Convention.  The 
case  was  decided  on  the  basis  of  national  law. 
in  its  decision  of  April  28,1988,111  the  second  chamber  of 
the  Constitutional  Court  was  involved  in  the  question  of  whether  a 
violation  of  the  European  Convention  could  be  considered,  when 
examining  the  constitutionality  of  a  legislative  provision.  The  case 
concerned  the  time  limit  set  by  Article  1817  para.  1  of  the  Civil 
Code  regarding  an  investigation  of  paternity.  The  complaint  had 
alleged  inter  alla  a  violation  of  Article  14  of  the  European 
Convention.  The  Court  discussed  the  question  of  whether  constitu- 
tional  control  might  Include  an  assessment  of  the  conformity  of 
Internal  law  to  properly  incorporated  international  law.  However, 
since  the  case  was  adequately  covered  by  Article  13  of  the 
Portuguese  Constitution,  the  matter  was  not  further  elaborated. 
The  primacy  approach,  then,  characterised  once  more  the  attitude 
of  the  Constitutional  Court. 
A  rather  interesting  decision  was  the  one  made  on  February, 
15,1989,112  by  the  first  chamber  of  the  Constitutional  Court.  The 
case  regarded  the  legality  of  certain  criminal  proceedings  against 
the  members  of  a  terrorist  organisation.  The  Court  found  that 
neither  Portuguese  Constitutional  law,  nor  the  European 
Convention,  obliged  the  criminal  court  to  justify  Its  decision,  In  or- 
110.  Ac6rdao  No.  39/88,  D.  R.  1988  1,  p.  740. 
111.  Ac6rdAo  No.  99/88,  D.  R.  1988  111,  p.  7642. 
112.  Ac6rcUlo  No.  219/89,  D.  R.  1989  H,  p.  6476. 
143 der  for  the  defence  to  be  properly  safeguarded  on  appeal.  This 
way,  the  Court  confirmed  that  a  breach  of  the  European 
Convention  may  give  rise  to  a  case  of  unconstitutionality.  This  is  a 
deviation  from  the  primacy  approach  that  the  Constitutional  Court 
has  been  traditionally  adopting.  Rather,  in  this  case  the 
Portuguese  court  favoured  an  interstitial  approach. 
The  fact  that  the  Portuguese  Constitution  contains  a  detailed 
catalogue  of  fundamental  guarantees  Is  probably  the  reason  for 
the  absence  of  reference  to  the  Convention,  by  the  rest  of,  the 
Portuguese  Courts.  As  an  exception  to  this  position  favouring  the 
primacy  approach,  Portuguese  courts  have  twice  specifically  men- 
tioned  the  European  Convention  and  Its  interpretation  by  the 
European  Court,  adopting  thus,  an  Interstitial  thinking.  The  first 
decision  was  that  of  the  District  Court  (Tribunal  judicial  da 
Comarca),  which  on  May  3  and  26,1982113  applied  Art.  6  para. 
3(e)  of  the  Convention  and  consulted  the  interpretation  of  the 
European  Court  In  the  Luedicke,  Belkacem,  W  case.  114  The 
supreme  Administrative  Tribunal  as  well,  In  a  decision  of  March 
21,1985,115  Interpreted  Article  486  para.  3  of  the  Code  of  Civil 
Procedure  in  accordance  with  Art.  6  para.  1  of  the  European 
Convention  and  in  doing  so  it  referred  to  the  Ringelsen  case116  of 
the  European  Court  and  the  case  law  of  the  Commission  on  Human 
Rights. 
113 
,  Not  published  yet. 
114 
*,  judgement  of  28/11/1978,  Series  A  No.  29. 
115 
,  Not  published  yet. 
116.  judgement  of  16/7/197  1,  Series  A  No.  13. 
144 5.2.7.3.  Summary 
The  evidence  provided  by  the  survey  Indicate,  that  the 
European  Convention  and  the  decisions  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  take  second  place  to  the  national  provisions  in  the 
preferences  of  the  Portuguese  courts,  when  it  comes  to  the 
protection  of  the  rights  of  their  citizens.  The  reason  for  that  could 
be  the  existence  of  a  detailed  list  of  fundamental  rights  within  the 
Portuguese  Constitution.  In  any  case,  the  New  Federalist  approach 
adopted  seems  to  be  the  primacy  one,  with  the  interstitial 
thinking  being  utilised  Infrequently.  Table  7  summarlses  the 
attitude  of  the  Portuguese  courts  as  demonstrated  by  the  findings 
of  the  Polakiewicz  and  Jacob-Foltzer  survey: 
Table  7 
Preferred  Case  Other  Case 
Approach  Examples  Approaches  Examples 
Primacy  DecisionNo  Interstitial  Decision  No 
69/88  219/88 
(Constitutional  (Constitutional 
Court)  Court) 
Decision  No  Decision  of  3  and 
39/88  26/5/1982 
(Constitutional  (District  Court) 
court) 
Decision  No  Decision  of 
99/88  21/3/1985 
(Constitutional  (Supreme 
Court)  Admin.  Tribunal) 
145 5.2.8.  SPAIN 
5.2.8.1.  Status  of  the  European  Convention  in  the  hierarchy  of 
national  law 
Spain  signed  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  in 
November  24,1977,  ratified  It  on  October  4,1979  and  Incorpo- 
rated  it  along  with  the  additional  protocols  into  domestic  law  fol- 
lowing  publication  In  the  Official  Bulletin.  The  right  of  Individual 
petition  was  eventually  recognised  on  July  1,1982  and  was  re- 
newed  on  October  15,1985. 
Article  96  para.  1  of  the  Spanish  Constitution  of  December 
27,1978  declares  Interafla: 
"validly  concluded  International  treaties,  once  officially  published 
In  Spain,  shall  constitute  part  of  the  internal  legal  order  ....  11 
Additionally,  Article  10  para.  2  of  the  Constitution  demands 
that  provisions  concerning  fundamental  rights  should  be  inter- 
preted  according  to  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and 
other  international  human  rights  treaties  to  which  Spain  is  a  sig- 
natory. 
According  to  Spanish  legal  tradition,  treaties  are  accorded  a 
superior  legal  status  In  the  hierarchy  of  laws.  Numerous  judicial 
decisions  refer  to  the  precedence  of  treaties  Incorporated  into 
Spanish  law.  However,  the  majority  of  them  confirm  the  superior- 
ity  of  treaties  which  do  not  touch  upon  the  crucial  point  of  conflict 
between  International  and  domestic  JaW.  117 
117.  See  for  example,  Tribunal  Supremo  16  December  1985,  Repertorio 
Aranzadi  1985,  No  6273,  Audencia  Territorial  de  Palma  de  Mallorca,  23  July 
198.5,  Revista  General  de  Derecho  1986,  p.  474. 
146 5.2.8.2.  Impact  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  decisions  of 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  national  jurisdiction. 
The  Spanish  Constitutional  Court  seems  to  be  adopting  an 
Interstitial  approach  when  deciding  on  human  rights  issues.  it 
refers  very  often  both  to  the  European  Convention  and  the  judge- 
ments  of  the  European  Court  interpreting  the  Convention,  fulfilling 
thus  the  requirements  of  Article  10  para.  2  of  the  Spanish 
Constitution.  In  Judgement  62/82  of  October  15,1982,  the 
Constitutional  Court  referred  to  Article  10  of  the  Convention 
(freedom  of  expression)  and  the  decision  of  the  European  Court  in 
the  Handyside  case,  118  In  order  to  decide  that  a  penalty  Imposed 
on  the  publisher  of  a  publication  for  parents  and  children  was  not 
unjustified  or  disproportionate.  In  Judgement  114/1984  of 
November  29,1984  the  Constitutional  Court  declared  unconstitu- 
tional  the  admission  of  evidence  obtained  through  a  violation  of 
fundamental  rights,  by  referring  to  Article  8  of  the  Convention 
and  the  judgement  of  the  European  Court  In  the  Malone  case.  119 
In  judgement  74/1985  of  June  18,1985,  the  Constitutional  Court 
while  involved  in  the  question  of  the  right  to  the  assistance  of  a 
lawyer,  referred  to  Article  6  of  the  Convention  and  the  decisions 
of  the  European  Court  in  the  Deweer'20,  Eckle,  121  Campbell  and 
Fell.  122  6Ztflrk123  and  Golder124  cases.  In  Judgement  112/1988  of 
June  8,1988,  the  Spanish  Court  based  a  ruling  on  the  guarantee  of 
118 
* 
judgement  of  7/12/1976,  Series  A  No.  24. 
119 
* 
judgement  of  2/8/1984,  Series  A  No.  82. 
120  judgement  of  27/2/1980,  Series  A  No.  35. 
121:  judgement  of  15/7/1982,  Series  A  No.  5  1. 
122.  judgement  of  28/6/1984,  Series  A  No.  80. 
123 
* 
judgement  of  23/10/1984,  Series  A  No.  85. 
124.  judgement  of  21/2/1975,  Series  A  No.  18. 
147 personal  freedom  on  Article  5  para.  1  (e)  of  the  European 
Convention  and  the  decisions  of  the  European  Court  In  the 
Winterwerp,  125  X  v.  The  United  Kingdom  126  and  Luberti'27  cases. 
Finally  in  Judgement  145/1988  of  July  12,1988  dealing  with  the 
problem  of  the  exercise  by  the  same  person  of  the  duties  of  In- 
vestigating  judge  and  trial  judge,  the  Spanish  Court  referred  to  the 
European  Court's  decision  In  the  De  Cubber128  case,  in  deciding  that 
the  right  to  an  Impartial  judge  was  a  fundamental  guarantee. 
Unlike  the  Constitutional  Court,  other  courts  make  much  less 
use  of  the  Convention  and  the  decisions  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights.  Indirectly,  however,  they  adopt  the  Interstitial 
approach,  since  they  tend  to  reiterate  the  declarations  of  the 
Constitutional  Court  whose  interpretations  of  constitutional  rights 
take  into  consideration  both  the  Convention  and  the  dicta  of  the 
European  Court.  Sometimes,  the  Spanish  Courts  deviate  from  their 
traditional  position,  and  adopt  directly  the  Interstitial  approach, 
by  means  of  direct  references  to  the  decisions  of  the  European 
Court.  In  a  judgement  of  March  14,1986,  the  Court  of  Appeal  of 
Barcelona  referred  to  the  Rasmussen  case'29  In  order  to  elaborate 
the  principle  of  equality  before  the  law.  Also,  the  Court  of 
Cassation  In  a  judgement  of  October  3,1985,  In  interpreting  the 
procedural  guarantees  of  the  accused,  referred  to  Article  6  para.  3 
of  the  Convention  and  the  decision  of  the  European  Court  in  the 
Artico  case.  130 
125  judgement  of  24/10/1979,  Series  A  No.  33. 
126:  judgement  of  5/11/198  1,  Series  A  No.  46. 
127 
*  judgement  of  23/2/1984,  Series  A  No.  75. 
128 
*  judgement  of  26/10/1984,  Series  A  No.  86. 
129 
, 
judgement  of  28/11/1984,  Series  A  No.  87. 
130.  judgement  of  13/5/1980,  Series  A  No.  37. 
148 5.2.8.3.  Summary 
The  findings  of  the  survey  indicate  that  both  the  provisions 
of  the  European  Convention  and  the  judgements  of  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights,  have  found  fertile  ground  in  the  Spanish 
judicial  order.  As  a  rule,  Spanish  judges  make  express  references 
to  the  law  of  the  Convention  when  they  are  called  upon  to  decide 
on  human  rights  issues.  Indeed,  the  adoption  of  an  interstitial 
thinking  is  the  case  In  every  decision  mentioned  In  the  survey.  No 
indications  exist  that  the  primacy  approach  has  ever  been  utillsed. 
I 
The  findings  of  the  survey  are  summarlsed  In  Table  8: 
Table  8 
Preferred  Case  Other  Case 
Approach  Examples  Approaches  Examples 
Interstitial  judgement 
62/1982 
(Constitutional 
Court)  , 
judgement 
114/1984 
(Constitutional 
court) 
judgement 
74/1985 
(Constitutional 
Court) 
judgement 
112/1988 
(Constitutional 
court) 
149 judgement 
145/1988 
(Constitutional 
Court) 
Judgement  of 
14/3/1986 
(Court  of  Appeal 
of  Barcelona) 
Judgement  of 
3/5/1980  (Court 
of  Cassation) 
5.2.9.  THE  NETHERLANDS 
5.2.9.1.  Status  of  the  European  Convention  in  the  hierarchy  of  the 
national  law 
The  Netherlands  became  a  signatory  of  the  European 
Convention  and  the  First  Additional  Protocol  In  November  4,1950 
and  March  20,1952.131  They  were  both  ratified  on  August  31, 
1954.  At  the  same  time  the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  was  recognised  by  the  Dutch 
Government.  A  declaration  recognising  the  right  of  Individual 
petition  In  accordance  with  Article  25  of  the  European  Convention 
was  made  on  July  5,1960.  Both  declarations  under  Articles  25 
and  46  have  been  renewed  on  September  1,1979  for  an 
unlimited  period.  In  accordance  with  Article  63  of  the  European 
Convention,  The  Netherlands  extended  the  application  of  the 
131.  Trachtatenblad  Nos.  154  (195  1)  and  80  (195  2) 
150 Convention  to  the  Netherlands  Antilles  and  to  Aruba.  The 
Netherlands  also  ratified  the  2nd,  3rd,  4th,  Sth,  6th  and  8th 
Protocols. 
The  attitude  of  the  Dutch  Constitution  of  1983  as  regards 
the  relationship  between  international  and  domestic  law  is 
monistic.  Article  93  of  the  Constitution  provides  that  provisions  of 
treaties  and  decisions  of  international  organIsations  shall  have  a 
binding  effect  from  the-  time  of  publication.  The  rights  contained 
in  the  European  Convention  are  considered  self-executing  by  the 
courts  and  are  therefore  directly  applicable. 
Article  94  of  the  Dutch  Constitution  provides: 
"regulations  which  are  in  force  in  the  Kingdom  of  the 
Netherlands  shall  not  be  applied  if  this  application  Is  not  In  con- 
formity  with  provisions  of  treaties  or  decisions  of  International 
organisations  which  are  binding  upon  everyone". 
The  Dutch  Courts  must  therefore  give  precedence  to  self-ex- 
ecuting  treaty  provisions  over  conflicting  domestic  law,  be  it  an- 
tecedent  or  posterior,  statutory  or  constitutional  JaW.  132  The 
Supreme  Court  confirmed  the  priority  of  the  self-executing  provi- 
sions  of  the  Convention  and  the  Sixth  Protocol  over  conflicting 
treaty  provisions,  when  It  refused  to  allow  an  American  service- 
man  to  be  handed  over  to  the  US  authorities  on  the  grounds  that 
he  would  face  capital  punishment.  133  But  the  courts  have  no  com- 
petence  to  nullify,  repeal  or  amend  the  legislation  in  question.  The 
provision  remains  In  force,  but  Is  not  applicable. 
132.  p.  v.  Dijk,  "Domestic  Status  of  Human  Rights  Treaties  and  the  Attitude  of 
the  judiciary:  The  Dutch  Case,  "  in  M.  Nowak/D.  Steurer/H.  Tretter  (eds.  ) 
"Progress  in  the  Spirit  of  Human  Rights,  Festschrift  Air  Felix  Ermacora" 
1988  631  ff. 
Supreme  Court  30/3/90,.  RM  29  (1990)  1388. 
151 5.2.9.2.  Impact  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  judgements  of 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  national  jurisprudence 
Until  1980,  the  Dutch  courts  did  not  seem  to  appreciate  the 
favourable  attitude  of  the  Dutch  legislature  towards  the  European 
Convention.  In  spite  of  its  direct  applicability,  the  Convention  was 
only  treated  as  a  secondary  source  of  law.  134When  specific  provi- 
sions  of  the  Convention  were  invoked  before  Dutch  courts,  these 
almost  always  came  to  the  conclusion  that  no  breach  had  occurred. 
Van  D!  jk135  has  indicated,  that  one  of  the  ways  that  the  courts 
reached  this  result  was  by: 
"-applying  a  comparable  provision  of  Dutch  law  and,  if  nec- 
essary,  giving  it  a  very  broad  scope,  while  ignoring  the  provision 
of  the  Convention...  " 
This  indicates  that  New  Federalist  approach  preferred  by  the 
Dutch  courts  at  the  time  was  the  primacy  one. 
During  this  period  the  Supreme  Court  (De  Hoge  Raad  der 
Nederlanden)  only  once  found  that  a  provision  of  the  Convention 
was  not  fully  respected.  136  And  only  once  did  a  court  abstain  from 
applying  a  provision  of  national  legislation  because  it  contradicted 
the  Convention.  137 
No  specific  references  to  Strasbourg  case-law  could  be  found 
in  the  jurisprudence  of  Dutch  courts.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising 
that  a  study  on  the  Implementation  of  human  rights  treaties  In 
the  Netherlands  published  In  1980  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
134.  E.  A.  Alkema,  "Fundamental  Human  Rights  and  the  Legal  Order  of  the 
Netherlands,  "  in  H.  F.  Panhuys  and  others  (eds.  )  "International  Law  in  the 
Netherlands",  Vol.  111  (1980),  P.  109  (136). 
135 
* 
see  note  13  2. 
136,  Supreme  Court  23/4/74.  NJ  1974,  No.  272. 
137.  District  Court  of  Maastricht,  14/11/1977,  NYIL  1978,293. 
152 role  of  the  legislature  In  this  field  had  been  more  prominent  than 
that  of  the  courts.  In  terms,  then,  of  the  New  Federalist  terminol- 
ogy,  the  Dutch  courts  utillsed  the  prinlacy  approach. 
Things  however,  have  changed  in  the  1980's.  A  statistical 
survey  provided  by  Van  D1jk138  shows  a  considerable  increase  of 
references  to  the  European  Convention.  The  following  examples 
are  indicative  of  the  tendency  of  the  Dutch  courts  to  indulge  into 
an  Interstitial  approach.. 
In  a  judgement  of  June  4,1982,139  the  Supreme  Court  held 
that  Article  1:  36  (2)  of  the  Dutch  Civil  Code  violated  Article  12  of 
the  European  Convention  and  should  not,  therefore,  have  been 
applied  by  the  lower  courts.  Article  1:  36  (2)  provided  that  if  one 
parent  refused  his  or  her  permission  for  the  marriage  of  an  under 
age  child,  the  court  could  do  nothing  about  It.  According  to  the 
Supreme  Court,  such  an  unlimited  veto  power  of  the  parents  was 
Incompatible  with  the  right  to  marry  laid  down  in  Article  12  of 
the  Convention.  On  July  1,1983,140  the  Supreme  Court  declared 
that  a  provision  of  the  Insanity  Act  which  empowered  the  public 
prosecutor  in  certain  cases  to  prevent  a  detained  person  from  ap- 
plying  to  a  court  for  release  from  detention,  was  incompatible 
with  Article  5  para.  4  of  the  Convention.  This  decision  was  clearly 
Influenced  by  the  judgement  of  the  European  Court  in  the 
Winterwerp  case.  Finally,  In  a  judgement  of  May  4,1984,141  the 
Supreme  Court  found  that  Article  1:  161  (1)  of  the  Dutch  Civil  Code, 
which  provides  that  in  the  case  of  a  divorce  the  court  shall  ap- 
point  a  guardian  and  a  supervising  guardian,  constituted  an  In- 
138  See  note  13  2. 
139  NJ  1983,  No.  32. 
140  NJ  1984,  No.  161. 
141:  NJ  1985,  No.  5  10. 
153 fringement  of  the  rights  of  parents  to  respect  for  their  family  life 
(Article  8  of  the  European  Convention).  The  Court  said  that  such 
an  action  was  only  permissible  It  the  Interests  of  the  child  so  re- 
quire.  Reaching  this  conclusion,  the  Court  could  not  rely  on  any 
case-law  from  Strasbourg. 
There  are  other  examples  where  the  Supreme  Court  has 
utillsed  the  Interstitial  approach,  by  relying  both  on  the  national 
legislation  and  the  provisions  of  the  European  Convention  and/or 
the  judgements  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights.  In  a 
judgement  of  January  18,1980,  the  Supreme  Court  declared  that 
Article  959  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Act  concerning  appeal  against 
decisions  of  the  local  courts  In  matters  of  custody  over  Infants, 
although  originally  intended  to  cover  only  cases  of  legitimate  chil- 
dren,  now  had  to  be  Interpreted  as  applying  equally  to  Illegitimate 
children.  142The  court  based  its  decision  on  the  interpretation  of 
Article  8  in  connection  with  Article  14  by  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  in  the  Marckx  case.  Similarly,  the  Supreme  Court, 
based  on  Article  8  of  the  European  Convention,  applied  the  provi- 
sions  regulating  the  right  of  divorced  or  separated  parents  to  visit 
their  children  also  to  parents  of  illegitimate  childten.  143 
The  right  of  the  accused  to  be  tried  within  a  reasonable  time 
(Article  6  para.  1  of  the  European  Convention)  has  been  an  area 
where  the  Supreme  Court  developed  a  strong  Interstitial  tradition. 
Between  1980  and  1986,  the  Supreme  Court  dealt  with  120  cases 
concerning  this  problem,  in  which  20  were  found  to  contain  a 
violation  of  the  Convention.  Referring  to  the  Neumelster  and 
Wemhoff  cases,  144  the  Supreme  Court  expressly  approved  this 
142 
*  NJ  1980,  No.  463. 
143  judgement  of  10/5/1985,  NJ  1986,  No.  5 
144:  judgements  of  27/6/1968,  Series  A  Nos.  8  and  7. 
154 
6- practice.  It  stated  that  In  case  of  a  violation  of  the  right  to  a  trial 
without  unreasonable  delay,  the  prosecution  must  be  deemed  to 
be  so  contrary  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  a  fair  trial  that  the 
prosecutor  loses  his  right  to  continue  his  prosecution  ad  his  charge 
can  no  longer  be  received-14-5 
other  examples  of  the  direct  influence  of  Strasbourg  case- 
law  include  a  judgement  of  December  12,1986,146  where  the 
Supreme  Court  held  that  the  requirement  laid  down  by  the 
Minister  of  justice  that  foreigners  can  only  be  permitted  in  the 
Netherlands  for  family  reunions  if  the  persons  concerned  have 
lived  together  before  one  or  more  of  them  came  to  the 
Netherlands  is  not  in  conformity  with  Article  8  of  the  European 
Convention.  In  another  situation,  the  Issue  was  the  conviction  of 
three  persons  on  the  basis  of  evidence  given.  by  anonymous  wit- 
nesses.  Only  one  of  the  accused  filed  an  application  to  the 
European  Commission  which  found  a  violation  of  the  Convention. 
The  two  others  asked  for  their  release  pending  the  examination  of 
the  case  before  the  European  Court.  In  Its  judgement,  the  District 
Court  ordered  the  release  of  the  two,  considering  that  it  was  al- 
most  certain  that  the  European  Court  would  not  accept  a  convic- 
tion  on  the  sole  bases  of  anonymous  witnesses.  The  European 
Court  In  fact  concluded  that  there  had  been  a  violation  of  Articles 
6  para.  3  (D)  and  5  para.  1  of  the  Convention.  147 
However,  there  are  also  examples  of  decisions  which  reveal 
that  the  Dutch  courts  have  not  abandoned  the  primacy  approach. 
In  a  judgement  of  May  15,1987  concerning  the  right  of  access  of 
grandparents  to  a  grandchild,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  the 
145.  judgement  of  23/9/1980,  NJ  198  1,  No.  116. 
146.  NJ  19  8  8,  No.  18  8. 
147.  Kostovski  case,  judgement  of  20/11/1989,  Series  A  No.  166. 
155 link  of  kinship  Is  not  sufficient  to  claim  such  a  right.  148  This  inter- 
pretation  of  "family  life"  In  the  sense  of  Article  8  of  the  European 
Convention,  was  exclusively  based  on  the  national  provisions  and 
seems  to  be  more  restrictive  than  that  given  by  the  European 
Court  In  the  Marck-Y  case.  149 
5.2.9.3.  Summary 
As  a  conclusion  it  is  reasonable  to  follow  Van  Dijk.  * 
"Although  the  attitude  of  the  Dutch  courts  may  not  always 
result  In  decisions  which  give  full  effect  to  the  applicable  provi- 
sions  of  human  rights  treaties,  in  general  it  may  be  stated  for  the 
period  since  1980  that  they  take  the  treaties  and  the  international 
case-law  based  thereupon,  seriously  and  are  in  general  prepared 
to  adapt  or  correct  their  own  case-law  in  the  light  of  the  for- 
mer.  "150  Table  9  demonstrates  the  attitude  of  the  Dutch  courts, 
under  the  prism  of  the  New  Federalist  approaches: 
Table  9 
Preferred  Case  Other  Case 
Approach  Examples  Approaches  Examples 
Interstitial  Decision  of  Primacy  Decision  of 
23/4/74  15/5/1987 
(Supreme  Court)  (Supreme  Court) 
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*  NJCM  BWletin  1987,529. 
149,  judgement  of  13  /6/19  7  9,  Series  A  No.  3  1,  para.  45. 
150.  See  note  13  2,  P.  648. 
156 Decision  of 
14/11/1977 
(District  Court  of 
Maastricht) 
Decision  of 
4/6/1982 
(Supreme  Court) 
Decision  of 
1/7/1983. 
(Supreme  Court) 
Decision  of 
4/5/1984 
(Supreme  Court) 
Decision  of 
18/l/1980 
(Supreme  Court) 
Decision  of 
12/12/1986 
(Supreme  Court) 
Decision  of 
23/9/1986 
(Supreme  Court) 
157 5.3.  Concluding  remarks 
Certain  interesting  observations  can  be  made  regarding  the 
above  survey,  when  seen  through  the  prism  of  the  New  Federalist 
approaches,  as  expanded  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis.  What  Is 
revealed  in  the  Member  States  of  the  EC,  In  the  first  place,  is  sig- 
n1ficant  fragmentation-  regarding  the  utillsation  of  the  Convention 
and  Its  Interpretation  by  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  In 
the  protection  of  the  rights  of  their  citizens.  A  number  of  national 
legislatures  and  jurisdictions  rely  on  them  on  a  continuous  basis, 
whilst  the  attitude  of  others  varies  from  hesitant  to  defiant.  In 
Belgium,  the  Court  of  Cassation  seems  to  adopt  the  interstitial 
approach.,  When  faced  with  Issues  regarding  the  protection  of  the 
I rights  of  its  citizens,  it  utilises  both  the  national  provisions  and 
those  of  the  European  Convention,  as  interpreted  by  the  European 
court  of  Human  Rights.  In  Germany,  the  Federal  Constitutional 
Court  seems  to  follow  the  primacy  approach,  when  deciding  on 
matters  other  than  criminal  ones.  In  the  latter  situations,  both  the 
Constitutional  and  other  courts  seem  to  prefer  the  Interstitial 
approach.  The  primacy  approach  is  also  favoured  by  the  French 
Court  of  Cassation.  However,  In  criminal  matters,  the  tendency  of 
the  Criminal  Chamber  of  the  latter  is  to  adopt  the  Interstitial 
approach,  a  tendency  followed  by  other  French  courts  as  well.  The 
Greek  courts  clearly  adopt  the  primacy  approach.  The  European 
Convention  and  the  decisions  of  the  European  Court  of  Human 
Rights,  are  very  seldom  relied  upon  in  the  protection  of  the  rights 
of  the  Greek  citizens.  The  approach  preferred  by  the  Italian 
Constitutional  Court  is  the  primacy  one.  Only  very  seldom,  the 
158 Court  of  Cassation,  in  criminal  matters  adopts  the  interstitial 
approach.  The  Luxembourg  courts  overwhelmingly  support  the 
interstitial  approach,  albeit,  by  means  of  references  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Convention,  not  the  case  law  of  the  European 
Courtof  Human  Rights.  The  Portuguese  courts  prefer  the  primacy 
approach,  with  some  notable  exceptions  regarding  criminal 
matters,  where  the  interstitial  approach  was  adopted.  The 
provisions  of  the  European  Convention  and  the  case  law  of  the 
European  Court  of  Human  rights,  hold  a  prominent  position  in  the 
decisions  of  the  Spanish  courts.  Almost  invariably,  every  decision 
of  every  court  will  include  an  analysis  of  the  relevant  provisions 
of  the  European  Convention  and  the  way  they  were  interpreted  by 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights.  Finally  In  the  Netherlands, 
the  interstitial  is  the  preferred  approach  of  the  Dutch  courts  from 
1980  onwards.  Here  again,  It  is  the  field  of  criminal  procedure 
that  attracted  the  more  frequent  application  of  the  above 
mentioned  approach.  Table  10  summarises  the  preferred  New 
Federalist  approaches  of  the  courts  of  the  Member  States  of  the 
BC: 
Table  10 
Member  State  Approach 
Belgium  Interstitial 
France  Primacy 
Germany  Primacy 
Greece  Primacy 
Italy  Primacy 
159 Luxembourg  Interstitial 
Portugal  Primacy 
Spain  Interstitial 
The  Netherlands  Interstitial 
It  can  be  seen  that  the  courts  of  five  Member  States  of  the 
EC  favour  the  primacy  approach,  whereas  four  seem  to  adopt  the 
interstitial  approach. 
It  is  important  to  note,  that  in  certain  circumstances  further 
fragmentation  can  be  observed  in  terms  of  the  utilisation  of 
different  approaches  In  the  decisions  of  courts  of  the  same 
Member  State.  It  seems  that  even  in  the  Member  States  where  the 
preferred  approach  Is  the  primacy  one,  there  is  a  tendency  to 
refer  and  analyse  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  and  the  case- 
law  of  the  European  Court  In  the  field  of  penal  procedure.  This  Is 
the  case,  for  example,  In  France,  Germany,  Italy  and  Portugal.  This 
can  attributed  to  the  fact  that  penal  procedure  Is  detailed  In  such 
a  way  In  the  Convention  (Articles  5  and  6),  that  these  provisions 
go  beyond  national  legislation  and  do  not  allow  for  a  margin  of 
appreciation  usually  granted  to  national  authorities  In  other 
articles. 
One  factor  which  is  crucial  in  determining  the  utilisation  of 
the  Convention  and  the  decisions  of  the  European  Court  In 
domestic  law  Is  the  status  of  the  Convention  in  the  hierarchy  of 
domestic  law.  In  the  countries  where  It  is  awarded  constitutional 
status  or  superiority  over  prior  and  subsequent  legislation,  the 
national  courts  refer  on  a  regular  basis  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Convention  and  the  judgements  of  the  European  Court  of  Human 
160 Rights,  following,  thus,  an  Interstitial  approach.  In  countries, 
where  It  is  not  awarded  prominent  status,  the  Convention  and  the 
judgements  of  the  European  Court  seem  to  take  second  place  to 
national  human  rights  legislation.  The  preferred  approach  here 
seems  to  be  the  primacy  one. 
Of  paramount  importance  also  is  the  existence  of  parallel 
constitutional  safeguards  in  the  national  constitutions,  especially 
when  they  are  combined  with  traditional  judicial  protection  of 
political  and  civil  rights  as  Is  the  case  in  France,  Italy,  Germany 
and  Portugal.  In  these  Member  States  the  courts  clearly  follow  a 
primacy  approach.  When  faced  with  human  rights  Issues  they 
prefer  to  entrust  the  protection  of  their  citizens  on  the  national 
protective  norms. 
Do  the  courts  of  the  Member  States  of  the  EC,  then, 
consider  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  to  be  an 
efficient  set  of  norms  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  their 
cItIzens7  In  the  field  of  criminal  procedure,  It  can  be  safely  said 
that  this  is  indeed  the  case.  At  least,  that  Is  what  the  adoption  of 
the  Interstitial  approach  in  the  decisions  of  the  national  courts 
indicates.  In  the  other  areas  of  human  rights,  national  courts  do 
not  seem  to  entrust  the  protection  of  their  citizens  with  the 
provisions  of  the  Convention,  opting  for  the  national  norms 
instead.  It  is  a  fact,  that  between  1981  and  1991,  the  Impact  of 
rulings  by  the  European  Court  has  been  felt  in  one  way  or  another 
In  several  European  countries.  However,  whether  this  was  the 
beginning  of  a  true  dialogue  between  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  and  national  jurisdictions,  Is  an  argument  that 
needs  to  be  very  carefully  considered.  Until  Influential  countries 
like  France,  Italy  and  Germany  start  to  converse  seriously  with 
161 Strasbourg,  then  the  role  of  the  Convention  and  the  European 
Court  might  never  be  as  significant  as  it  was  Intended  to  be. 
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The  attitude  of  the  American  state  courts  towards  the  movement 
of  New  judicial  Federalism:  The  situation  in  the  states  of  Florida, 
Maryland  and  New  York. 
6.1.  Introductory  note 
This  chapter  will  examine  the  response  of  the  courts  of  the 
states  of  Florida,  Maryland  and  New  York  to  the  calls  of  the 
proponents  of  New  judicial  Federalism  for  utilisation  of  the  state 
constitutional  provisions  Instead  of  the  federal  ones,  in  cases 
where  breaches  of  human  rights  are  alleged.  The  choice  of  norms 
that  the  courts  of  these  states  make  for  the  protection  of  their 
citizens,  Is  relevant  to  the  consideration  of  the  concepts  of 
efficiency  and  uniformity  that  this  thesis  puts  forward.  An 
inclination  towards  state  constitutional  protection  could  indicate 
that  the  uniformly  applied  federal  law  is  not  regarded  the  most 
efficient  protection  available  to  the  citizen. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  vast  majority  of  the  cases 
analysed  have  been  decided  by  the  highest  ranking  courts  of  the 
three  states,  namely  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  State  of  Florida,  the 
Court  of  Appeals  of  the  State  of  New  York  and  the  State  of 
Maryland  Court  of  Appeals.  Decisions  of  lower  ranking  courts  will 
163 be  analysed  where  available.  The  reason  for  the  above  approach 
lies  In  the  availability  of  Information  provided  by  specific 
academic  work  for  each  of  the  states.  Note,  also,  that  not  every 
decision  of  the  court  of  each  state  is  mentioned.  That  would  be  an 
impossible  task  within  the  limits  of  this  thesis  or  even  any  thesis. 
Consequently,  the  evaluation  of  the  preferred  approach  of  each 
court  is  based  on  decisions  representative  of  the  specific  legal 
issue.  Additionally,  in  certain  circumstances,  the  cases  mentioned 
represent  the  exception  to  the  rule  as  regards  the  preferred 
approach.  This  should  be  taken  Into  consideration  when 
considering  the  tables  at  the  end  of  the  analysis  of  the  decisions  of 
the  courts  of  each  of  the  states,  which  only  summarise  the 
preferred  approach  as  demonstrated  from  the  available  cases. 
It  is  reminded,  that  our  Intention  Is  to  offer  just  an  example 
of  the  possible  Influences  of  New  judicial  Federalism  In  the  US 
state  judiciary.  We  do  not  consider  the  three  states  to  be  a  sample 
representative  of  a  statistical  analysis,  something  which  lies  out- 
side  the  purposes  of  this  thesis.  It  Is  also  reminded,  that  the  choice 
of  the  specific  states  was  dictated  partly  on  the  basis  of  certain 
geographical,  social  and.  political  criteria  and  partly  on  the  basis  of 
availability  of  Information. 
6.2.  FLORIDA 
6.2.1.  The  scope  of  New  judicial  Federalism  In  Florida 
The  rediscovery  within  the  past  decades,  by  state  supreme 
courts,  of  the  broad  guarantees  of  individual  rights  In  state  consti- 
tutions,  Is  an  area  of  law  in  the  development  of  which,  Florida  has 
not  played  a  particularly  active  role.  Most  commentators  perceive 
164 it  to  be  a  reluctant  or  even  a  non-participant  in  the  state  constitu- 
tional  law  revival.  '  Undeniably,  the  Florida  courts  have  not  ag- 
gressively  exercised  their  power  to  Interpret  the  Florida 
Constitution  independently  with  the  same  frequency  that  other 
state  courts  have  expansively  utilised  their  state  constitutions. 
However,  this  lack  of  aggressiveness  should  not  necessarily  be 
considered  to  exhibit  timidity  or  a  lack  of  sophistication  on  behalf 
of  the  Florida  judiciary.  The  Florida  courts  have  recognised  the  al- 
ternative  of  state  constitutional  interpretation  but  they  have  used 
it  sparingly  and  only  after  considerable  thought. 
When  faced  with  civil  rights  cases  addressing  freedoms  of 
speech,  religion  and  assembly,  the  methodology  the  Florida 
Supreme  Court  has  used  has  varied  throughout  the  years.  In  the 
case  of  Florida  Canners  Association  v.  Department  of  Cltrus2, 
where  the  court  of  appeals  considered  whether  the  free  speech 
guarantees  embodied  In  Article  1,  section  4  of  the  Florida 
Constitution,  were  broader  than  the  free  speech  guarantees  of  the 
First  Amendment  to  the  Federal  Constitution,  It  held  that  the  state 
provision  was  no  broader  than  Its  federal  counterpart.  3  This  Is  a 
clear  example  of  the  lockstep  approach,  since  the  Florida  state 
court  chose  to  bind  the  state constitutional  provision  with  the  fed- 
eral  one.  The  same  court  however  has  -treated  other  speech  cases 
1  in  a  newspaper  article  on  this  issue  the  Florida  judiciary's  role  was 
chi7iracterised  as  follows:  "Lawyers  and  law  professors  say  the  state's 
politically  conservative  atmosphere,  combined  with  the  cautiousness  of  the 
high  court  and  the  apathy  of  practitioners,  have  led  Florida  to  lag  behind 
other  states.  "  Nflami  Review,  Feb.  20,1987,  at  1.  In  a  more  recent  article, 
Florida  was  described  as  possessing  a  "traditionalist  political  culture. 
Gormley,  "Ten  Adventures  in  State  Constitutional  Law",  1  Emerging  Issues 
in  State  Constitutional  Law  29  (1988). 
2.371  So.  2d  503  (Fla.  2d  DCA  1979). 
3.  "Under  these  circumstances  and  in  the  absence  of  any  expression  by  our 
supreme  court  that  the  Florida  guarantee  is  broader  than  the  federal,  we 
conclude  that  the  two  are  the  same  and  will  not  treat  them  separately.  "  lbid 
at  5  17. 
165 using  a  different  approach.  For  example,  In  Firestone  v.  News- 
press  Pub.  CO.  4and  Sakon  v.  Pepsi  C6.5  the  Florida  court  deferred 
to  the  federal  interpretation  when  construing  the  similar  state 
provision  but  the  former  was  not  perceived  to  be  binding  since  lo- 
cal  or  special  circumstances  might  suggest  different  results.  It 
seems  then  that  the  Interstitial  method  of  interpretation  is  em- 
ployed  in  this  cases. 
As  far  as  the  right  to  privacy  is  concerned,  while  there  is  no 
federal  textual  analogue  to  Florida's  privacy  provision  of  article  1, 
section  23,  a  number  of  federal  decisions  concerning  the  right  to 
privacy  in  decisional  issues  regarding  the  right  to  d1e6  and  right  to 
an  abortionj  have  caused  controversy.  The  Florida  experience 
with  privacy  cases  suggests  that  a  different  analytical  approach  Is 
used  in  privacy  cases  under  article  1,  section  23,  depending  upon 
the  nature  of  the  claim.  In  right  to  die  cases  an  Interstitial  ap- 
proach  is  used  as  the  court's  decision  In  the  case  of  Public  Health 
Tr.  of  Dade  County  v.  Wons  indicates.  8  In  abortion  cases  however, 
the  Florida  court,  by  utillsing  the  absence  of  a  federal  counterpart 
provision,  has  interpreted  the  state  constitutional  provision  inde- 
pendentlyý  employing  a  primacy  approach.  9  In  general  though, 
4.538  So.  2d  457  (Fla.  1989). 
5.553  So.  2d  163  (Fla.  1989). 
6.  Cruzan  v.  Director,  Missouri  Dept.  of  Health,  110  S.  Ct.  2  841  (1990);  in  re 
Qjjinlan,  355  A.  2d  647  (NJ.  1976). 
7.  Roe  v.  Wade,  410  U.  S.  113  (1973). 
8.541  So.  2d  96  (Fla.  1989).  Here,  instead  of  explicitly  stating  that  article  1, 
section  23  of  the  Florida  constitution  was  the  basis  of  its  decision  to  protect 
Ms.  Wons'  constitutional  right  of  privacy  and  religion,  the  court  analysed 
the  right  under  Satz  v.  Perlmutter,  379  So.  2d  359  (Fla.  1980).  The  Wons  court 
based  the  right  of  privacy  in  the  Federal  Constitution,  thus  evincing  an 
interstitial  approach.  It  should  be  asked  whether  a  primacy  approach  could 
be  employed  due  to  the  absence  of  a  federal  analogue. 
9.  In  re  T.  W.,  551  So.  2d  1186  (Fla.  1989)  (statute  requiring  Parental  consent 
for  abortions  performed  on  a  minor  held  unconstitutional  under  article  1, 
section  23  of  the  Florida  constitution,  State  v.  Barquet,  262  So.  2d  431  (Fla. 
1972)  (statute  imposing  a  prison  term  for  manslaughter  on  persons  who 
used  any  means  of  causing  an  abortion  unless  two  physicians  attested  that 
166 while  recognising  the  fundamental  nature  of  the  right  to  privacy, 
the  Florida  courts  have  not  construed  the  right  as  broadly  as  other 
states.  10  Moreover,  the  Florida  courts  have  held  that  the  provision 
of  article  2,  section  23  could  not  enlarge  a  citizen's  expectations  of 
privacy  for  purposes  of  the  search  and  seizure  provisions  of  the 
Florida  constitution.  " 
The  right  of  access  to  courts  is  an  area  that  has  been  sub- 
jected  to  extensive  judicial  interpretation  by  the  state  courts. 
Article  1,  section  21  of  the  Florida  constitution  guarantees  that  the 
Florida  courts  "shall  be  open  to  every  person  for  redress  of  any 
injury,  and  justice  shall  be  administered  without  sale,  denial  or 
delay.  "  There  Is  no  federal  counterpart  to  this  provision,  however 
federal  opinions  have  occasionally  Insinuated  the  existence  of  a 
federally  protected  right  of  access  to  courts  both  inCIVJ112  and 
crimInaI13  proceedings.  However,  since  such  opinions  are  either 
the  procedure  was  necessary  to  save  the  life  of  the  mother  held 
unconstitutional,  because  it  violated  the  state  constitution's  due  process 
clause)  -  10.  Under  a  similar  provision,  the  Alaska  supreme  court  held  in  Ravin  v. 
State,  537  P  2d  494  (Alaska  1975),  that  the  right  to  privacy  prevented  the 
amendization  of  small  quantities  of  marijuana  in  the  home.  Florida  has  not 
accepted  this  interpretation.  The  court  in  Maisler  v.  State,  425  So.  2d  107,108 
(Fla.  1st  DCA  1982)  concluded  that  no  compelling  argument  has  been 
presented  that  the  private  possession  of  cannabis  was  permitted  under  the 
frIvacy  guarantees  of  article  1,  section  23. 
1.  State  v.  Hume,  512  So.  2d  185  (Fla.  1987).  In  Madsen  v.  State,  502  So  2d  948, 
950  (Fla.  4th  DCA  1987),  the  court  held:  Appellant's  additional  contention 
that  recording  of  his  conversation  constituted  a  violation  of  his  right  to 
privacy  embodied  in  article  1,  section  23  of  the  Florida  Constitution  is 
similarly  rejected.  If  we  were  to  apply  the  right  to  privacy  in  the  manner 
proposed  by  the  appellant,  we  would  effectively  nullify  the  constitutional 
amendment  to  section  12,  and  this  is  obviously  not  an  appropriate  judicial 
prerogative. 
12.  In  Boddie  v.  Connecticut,  401  U.  S.  371  (1971),  the  Supreme  Court  seemed 
to  recognise  a  constitutional  right  of  judicial  access  when  it  invalidated  a 
state  statute  conditioning  granting  a  divorce  upon  payment  of  court  fees 
and  costs.  In  United  States  v.  Kras,  409  U.  S.  434  (1973)  the  Court  refused  to 
apply  the  same  reasoning  to  the  payment  of  Ming  fees  in  bankruptcy. 
13.  In  Bounds  v.  Smith,  430  U.  S.  817,821  (1977),  the  Supreme  Court  implied 
the  existence  of  a  fundamental  "constitutional  right  of  access  to  the  courts" 
requiring  prison  authorities  to  assist  inniates  to  prepare  and  file  legal 
papers.  The  scope  of  this  right  has  never  been  clearly  articulated.  As 
167 narrow  in  scope  or  based  on  different  constitutional  grounds,  the 
Florida  supreme  court,  In  access  to  court  situations,  is  functioning 
In  a  field  where  there  is  no  federal  analogue.  14  When  it  comes  to 
court  costs  and  f1ling  fees,  Florida  courts  have  held  that  they  do 
not  constitute  an  Impermissible  Impairment  to  the  constitutionally 
guaranteed  right  of  access  to  courts  if  they  are  reasonable.  15 
However,  when  unreasonable  deposits  were  required  as  a  condi- 
tion  for  access  to  courts,  the  Florida  courts  have  considered  such  a 
condition  a  violation  of  the  access  clause.  16  Reasonable  statutes  of 
limitations  are  also  permitted  under  article  1,  section  2  1. 
However,  when  these  statutes  function  as  a  bar  to  an  action  before 
accrual,  such  limitations  have  been  invalidated.  17  In  Interpreting 
the  access  clause  then,  the  Florida  supreme  court,  uninterrupted 
by  the  influence  of  any  federal  analogue,  interpreted  inde- 
pendently  a  constitutional  right  unique  to  Florida,  following,  thus, 
the  primacy  approach. 
Article  1,  section  9,  of  the  Florida  constitution  provides  that 
"No  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without 
due  process  of  law.  "  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  this  provision  Is  al- 
most  identical  to  both  the  Fifth  and  the  Fourteenth  amendments 
to  the  Federal  Constitution,  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  has  not  al- 
ways  interpreted  this  provision  In  the  same  manner  that  the  fed- 
regards  criminal  appeals,  the  Supreme  court  has  held  in  McKane  v. 
Durston,  153  U.  S.  684  (1894),  that  a  state  need  not  provide  a  system  of 
criminal  appeals. 
14.  In  Overland  Construction  Co.,  Inc.  v.  Sirmons,  369  So.  2d  572,573  (Fla. 
1979),  the  Florida  supreme  court  recognised  the  exclusively  state  origins  of 
the  access  to  courts  clause.  "This  constitutional  mandate,  which  has 
appeared  in  every  revision  of  the  state  constitution  since  1838,  has  no 
counterpart  in  the  federal  constitution  and  derives  its  scope  and  meaning 
solely  from  Florida  case  law.  " 
15.  Carter  v.  Sparkman,  335  So.  2d  802  (Fla.  1976). 
16.  G.  B.  B.  Investments,  Inc.  v.  Hinterkopf,  343  So.  2d  899  (Fla.  1977). 
17.  Diamond  v.  E.  R.  Squibb  and  Sons,  Inc.,  397  So.  2d  671  (Fla.  1981). 
168 eral  courts  have  interpreted  its  federal  counterparts.  In  most  due 
process  cases  the  Interstitial  approach18  is  employed,  though  the 
use  of  the  primacy  method  has  also  been  used  in  several  cases.  19 
ID,  m 
Recent  equal  protection  cases  reveal  that  In  this  area  a  pref- 
erence  by  the  Florida  courts  towards  the  Interstitial  approach  ex- 
IStS.  20 
18.  Spivey  v.  State,  5  29  So.  2d  1088,1095  (Fla.  1988)  (the  court  reversed, 
under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  the  judge's  sentence  of  death,  because 
the  judged  erred  in  imposing  the  death  penalty  when  there  was  a 
reasonable  basis  for  the  jury's  recommendation  of  life  imprisonment), 
Engle  v.  State,  438  So.  2d  803  (Fla.  1983)  (the  court  explicitly  relied  on  the 
Sixth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  in  finding  that  consideration  of 
testimony  given  in  at  another  trial  unconstitutionally  denied  an 
opportunity  to  cross  examine  and  confront  during  a  sentencing  hearing. 
The  court  vacated  the  death  sentence  and  remanded  for  sentencing  without 
empanelling  another  jury). 
Cases  decided  following  the  interstitial  approach  implicitly  depend  on  an 
assumption  that  when  a  clear  and  plain  statement  of  a  state  basis  for  a 
decision  is  absent,  a  federal  basis  will  be  inferred.  Such  cases  include  Wood 
v.  State,  544  so.  2d  1004,1006  (Fla.  1989)  (the  court  found  that  a  defendant 
must  be  given  notice  before  costs  are  assessed  against  him,  stating  that 
holding  goes  to  the  very  heart  of  the  requirements  of  the  due  process 
clause  of  the  state  of  Florida  and  the  Federal  Constitution),  Garron  v.  State, 
528  So.  2d  353  (Fla.  1988)  (the  court  found  that  the  use  of  post-Miranda 
silence  as  evidence  of  sanity  violated  due  process,  bases  on  US  Supreme 
Court  cases),  Harmon  v.  State,  527  So.  2d  182  (Fla.  1988)  (the  trial  court  was 
mistaken  in  overriding  jury  recommendation  of  life  because  reasonable 
people  could  differ  that  death  was  the  appropriate  penalty). 
9 !.  state  v.  Barquet,  262  So.  2d  431  (Fla.  1972)  (the  court  declared 
unconstitutionally  vague  and  violative  of  the  state  due  process  guarantees, 
a  statute  prohibiting  the  performance  of  abortions  except  when  necessary 
to  save  the  life  of  the  mother)  State  v.  Smith,  547  So.  2d  131  (Fla.  1989)  (ex 
parte  order  compelling  participation  in  a  police  line  up  violated  article  1, 
section  9  of  the  Florida  constitution),  Hill  v.  State,  549  So.  2d  179  (Fla.  1989) 
(the  court  explicitly  rejected  a  broader  federal  interpretation  and  found 
that  failure  to  admit  double  hearsay  testimony  did  not  violate  article  1, 
section  16  of  the  Florida  constitution  regarding  right  to  a  fair  and  speedy 
trial  in  criminal  matters),  State  v.  Glosson,  462  So.  2d  1082  (Fla.  1989)  (the 
court  rejected  the  narrow  application  of  the  due  process  defence  found  in 
federal  cases  and  held  that  a  payment  of  a  contingent  fee  to  an  informant 
conditioned  on  cooperation  and  testimony  needed  for  a  successful 
prosecution  violated  article  1,  section  9  of  the  Florida  constitution). 
20.  United  Tel.  Long  Distance  v.  Nichols,  546  So.  2d  717,720  (Fla.  1989)  (order 
requiring  a  long-distance  telephone  subsidiary  to  compensate  the  local 
exchange  parent  and  its  ratepayers  for  intangible  benefits  derived  from 
the  parent  is  "neither  confiscatory  nor  violative  of  the  due  process  or 
equal  protection  clauses  of  the  state  and  Federal  constitutions"),  Texaco, 
Inc.  v.  Department  of  Transp.,  537  So  2d  92  (Fla.  1989)  (the  court  rejected  an 
equal  protection  claim  without  specific  reference  to  state  or  federal  basis 
for  its  decision). 
169 In  the  field  of  eminent  domain,  the  Florida  Supreme  Court 
had  in  Departmen  t  of  Agi1c.  v.  Mid-Fla.  Growers,  21  the  occasion  to 
consider  whether  the  provision  of  article  X,  section  6  of  the  Florida 
constitution,  requiring  private  property  not  to  be  taken  for  a  pub- 
lic  purpose  unless  full  compensation  is  paid,  should  be  construed 
similarly  to  the  federal  counterpart  of  the  Fifth  Amendment.  The 
court  without  referring  to  any  federal  constitutional  provisions, 
and  while  conceding  that  the  state  had  acted  in  good  faith  and  in 
the  public  Interest  in  destroying  apparently  healthy  citrus  trees  in 
an  attempt  to  control  the  spread  of  citrus  canker,  held  that  "full 
and  just  compensation  is  required  when  the  state,  pursuant  to  Its 
police  power,  destroys  healthy  trees".  22  The  primacy  approach  was 
followed  in  this  instance. 
When  It  comes  to  criminal  law  and  procedure,  Florida  courts 
have,  as  a  general  rule,  the  power  to  interpret  a  provision  of  the 
state  constitution  more  protectively  than  the  US  Supreme  Court 
interprets  a  similar  provision  of  the  Federal  Constitution. 
However,  an  exception  to  this  general  rule  Is  article  1,  section  12 
of  the  Florida  Constitution  which  expressly  precludes  the  state 
courts  from  construing  the  search  and  seizure  clause  of  the 
Federal  Constitution  broader  than  the  US  Supreme  Court's  Inter- 
pretation  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  to  the  US  Constitution.  23  This 
21.521  So.  2d  101  (Fla.  1988). 
22.  Ibid  at  105. 
23.  Article  1,  section  12  of  the  Florida  Constitution  as  amended  in  1982 
provides:  "The  right  of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their  persons,  houses, 
papers,  and  effects  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures,  and  against 
the  unreasonable  interception  of  private  communications  by  any  means, 
shall  not  be  violated.  No  warrant  shall,  issue  except  upon  probable  cause, 
supported  by  affidavit,  particularly  the  place  or  places  to  be  searched,  the 
person  or  persons,  thing  or  things  to  be  seized,  the  communication  to  be 
intercepted,  and  the  nature  of  the  evidence  to  be  obtained.  This  right  shall 
be  construed  in  conformity  with  the  4th  amendment  to  the  United  States 
Constitution,  as  interpreted  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court.  Articles  or 
information  obtained  in  violation  of  this  right  shall  not  be  admissible  as 
170 restriction  was  Imposed  upon  the  Florida  courts  by  voters  In  1982 
in  direct  response  to  the  Florida  Supreme  Court's  exercise  of  its 
power  to  construe  its  predecessor  section  more  protectively  than 
otherwise  required  by  the  Fourth  Amendment.  In  the  case  of 
State  v  Sarmien  to,  24  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  held  that  the  state 
constitution  prohibited  police  officers  from  Intercepting  oral  com- 
munications  within  a  suspect's  residence  even  when  consented  to 
by  one  of  the  parts  to  the  conversation.  In  holding  that,  the  court 
recognlsed  that  the  interception  of  these  communications  did  not 
violate  the  federal  constitution.  25  Referring  to  the  trial  court 
record,  the  Florida  court  concluded  that  the  interception  of  private 
communications  within  a  suspect's  home  without  a  warrant  was 
violative  of  the  provisions  of  article  1,  section  12  of  the  Florida 
constitution.  26  The  reasoning  of  this  decision  was  subsequently 
reaffirmed  by  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  in  Odom  v.  State.  27 
Responding  to  these  decisions,  the  Florida  electorate  amended  the 
constitution  to  remove  the  court's  discretion  to  interpret  the 
search  and  seizure  state  constitutional  provisions  broader  than  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court  interpreted  the  Fourth 
Amendment.  28  Thust  for  better  or  worse,  Florida  now  follows  the 
evidence  if  such  articles  or  information  would  be  inadmissible  under  the 
decisions  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  construing  the  4th  amendment 
to  the  United  States  Constitution. 
24.3  97,  So.  2d  643  (Fla.  198  1). 
25.  ibid  at  645. 
26.  "We  are  unwilling  to  impose  upon  our  citizens  the  risk  of  assuming  that 
the  uninvited  ear  of  the  state  is  an  unseen  and  unknown  listener  to  every 
private  conversation  which  they  have  in  their  homes.  This  Is  too  much  for 
a  proud  and  free  people  to  tolerate  without  taking  a  long  step  down  the 
totalitarian  road.  The  home  is  the  one  place  to  which  we  can  retreat,  relax 
and  express  ourselves  as  human  beings  without  fear  that  an  official  record 
is  being  made  of  what  we  say  by  unknown  government  agents  at  their 
unfettered  decision.  "  397  So.  2d  643,645  (Fla.  1981)  (citing  Sarmiento  v. 
state,  371  So.  2d  1047,1051  (Fla.  3dDCA  1979). 
27.403  So.  2d  936  (Fla.  1981). 
28.  This  amendment  was  approved  by  63%  of  all  citizens  voting. 
171 Supreme  Court's  lead  in  the  search  and  seizure  area  serving  as  an 
example  of  the  lockstep  approach. 
The  identification  of  the  constitutional  methodology  applied 
by  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  to  resolve  state  constitutional  issues 
of  the  entitlement  to  trial  by  jury  will  now  be  attempted.  This 
should  be  distinguished  from  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  approach 
in  resolving  issues  concerning  the  incidents  of  the  jury  trial  rights 
to  which  one  is  entitled.  The  court's  approach  to  the  latter  situa- 
tion  has  been  to  rely  upon  the  Florida  constitution  as  its  holding  in 
state  v.  NeJI29  Indicates.  The  Florida  court  position  as  regards  the 
entitlement  to  jury  trial  though  is  not  that  straightforward.  Two 
sections  of  Florida's  Declaration  of  Rights  protect  the  guarantee  of 
trial  by  jury.  Article  1,  section  22  provides  that  "the  right  of  trial 
I 
by  jury  shall  be  secure  to  all  and  remain  Inviolate",  while  article  1, 
section  16  provides  that  "  [I]  n  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused 
shall  ... 
have  the  right  to  ...  trial  by  impartial  jury.  "  Both  provisions, 
that  were  recently  restated  in  the  1968  Florida  constitution,  have 
federal  analogues:  the  Seventh  Amendment  for  article  1,  section 
22  and  the  Sixth  Amendment  for  article  1,  section  16.  However, 
only  the  Sixth  Amendment  has  been  incorporated  and  applied  to 
the  states  through  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  Thus  in  this  case 
there  exists  no  dual  protection  of  the  right  to  jury  trial  In  civil 
cases,  and  the  states  must  develop  their  own  law.  Contrary  to  that, 
there  is  dual  protection  of  the  right  to  jury  trial  in  criminal  mat- 
ters.  Given  this  distinction,  it  Is  expected  that  In  civil  jury  trial 
cases  the  courts  would  interpret  the  state  constitution  Indepen- 
dently.  In  criminal  matters,  however,  the  approach  would  depend 
on  how  the  court  views  Issues  of  federal  supremacy  and  state  au- 
29.457  So.  2d481  (Fla.  1984)  (rejecting  Swain  v.  Alabama,  380  U.  S.  202  (1966). 
172 tonomy.  Indeed,  in  civil  jury  trial  cases,  the  predominant  ap- 
proach  is  the  primacy  one.  Employing  this  methodology  the 
Florida  Supreme  Court  has  found  that  a  right  to  civil  jury  trial  ex- 
ists  as  to  In  rem  forfeiture  proceedIngs3O  and  civil  commitment 
proceedingS,  31  in  situations  where  a  common  law  Issue  is  raised  In 
a  compulsory  counterclaim  to  an  equity  issue,  32  damages  for  tres- 
pass,  33  or  ejection.  34  No  right  to  jury  trial  exists  in  actions  for  emi- 
nent  domain,  35  enjoining  trespass,  36  partitioning,  37  quiet  title,  38  or 
revocation  of  a  real  estate  ficense.  39  In  these  situations  the  court 
considered  the  claims  in  respect  of  the  state  constitution  and  Ig- 
nored  completely  the  federal  analogues,  introducing,  thus,  a 
primacy  thinking. 
If  the  primacy  approach  Is  the  method  the  Florida  courts  are 
opting  for  in  civil  jury  trial  Issues,  the  situation  In  criminal  jury 
trial  cases  Is  more  complicated.  Since  1968,  unlike  civil  cases, 
there  has  been  a  federal  counterpart  applicable  to  the  states  as 
regards  the  right  to  jury  trial  In  criminal  matters-the  Sixth 
Amendment.  It  could  be  expected  then,  that  the  method  the 
Florida  Supreme  Court  would  follow  In  deciding  criminal  right  to 
jury  trial  matters,  would  be  the  Interstitial  one.  Nevertheless, 
three  cases  Indicate  that  the  state  court  has  employed  different 
approaches.  In  Reed  v.  StateýO  where  Reed  asserted  a  right  to  jury 
trial  In  the  county  court  for  a  petty  statutory  offence  of  criminal 
30.  In  Re  Forfeiture  of  1978  Chevrolet  Van,  493  So.  2d  433  (Fla.  1986). 
31.  In  Re  Jones,  33  9  So.  2d  1117  (Fla.  1976). 
32.  Hightower  v.  Bigoney,  156  So.  2d  501  (Fla.  1963). 
33.  Wiggins  v.  Williams,  36  Fla.  637,18  So.  859  (1896). 
34.  Hughes  v.  Hannah,  39  Fla.  365  22  So.  613  (1897). 
35.  Carter  v.  State  Road  Dep't,  189  So.  2d  793  (1966). 
36.  Wiggins  v.  Williams,  36  Fla.  63  6,18  So.  85  9  (1896). 
37.  Camp  Phosphate  Co.  v.  Anderson,  48  Fla.  226,37  So.  722  (1904). 
38.  Hawthorne  v.  Panarna  Park  Co.,  44  Fla.  194,3  2  So.  812  (1902). 
39.  J.  B.  Green  Realty  Co.  v.  Warlow,  130  Fla.  220,177  So.  535  (1937). 
40.470  So.  2d  1382  (Fla.  1985). 
173 mischief,  the  court  employed  a  federal  analysis,  It  then  looked  to 
Florida  law,  and  held  that  a  right  to  jury  trial  for  charges  of  crimi- 
nal  mischief  does  exist,  basing  its  decision  on  both  federal  and 
state  case  law.  The  emphasis  on  the  federal  analysis  In  connection 
with  the  absence  of  an  explicit  statement  of  a  state  law  basis  for 
Its  decision,  indicates  that  the  court  employed  an  interstitial  anal- 
ysis.  One  year  prior  to  Reed,  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  had  em- 
ployed  the  same  method  In  Whirley  v.  State41-the  case  relied  upon 
In  Re6d-ln  a  question  Involving  the  right  of  citizens  to  jury  trial 
for  trafflc  violations.  However,  one  should  consider  that  in  1976, 
In  the  case  of  State  v.  Webb42  -which  was  cited  both  In  Reed  and 
whirley43-the  court  clearly  employed  a  primacy  approach.  Webb 
involved  a  claim  that  a  defendant  charged  with  a  violation  of  a 
state  statute  requiring  motor  vehicles  to  have  a  valid  inspection 
certificate  had  the  right  to  a  jury  trial.  The  court,  employing  the 
primacy  analysis,  based  Its  holding  explicitly  on  state  grounds, 
while  federal  issues  were  addressed  as  Influential  but  not  dis- 
positive.  44  it  is  therefore  difficult  to  categorise  the  constitutional 
approach  of  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  In  this  area.  It  could  be 
said  that  in  criminal  jury  trial  matters,  the  court  has  evolved  from 
a  primacy  analysis,  in  Webb,  to  an  Interstitial  approach,  In 
41.450  So.  2d  83  6  (Fla.  1984). 
42.335  So  2d  826  (Fla.  1976). 
43.335  So.  2d  826  (Fla.  1976).  Eg.,  Reed,  470  So.  2d  at  1324;  Whirley,  45O  So.  2d 
at838. 
44.  "While  we  are  influenced  by  the  fact  that,  even  if  the  statute  had  not 
been  decriminalized  and  still  involved  a  criminal  violation  for  which 
incarceration  was  a  possible  punishment,  the  right  to  a  jury  trial  as 
provided  by  the  sixth  amendment  of  the  United  State  Constitution  would  not 
apply  ....  We  therefore  hold  that,  there  being  no  right  to  a  trial  by  jury  for 
this  traffic  violation  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  Florida's  first 
constitution,  the  denial  of  a  jury  trial  by  [the  inspection  statute]  is  not 
prohibited  by  Fla.  Const.  art.  1,22.  " 
174 Whirley  and  Reed,  that  first  addresses  the  federal  provision  and 
then  the  state  one. 
The  primacy  approach  was  the  approach  followed  in  the  Is- 
sue  of  protection  against  double  jeopardy.  Article  1,  section  9  of 
the  Florida  constitution  provides,  among  others,  that  no  person 
shall  "be  twice  put  In  jeopardy  for  the  same  offence.  "  This  provi- 
sion  has  as  its  federal  analogue  the  Fifth  Amendment  which  pro- 
vides  "nor  shall  any  person  be  subject  for  the  same  offence  to  be 
twice  put  in  jeopardy  of  life  or  limb 
....  "  In  Ohio  v.  Johnson,  45  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court  Interpreted  the  federal  clause  as 
permitting  an  Individual  to  be  prosecuted  for  murder  despite  the 
fact  he  had  pleaded  guilty  to  a  lesser  charge  of  Involuntary 
manslaughter,  and  both  charges  came  as  a  result  of  the  same 
homicide,  provided  that  the  individual  was  only  punished  for  one 
conviction.  46  In  the  case  of  Bean  V.  State,  47  the  Florida  Fifth  District 
Court  of  Appeal  declined  to  follow  the  federal  precedent  finding  it 
i,  incongruous"48  and  instead  relied  exclusively  on  the  Florida  con- 
stitution,  holding  that  an  individual  could  not  be  convicted  twice 
for  both  murder  or  manslaughter  arising  from  the  same  homicide. 
Another  example  of  a  Florida  court  interpreting  a  state 
constitutional  as  affording  more  protection  than  Its  federal  coun- 
terpart  Is  the  case  of  Marshall  v.  State,  49where  the  Second  District 
court  of  Appeals  held  that  the  state  constitution  guarantees  a 
right  to  appeal  which  Is  more  protective  than  any  rights  embodied 
in  the  Federal  Constitution.  The  appellant  In  Marshall  had  escaped 
from  custody  while  an  appeal  of  his  conviction  was  pending,  and 
45.467  U.  S.  493  (1984). 
46.  ibid  at  500. 
47.469  So.  2d  768  (ML  Sth  DCA  1984). 
48.  Ibid  at  769. 
49.344  So.  2d  646  (Fla.  2d  DCA  1977). 
175 the  state  moved  to  dismiss  the  appeal  based  on  the  escape.  The  US 
Supreme  Court  had  previously  held  in  Estelle  v.  Dorough,  -50  that  no 
federal  constitutional  provision  prohibited  the  automatic  dismissal 
of  an  appeal  when  the  appellant  had  escaped  custody.  Ignoring 
Estelle,  the  Florida  court  refused  to  dismiss  the  appeal,  relying  on 
the  state  constitution.  51 
The  stance  of  the  Florida  courts  In  right  to  counsel  situations 
has  also  tended  to  be  pro-state  constitutional.  in  KJrby  v.  Minols,  52 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  held  that  the  Sixth  Amendment 
right  to  counsel  guarantees  became  operative  only  when  proceed- 
Ings  had  been  Initiated  by  either  "formal  charge,  preliminary 
hearing,  indictment,  Information,  or  arraignment.  1153  That  means 
that  according  to  federal  Interpretation,  a  defendant  is  only  enti- 
tled  to  counsel  when  proceedings  have  been  formally  commenced 
against  him.  Contrary  to  that,  the  Florida  constitution  guarantees 
in  article  1,  section  16  the  right  to  counsel  In  all  criminal  prosecu- 
tions.  Pursuant  to  its  authority  to  promulgate  rules  of  practice  and 
procedure,  vested  on  It  by  article  V,  section  2  of  the  state  consti- 
tution,  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  has  adopted  the  Florida  Rules  of 
criminal  Procedure.  Under  these  standards  the  right  to  counsel 
may  become  available  at  an  earlier  time  than  required  by  the 
Federal  Constitution.  The  above  is  illustrated  In  State  v.  Douse,  54 
where  the  Fourth  District  Court  of  Appeal  suppressed  evidence 
which  a  police  offlicer  had  surreptitiously  obtained.  This  evidence 
was  produced  two  days  after  the  defendant's  arrest,  but  before 
the  filing  of  the  information  against  him.  Under  the  Federal 
50.420  U.  S.  534  (1975). 
51.344  So.  2d  at  647. 
52.406  U.  S.  682  (1972). 
53.  Ibid  at  689. 
54.448  So.  2d  1184  (Fla.  4th  DCA  1984). 
176 Constitution,  the  right  to  counsel  would  not  attach  until  the  Ming 
of  the  Information  and  as  a  result  the  defendant  would  be  able  to 
suppress  the  evidence  under  federal  law.  Despite  this,  the  Florida 
court,  found  that  "in  this  Instance  state  law  provides  greater  pro- 
tection  than  Its  federal  counterpart  and,  therefore,  the  case  at  bar 
should  be  adjudicated  under  principles  of  Florida  law.  "55  In  an- 
other  application  of  this  principle,  the  same  court  came  to  a  simi- 
lar  conclusion  In  Sobczak  v.  State.  56  Here,  the  defendant  tried  to 
suppress  Identification  testimony  resulting  from  a  line-up  con- 
ducted  without  defence  counsel.  The  line-up  took  place  following  a 
court  order  obtained  after  the  defendant's  first  appearance  before 
a  magistrate.  The  Florida  Fourth  District  Court  of  Appeal,  finding 
that  Rule  3.130  of  the  Florida  Rules  of  Criminal  Procedure  pro- 
vided  the  right  to  counsel  at  the  f1rst  appearance,  concluded  that 
the  line-up  was  Illegal  under  the  Florida  constitution  and  that  the 
evidence  was  properly  suppressed.  57 
As  is  known,  in  the  late  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  cen- 
turies,  the  US  Supreme  Court  developed  a  doctrine  of  substantive 
due  process  which  was  used  to  Invalidate  state  economic  regula- 
tlons  that  interfered  with  traditional  notions  of  capitalism.  This 
judicial  approach  was  eventually  abandoned  by  the  federal  courts, 
leaving  the  state  legislatures  free  from  the  supervision  of  federal 
courts  on  the  selection  of  state  economic  measures.  This  judicial 
development  though,  was  not  unanimously  followed  by  the  state 
courts.  In  the1930s  and  1940s  for  Instance,  a  number  of  states 
enacted  Fair  Trade  Laws  in  order  to  regulate  retail  prices  for 
manufactured  goods  and  created  causes  of  action  for  manufactur- 
55.448  So.  2d  at  1185. 
56.462  So.  2d  1172  (Fla.  4th  DCA  1984). 
57.  Ibid  at  1173. 
177 ers  against  retailers  and  vendors  that  violated  the  agreement.  The 
Florida  Supreme  Court  invalidated  in  1949  a  provision  of  this  law 
using  a  substantive  due  process  analysis.  -58  There  is  a  number  of 
cases  that,  while  they  could  be  considered  to  have  more  historical 
interest  than  current  consequences,,  indicate  that  the  doctrine  of 
substantive  due  process  is  alive  in  Florida.  59  More  recently,  in  the 
case  of  Department  of  Insurance  v.  Dade  County  Consumer 
Advocate,  60  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  invalidated  on  substantive 
due  process  grounds  a  statute  prohibiting  insurance  agents  from 
rebating  a  portion  of  their  sales  commissions  to  Insurance  pur- 
chasers.  The  court,  relying  on  many  of  the  cases  mentioned  above, 
found,  although  not  unanimously,  no  reasonable  or  logical  rela- 
tionship  between  the  statute  and  any  legitimate  state  purpose.  61 
An  important  development  took  place  in  1986,  when  in  the  case 
of  State  v,  Sajez,  62  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  has  utillsed  substan- 
tive  due  process  analysis  In  non-economic  regulatory  settings. 
There,  the  court  Invalidated  a  state  criminal  statute  prohibiting 
the  possession  of  embossing  machines  that  could  be  used  to  re- 
produce  credit  cards.  It  found  no  reasonable  relationship  between 
the  state  purpose  and  the  means  chosen  by  the  legislature  to 
achieve  the  state  goal.  63 
58  Liquor  Store,  Inc.  v.  Continental  Distilling  Corp.,  40  So.  2d  371  (Fla.  1949). 
59:  Sullivan  v.  DeCerg  23  So  2d  571  (ML  1945)  (invalidation  on  substantive 
due  process  grounds  of  a  statute  which  required  licensing  of  professional 
photographers),  Larsen  v.  Lasser,  106  So.  2d  188  (Fla.  1958)  (restrictions  on 
the  manner  in  which  public  adjusters  could  solicit  employment  were  found 
to  violate  substantive  due  process),  Stadnik  v.  Shell's  City,  Inc.,  140  So.  2d 
871  (Fla.  1962);  Florida  Bd.  of  Pharmacy  v.  Webb's  City,  Inc.  219  So.  2d  681 
(Fla.  1969)  (invalidation  on  substantive  due  process  grounds  of  state 
harrnacy  rules  regulating  the  advertisement  of  prescription.  drugs). 
' 
492  So.  2d  1032  (Fla  1986). 
61  Ibid  at  103  5. 
62:  489  So.  2d  1125  (Fla.  1986). 
63.  ,  IT]  he  legislature  has  chosen  a  means  which  is  not  reasonably  related  to 
achieving  its  legitimate  legislative  purpose.  It  is  unreasonable  to 
178 The  numbers  of  recent  cases  Involving  a  substantive  due 
process  analysis  along  with  the  expanded  reach  of  the  doctrine  to 
non-economic  matters,  suggest  a  continued  utilisation  of  state 
constitutional  law  by  the  Florida  courts  In  the  immediate  future. 
6.2.2.  Summary 
It  is  undeniable  that  the  Florida  courts  have  not  resorted  to 
expansive  interpretation  of  the  state  constitution.  However,  the 
existing  cases  establish  that  there  is  an  awareness  of  their  power 
to  do  so.  The  failure  to  exercise  this  power  may  be  attributed  to  a 
number  of  factors  including  the  asserted  conservatism  of  the 
Florida  courts  and  the  inability  of  counsel  to  raise  and  pursue 
constitutional  law  issues.  It  is  more  likely  though  that  this  reluc- 
tance  could  be  owed  to  the  absence  of  any  methodology  by  which 
state  constitutional  law  is  approached.  Additionally,  the  Florida 
Supreme  Court  has  not  articulated  the  proper  considerations  that 
would  help  it  to  Interpret  the  state  constitution  Independently. 
When  the  Florida  courts  have  resorted  to  the  state  constitution,  no 
clear  guidance  is  provided  as  to  which  method  of  Interpretation  is 
utillsed,  since  all  of  them  have  been  adopted  at  one  time  or  an- 
other.  The  primacy  approach  has  been  used  predominantly  In  sit- 
uations  where  no  federal  counterpart  exists  to  a  provision  of  the 
state  constitution  or  where  the  federal  analogue  is  not  applicable 
to  the  states,  such  as  access  to  court,  right  to  privacy,  civil  jury 
trial  cases  and  cases  Involving  substantive  due  process.  However, 
criminalize  the  mere  possession  of  embossing  machines  when  such  a 
prohibition  clearly  interferes  with  the  legitimate  personal  and  property 
rights  of  a  number  of  individuals  who  use  embossing  machines  in  their 
business  and  for  other  non-criminal  activities.  "  Ibid  at  1129. 
179 it  has  been  used  in  situations  where  there  is  a  federal  analogue 
such  as  due  process  cases.  The  lockstep  approach  has  been  used  in 
search  and  seizure  as  well  as  In  some  freedom  of  speech  cases. 
The  interstitW  approach  has  been  preferred  in  civil  rights  cases 
addressing  freedom  of  religion  assembly  and  speech  cases,  equal 
protection  cases  as  well  as  criminal  jury  trial  cases,  and  it  seems 
to  be  the  one  favoured  by  the  Florida  courts.  The  New  Federalist 
approaches  that  the  Florida  courts  opted  for  In  the  cases  made 
available  are  demonstrated  in  Table  11. 
Table  11 
Court 
Supreme  Court 
Supreme  Court 
Supreme  Court 
Supreme  Court 
Supreme  Court 
Case  Subject  Approach 
Flo.  Canners  Ass.  v  Freedom  of  expres-  Lockstep 
Dep.  of  Citrus  slon 
Firestone  v  News-  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
press  Pub.  Co. 
Sakon  v  Pepsi  Co. 
Public  Health  Tr.  of 
Dade  County  v  Wons 
Re  T.  W. 
SuPreme  Court  State  v  Barquet 
sion 
Freedom  of  expres-  Interstltlal 
sion 
Right  of  privacy  Interstitial 
Right  of  privacy  Primacy 
Right  of  privacy  Primacy 
180 Supreme  Court  Maisler  v  State 
Supreme  Court  State  v  Hume 
Supreme  Court  Madsen  v  State 
Right  of  privacy  Primacy 
Right  of  privacy  Primacy 
Right  of  privacy  Primacy 
Supreme  Court  Overland  Con.  Co.,  Inc.  Right  of  access  to  Primacy 
v  Sirmons  courts 
Supreme  Court  Carter  v  Sparkman  Right  of  access  to  Primacy 
courts 
Supreme  Court  G.  B.  B.  Invest.,  Inc.  v  Right  of  access  to  Primacy 
Hinterkopf,  courts 
Supreme  Court  Diamond  v  E.  R.  Right  of  access  to  Primacy 
Squibb  and  Sons,  Inc.  courts 
Supreme  Court  Engle  v  State  Due  process  Interstitial 
Supreme  Court  Spivey  v  State  Due  process  Interstitial 
Supreme  Court  Wood  v  State  Due  process  Interstitial 
Supreme  Court  Garron  v  State  Due  process  Interstitial 
Supreme  Court  Harmon  v  State  Due  process  Interstitial 
181 Supreme  Court  United  Tel.  Long  Dist.  Equal  protection 
v  Nichols 
Supreme  Court  Texaco,  Inc.  v  Dep.  of  Equal  protection 
Transp. 
Supreme  Court  State  v  Smith  Due  process 
Supreme  Court  Hill  v  State  ,  Due  process 
Supreme  Court  State  v  Glosson  Due  process 
Interstitial 
Interstitial 
Primacy 
Primacy 
Primacy 
Supreme  Court  Dep.  of  Agric.  v  mId-  Eminent  domain  Primacy 
Fla.  Growers 
Supreme  Court  State  v  Sarmiento  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
Supreme  Court  Odom  v  State  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
Supreme  Court  State  v  Nell 
Supreme  Court  In  Re  Forfeiture 
Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
182 Supreme  Court  In  Re  Jones  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
Supreme  Court  Hightower  v  Bigoney  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
Supreme  Court  Wiggins  v  Williams  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
Supreme  Court  Hughes  v  Hannah  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
Supreme  Court  Carter  v  State  Road  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
Dep't  procedure 
Supreme  Court  Camp  Phosphate  Co.  v  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
Anderson  procedure 
Supreme  Court  Hawthorne  v  Panama  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
Park  Co.  procedure 
Supreme  Court  J.  B.  Green  Realty  Co.  v  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
Warlow  procedure 
Supreme  Court  State  v  Webb  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
183 Supreme  Court  Whirley  v  State  Criminal  law  and  Interstitial 
procedure 
Supreme  Court  Reed  v  State  Criminal  law  and  Interstitial 
procedure 
Supreme  Court  Bean  v  State  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
Supreme  Court  Marshall  v  State  Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
Fourth  District  State  v  Douse 
Court  of  Appeals 
Supreme  Court  Sobczak  v  State 
Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
Criminal  law  and  Primacy 
procedure 
Supreme  Court  Liquor  Store,  Inc.  v  Substantive  due  Primacy 
Cont.  Distilling  Corp.  process 
Supreme  Court  Florida  Bd.  of  Pharm.  Substantive  due  Primacy 
V.  Webb's  City,  Inc.  process 
Supreme  Court  Larsen  v  Lasser  Substantive  due  Primacy 
process 
184 Supreme  Court 
Supreme  Court 
Dep't  of  Insurance  v  Substantive  due  Primacy 
Dade  CountY  Cons.  process 
Advocate 
State  v  Salez  Substantive  due  Primacy 
process 
6.3.  NEWYORK 
6.3.1.  The  scope  of  New  judicial  Federalism  In  New  York 
Courts  In  the  state  of  New  York  seem  to  demonstrate  a 
preference  towards  relying  on  the  Individual  rights  guarantees 
provided  by  their  own  state  constitution,  as  opposed  to  reliance  on 
the  protective  provisions  of  the  federal  Constitution.  This  policy 
could  be  considered  logical  where  the  rights  protected  by  the  state 
constitution  do  not  enjoy  federal  protection,  or  where  substantial 
differences  exist  between  the  two  texts  which  justify  some  kind  of 
independent  Interpretation  of  the  state  constitution.  New  York 
courts,  however,  have  been  resorting  to  independent  analysis 
even  in  situations  where  no  textual  difference  between  compara- 
ble  provisions  exists.  As  Galie64  points  out,  the  courts  of  that  state 
have  consistently  recognised  that  their  own  constitutional  tradi- 
tions  acquire  a  significant  value,  Independent  from  that  of  the 
federal  Constitution.  In  addition,  this  trend  does  not  seem  to  con- 
64.  Galie,  "State  Constitutional  Guarantees  and  Protection  of  Defendants' 
Rights:  The  Case  of  New  York",  1960-1978,28  Buffalo  Law  Review  157,192 
(1979). 
185 stitute  a  recent  phenomenon  due  to  the  contraction  by  the  Burger 
Court  of  federal  rights  and  remedies  in  criminal  procedure.  The 
right  to  counsel,  for  Instance  Is  similarly  worded  in  both  the 
Federal  and  the  New  York  Bills  of  Rights.  New  York  courts,  how- 
ever,  have  consistently  interpreted  the  state  provision  as  offering 
wider  protection  than  the  Federal  one,  forcing  thus  commentators 
to  regard  the  right  to  counsel  In  the  state  of  New  York  as  "the 
strongest  protection  -of  right  to  counsel  anywhere  in  the 
country,  65.  The  New  Federalist  approach  that  the  New  York  courts 
follow  in  right  to  councel  situations,  is  usually  the  interstitial  one. 
They  first  examine  the  federal  provision  only  to  find  that  the  state 
one,  which  Is  subsequently  analysed,  offers  wider  protection. 
The  due  process  clause  is  another  example  of  how  two  pro- 
visions,  similarly  worded  in  both  the  state  and  the  federal 
constitutions  may  require  separate  interpretation.  The  fourteenth 
amendment  to  the  federal  Constitution  reads  that:  "nor  shall  any 
state  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due 
process  of  law.  "  The  New  York  constitution's  due  process  clause, 
which  came  to  force  before  the  fourteenth  amendment,  provides 
that:  "No  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  " 
The  apparent  similarity  of  the  two  provisions  could  dictate 
that  the  federal  one  should  take  precedence  over  its  state  coun- 
terpart.  It  was  as  early  though  as  1911  that  it  became  apparent 
that  New  York  courts  were  not  willing  to  apply  blindly  the  fed- 
eral  due  process  clause.  In  the  Ives  case66  the  state  due  process 
65.  Galie,  "The  Other  Supreme  Courts:  Judicial  Activism  Among  Supreme 
Courts",  33  Syracuse  Law  Review  731,764  (1982),  People  v.  Hobson,  39  N.  Y. 
2d  479,348  N.  E.  2d  894,3  84  N.  Y.  S.  2d  419  (1976). 
66.  Ives  v.  South  Buffalo  Ry.  Co.,  N.  Y.  271,94  N.  E.  431  (1911). 
186 clause  was  utilised  In  order  to  annul  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act  of  1910,  a  statute  that  forced  employers  to  contribute  to  an 
Insurance  fund  for  the  benefit  of  employees  injured  in  the  course 
of  employment,  irrespective  of  fault.  That  opinion  of  the  New  York 
Court  of  Appeals  became  promptly  unpopular.  It  was  rejected  na- 
tionally.  It  was  publicly  criticised  by  Theodore  Roosevelt,  who  was 
then  planning  his  progressive  political  movement.  It  led  to  an 
amendment  of  the  state constitution  to  include  workers,  compen- 
sation  in  no  less  than  the  Bill  of  Rights  and  it  cost  its  author  the 
chief  judgeship  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  in  the  next  election.  The 
jurisprudencial  and  political  importance  of  Ives  is,  then,  beyond 
doubt.  But  this  case  is  also  signIficant  due  to  the  fact  that  Its  spe- 
cific  outcome  necessitated  a  rejection  of  two  preceding  decisions  of 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  that  supported  the  validity  of  the 
statute.  The  Court  said  that  the  above  mentioned  decisions  were 
"not  controlling  of  our  construction  of  our  Constitution"  and  con- 
tinued"  [a]lI  that  Is  necessary  to  affirm  In  this  case  before  us  is 
that  in  view  of  the  Constitution  of  our  state,  the  liability  sought  to 
be  imposed  upon  the  employees  enumerated  In  the  statute  before 
us  is  a  taking  of  property  without  due  process  of  law,  and  the 
statute  is  therefore  vold.  "67  It  can  be  said  then,  that  Ives  is  a  clear 
Indication  of  the  intentions  of  the  state  court  to  Interpret  in- 
dependently  Its  state  constitution,  since  a  statute  considered  valid 
as  regards  federal  due  process  fell  In  doubt  as  regards  state  due 
process.  The  interstitial  approach  characterises,  again,  the  attitude 
of  the  state  courts  in  due  process  situations. 
Ives  Is  a  milestone  decision  for  the  New  York  courts  In  as 
far  as  it  became  the  departure  point  in  their  subsequent  tendency 
67.  Ives  v.  South  Buffalo  Ry.  Co.,  201  MY  at  317,94  N.  E.  at  448. 
187 to  interpret  the  state  due  process  clause  broader  than  the  federal 
one.  For  example,  In  Sharrock  v.  Dell  Buick-Cadillac,  Inc.  68  the  New 
York  Court  of  Appeals  was  faced  with  a  situation  Involving  a 
challenge  under  the  state  and  federal  due  process  clauses  to  the 
statutory  lien  enabling  garage  men  to  foreclose  for  delinquent  re- 
pair  and  storage  charges.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
had  proclaimed,  two  months  earlier,  In  a  finding  which  the  state 
court  could  have  relied  on  to  dispose  of  the  case,  that  a  private 
sale  of  property  subject  to  a  warehouseman's  possessory  lien  did 
not  constitute  "state  action"  for  the  purposes  of  the  fourteenth 
amendment.  69  The  New  York  court,  though,  adopting  an  interstitial 
approach,  decided  that  It  could  give  a  broader  reading  to  the 
"state  action"  requirement  since  no  reference  to  "state"  is 
contained  in  the  state  due  process  clause,  unlike  its  federal 
counterpart.  Fundamental  principles  of  federalism,  the  history  of 
the  due  process  clause  In  New  York  along  with  the  textual 
constitutional  difference  and  the  long  tradition  of  due  process 
protection  afforded  to  the  citizens  of  that  state,  were  the  crucial 
factors  taken  Into  consideration  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  in  its 
decision  to  invalidate  the  statute.  70 
68.45  N.  Y.  2d  152,379  N.  E2d  1169,408  N.  Y.  S.  2d  39  (1978). 
69.  Flagg  Bros.,  Inc.  v.  Brooks,  436  U.  S.  149  (1978). 
70.45  N.  Y.  2d  at  159-161,379  N.  E.  2d  at  1173-1174,408  N.  Y.  S.  2d  at  43-45.  Also 
Svendsen  v.  Smith's  Moving  and  Trucking  Co.,  54  N.  Y.  2d  856,429  N.  E.  2d  411, 
444  N.  Y.  S.  2d  904  (1981)  (mem.  ),  cert.  denied,  455  U.  S.  927  (1982).  The 
concurrence  in  Svendsen,  54  N.  Y.  2d  at  868,429  N.  E.  2d  at  412,444  N.  Y.  S.  2d  at 
905  (Jasen,  J.,  concurring)  and  the  dissent  in  Sharrock  v.  Dell  Buick- 
Cadillac,  Inc.,  45  N.  Y.  2d  152,169,379,  N.  E.  2d  1169,1179-1180,408  N.  Y.  S.  2d  39, 
50  (jasen.  J.,  dissenting),  would  instead  have  relied  on  the  per  curiam. 
opinion  in  Central  Savings  Bank  v.  City  of  New  York,  280  N.  Y.  9,19  N.  E.  2d 
659  (1939),  cert.  denied,  306  U.  S.  661  (1939),  in  which  the  Court  of  Appeals 
held,  on  remittitur,  that  the  state  and  federal  due  process  clauses  "are 
formulated  in  the  same  words  and  are  intended  for  the  protection  of  the 
same  fundamental  rights  of  the  individual  and  there  is,  logically,  no  room 
for  distinction  in  definition  of  the  scope  of  the  two  clauses"  Id  at  10,19 
N.  E.  2d  at  659.  The  explanation  provided  by  the  court  in  concluding  that  the 
188 Unlike  the  provisions  regarding  the  right  to  counsel  and  due 
process,  the  state  protection  against  unreasonable  searches  and 
seizures  does  not  differ  either  in  text  or  in  history  from  the  fed- 
eral  Constitution.  Article  I,  section  12,  Is  Identically  worded  with 
the  fourth  amendment  and  it  was  not  until  1938  that  It  became 
part  of  the  state  constitution,  New  York  actually  being  the  last 
state  to  adopt  It.  The  protection  against  unreasonable  searches  and 
seizures  was  not  unfamiliar  to  the  state  of  New  York.  It  had  al- 
ready  been  contained  in  the  Civil  Rights  Law  for  a  decade  but 
what  caused  dispute  in  the  193  8  Convention,  was  the  exclusionary 
rule.  In  Weeks,  the  Supreme  Court  had  declared  that  the  exclusion 
of  evidence  In  federal  courts  was  'essential  to  meaningful 
protection  against  unreasonable  searches.  71  The  New  York  Court  of 
Appeals,  however,  deviated  from  that  holding.  judge  Cardozo, 
pointed  out  that  state  courts  were  not  obliged  to  Interpret  the 
New  York  statutes  the  way  the  federal  courts  had  Interpreted  the 
federal  Constitution.  He  concluded  that  the  public  policy  of  New 
York  dictated  rejection  of  the  exclusionary  rule.  72  In  the  end,  the 
protection  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  became  a 
part  of  the  constitution  of  the  state  of  New  York,  unlike  an  explicit 
exclusionary  rule  a  fact  inevitably  leaving  open  the  question  of 
whether  the  exclusion  of  evidence  should  follow  Implicitly,  as  was 
the  case  in  the  federal  constitution.  Subsequently  it  was  held  that 
it  does.  73 
amendment  was  in  breach  of  the  state  due  process  clause  followed 
necessarily  from  their  determination  that  according  a  long  line  of 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  the  statute  was 
repugnant  to  the  Federal  Constitution. 
71.  Weeks  v,  United  States,  232  U.  S.  383  (1914). 
72.  People  v.  Defore,  242  N.  Y.  13,150  N.  E  585,  cert.  denied,  270  US.  657  (1926). 
73.  In  people  v.  Johnson,  66  N.  Y.  2d  398,408,488  N.  E2d  439,446-447,497 
N.  Y.  S.  2d  618,625-626  (1985)  (Titone,  J.,  concurring)  there  is  a  discussion  of 
the  relevant  history. 
189 When  contemplating  this  text  and  history,  the  New  York 
Court  of  Appeals  chose  for  many  years  not  to  deviate  from  the 
flndings  of  the  federal  courts  when  it  came  to  search  and  seizure 
arguments  based  on  the  state  constitution.  74  This  meant  that  New 
York  courts  in  general  when  faced  with  situations  dictating  a 
choice  between  the  state  clause  regarding  unreasonable  searches 
and  seizures  and  the  fourth  amendment,  they  would  consider  the 
latter  as  the  guiding  precedent,  adopting,  thus,  a  lockstep 
approach.  75 
The  analysis  regarding  search  and  seizure  applies  as  well  to 
the  equal  protection  clause.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  state 
and  the  federal  constitution  share  history  and  text,  the  Court  of 
Appeals  has  followed  a  lockstep  approach,  only  occasionally 
deciding  that  the  equal  protection  clause  of  the  state  constitution 
provided  for  greater  rights  as  opposed  to  Its  federal  counterpart. 
In  Dorsey76the  court  pointed  out  that  the  equal  protection  clause 
approved  at  the  1938  Constitution  Convention,  N.  Y.  Const.  art.  I 
section1l,  was  designed  to  embody  "in  our  Constitution  the 
74.  Seefor  example,  People  v.  Ponder,  54  N.  Y.  2d  160,165,429  N.  E.  2d  735,737- 
73  8,445  N.  Y.  S.  2d  5  7,5  9  (198  1). 
75.  People  v.  Johnson,  66  N.  Y.  2d  at  406,488  N.  E.  2d  at  445,497  N.  Y.  S.  2d  at  624, 
see  also  People  v.  Gonzalez,  62  N.  Y.  2d  386,389-390,465N.  E.  2d823,824-825, 
477  N.  Y.  S.  2d  103,105  (1984). 
76.  Dorsey  V.  Stuyvesant  Town  Corp.,  299  N.  Y.  512p  530p  87  N.  E.  2d  541,552 
(1949),  cert.  denied,  33  9  U.  S.  981  (1950),  also  Under  21  v.  City  of  New  York,  65 
N.  Y.  2d  344,360,482  N.  E.  2d  1,7-8,492  N.  Y.  S.  2d  522,528-529  (1985)  (applying 
federal  precedents),  Esler  v.  Walters,  56  N.  Y.  2d  306,313-314,437  N.  E.  2d  1090, 
1094-1095,452  N.  Y.  S.  2d  333,337-338  (1982)  (identical  coverage  to  the  federal 
provision).  In  Cooper  v.  Morin,  49  N.  Y.  2d  69,399  N.  E.  2d  1188,424,  N.  Y.  S.  2d. 
168  (1979),  cert.  denied,  446  U.  S.  984  (1980),  though,  the  Court  of  Appeals, 
found  unacceptable  under  state  law,  the  fact  that  as  a  matter  of  federal  law 
the  denial  of  contact  visitation  privileges  to  pretrial  detainees  was  not 
prohibited.  The  court  declared  that"  We  have  not  hesitated  when  we 
concluded  that  the  Federal  Constitution  as  interpreted  by  the  Supreme  Court 
fell  short  of  adequate  protection  for  our  citizens  to  rely  upon  the  principle 
that  document  defines  the  minimum  level  of  individual  rights  and  leaves 
the  States  free  to  provide  greater  rights  for  its  citizens  through  its 
Constitution,  statutes  or  rule-making  authority. 
Ibid  at  79  399  N.  E.  2d.  at  1193,424  N.  Y.  S.  2d.  at  174. 
190 provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution  which  are  already  binding 
upon  our  State  and  its  agencies.  " 
Why  then  did  the  New  York  courts  prefer  this  line  of  policy7. 
According  to  Kaye77  the  policy  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  conform- 
ing  with  the  federal  courts  can  be  attributed  to  two  factors.  First, 
"continuing  a  policy  of  conformity  necessarily  depends  upon  the 
continuation  of  that  to  which  one  has  to  conform"  and  second,  via 
policy  of  having  a  single  workable  rule  can  as  readily  be  served 
by  imposing  a  higher  state  standard  as  by  conforming  to  the  fed- 
eral  standard.  "  The  Court  of  Appeals  noted  in  P.  J.  Video  Inc.  78  that 
the  interest  of  uniformity  is  only  ""one  consideration  to  be  bal- 
anced  against  other  considerations  that  may  argue  for  a  different 
rule"  and  continued  that  when  "weighed  against  the  ability  to 
protect  fundamental  constitutional  rights,  the  practical  need  for 
uniformity  can  seldom  be  a  decisive  factor.  " 
A  question  that  has  to  be  answered  then,  is  why  should  it  be 
concluded  that  state  law  affords  greater  protection  than  Its  federal 
counterpart,  where  the  text  and  the  history  of  a  provision  dictate 
a  policy  of  uniformity.  A  widely  quoted  argument  Indicates  that 
the  Supreme  Court  establishes  the  lowest  common  denominator  as 
regards  the  application  of  individual  rights,  leaving  to  the  state 
courts  the  additional  duty  to  supplement,  when  necessary,  those 
rights  by  means  of  enforcing  their  own  constitutions.  79  A  differ- 
ence  in  interpretation  of  common  provisions  has  been  justified  as 
77.  J.  S.  Kaye,  "Dual  Constitutionalism  in  Practice  and  Principle"  61  St.  Johns 
Law  Review  399  at  417  (1987). 
78.  People  v.  Pj.  Video  Inc.,  68  N.  Y.  2d  296,304,501  N.  E.  2d  556,561,508 
N.  Y.  S.  2d  907,912-913  (1986),  cert.  denied,  107  S.  Ct.  1031  (1987). 
79.  See  Cooper  v.  Morin,  49  N-Y.  2d  69,399  N.  F-2d  1188,424  N.  Y.  S.  2d  168  (1979) 
(right  of  visitation  granted  to  pretrial  detainee  by  state  constitution)  cert. 
denied,  446  US  984  (1980),  People  v  Adams,  53  N.  Y.  2d  241,250,423  N.  E..  2d  379, 
3  83,440  N-Y-S.  2d  902,906  (198  1),  People  ex  rel.  Arcara  v.  Cloud  Books,  Inc., 
68N.  Y.  2d  553,557,503N.  E2d492,494,510N.  Y.  S.  2d844,846(1986). 
191 being  based  in  sound  policy  considerations  such  as  particular 
characteristics  of  the  state,  statutes  of  common  law,  and  public 
attitudes  as  regards  the  scope,  definition  and  protection  of  the  rel- 
evant  right. 
In  New  York,  issues  that  involve  particular  characteristics 
of  that  state  and  its  traditions  have  been  considered  to  be  the 
ones  related  to  free  expression,  80  as  well  as  disputes  regarding 
land  use.  81  Here,  the  state  courts  adopt  the  primacy  approach.  The 
New  York  Court  of  Appeals  has  also  departed  from  the  federal 
constitution  In  search  and  seizure  cases  due  to  the  above 
mentioned  policy  considerations82.  Kaye83cites  as  an  example,  that 
by  decisional  law  developed  over  the  years,  deflnable  standards 
had  been  established  and  consistently  applied  to  probable  cause 
determinations  within  the  state  of  New  York.  The  New  York  Court 
of  Appeals  has  a  steady  record  of  applying  those  standards  as  a 
matter  of  state  constitutional  law  under  article  1,  section  12.  In  Pj 
80.  See  People  v.  Barber,  289  N.  Y.  378,384,46  N.  E2d  329,331  (1943),  Prune 
Yard  Shopping  Center  v.  Robins,  447  US.  74  (1980),  Bellanca  v.  State  Liquor 
Auth.,  54  N.  Y.  2d  228,429  N.  E2d  765,445  N.  Y.  S  2d  87  (1981)  cert  denied,  456 
U.  S.  1006  (1982),  SHAD  Alliance  v.  Smith  Haven  Mall,  66  N.  Y.  2d  496,488 
N.  E.  2d  1211,498  N.  Y.  S.  2d  99  (1985),  Arcara  v.  Cloud  Books,  Inc.,  68  N.  Y.  2d  553, 
503  N.  E.  2d  492,5  10  N.  Y.  S.  2d  844,  (1986).  These  cases  involve  freedom  of 
speech. 
81.  McMinn  v.  Town  of  Oyster  Bay,  66  N.  Y.  2d  544,488  N.  E.  2d  1240,498  N.  YS.  2d 
128  (1985).  See  also  Pollock,  "State  Constitutions,  Land  Use  and  Public 
Resources:  The  Gift  Outright",  in  "Developments  in  State  Constitutional  Law. 
The  Williamsbourg  Conference"  (B.  D.  McGraw  ed.  1985), 
82.  See  for  example,  People  v.  Bigelow,  66  N.  Y.  2d  417,488  N.  E.  2d  451,497 
N.  Y.  S.  2d  630  (1985),  People  v.  Pj.  Video  Inc.,  68  N.  Y.  2d  296,501  N.  E2d  556, 
508  N.  Y.  S.  2d  907  (1986),  cert.  denied,  107  S.  Ct.  1031  (1987),  People  v. 
johnson,  66  N.  Y.  2d  398,488  N.  E.  2d  439,497  N.  Y.  S.  2d  618  (1985),  also  see 
Comment,  "Article  I,  Section  12  of  the  New  York  State  Constitution:  Revised 
interpretation  in  Wake  of  New  Federal  Standards?  ",  60  St.  John7s  Law 
Review  770  (1986).  The  Court  of  Appeals  wrote  in  1987  in  Patchogue- 
Medford  Congress  of  Teachers  v.  Board  of  Education,  70  N.  Y.  2d  57,510  N.  E.  2d 
325,517  N.  Y.  S.  2d  456  (1987),  that  the  constitutionality  of  compulsory  urine 
testing  for  public  school  teachers  "presents  a  type  of  inquiry  appropriate 
for  resolution  under  the  state  Constitution"  Id.  at  65,510  N.  E.  2d  at  327-328, 
5  17  N.  Y.  S.  2d  at  45  9. 
83.  See  note  77  at  419. 
192 VideoMthe  Court  expressly  pronounced  Its  departure,  on  policy 
considerations,  from  the  from  fourth  amendment  precedents  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  Supreme  Court  had  lately  changed  the  federal 
standards,  thus  "heightening  the  danger  that  our  citizens'  rights 
against  unreasonable  police  intrusions  might  be  violated" 
It  seems  then,  that  the  state  of  New  York  could  be,  for  a 
number  of  reasons,  fertile  ground  for  the  development  of  an  inde- 
pendent  body  of  constitutional  jurisprudence.  A  question  that  has 
to  be  asked  though,  is  whether  this  trend  will  have  the  impetus  to 
survive  through  the  nineties.  Because  it  is  easily  understood  that 
the  survival  of  the  doctrine  of  New  judicial  Federalism  depends 
predominantly  on  a  continuous  supply  of  indications  that  state 
courts  do  actually  wish  to  assume  the  dominant  role  in  protecting 
individual  rights,  a  role  traditionally  occupied  by  the  Supreme 
Court.  On  that  subject,  as  far  as  New  York  is  concerned,  Important 
information  Is  provided  In  a  survey  by  Gardner.  85In  Part  11186  of 
his  project,  Professor  Gardner,  who  Is  not  included  amongst  the 
New  Federalism  enthusiasts,  after  concluding  that  It  would  not  be 
feasible  to  examine  the  status  of  state  constitutional  law  of  every 
84.  People  v.  Pj.  Video  Inc.,  68  N.  Y.  2d  at  301,501  N.  E2d  562,508  N.  Y.  S.  2d  at 
913,  also  State  v.  Kimbro,  197  Conn.  219,496  A  2d  498  (1985).  Connecticut 
Supreme  Court  Chief  justice  Peters  noted,  in  electing  to  interpret  broadly 
state  constitutional  law  instead  of  the  federal  precedent  that  "[T]he 
Connecticut  Court  was  able  to  profit  from  a  developed  history  of  an 
established,  workable  test  for  warrantless  searches,  without  having  to 
commit  itself  to  changing  federal  views  on  the  reach  of  the  fourth 
amendment.  We  were  reinforced  in  our  view  of  our  constitution  by  a 
similar  decision  reached  by  a  Massachusetts  court  with  similar 
constitutional  history.  "  E.  Peters,  "Remarks  at  the  Second  Circuit  judicial 
Conference",  at  3  (Sept.  5,1986)  (unpublished  text),  cf.  Peters,  "State 
Constitutional  Law.  Federalism  in  the  Common  Law  Tradition"  (Book 
Review),  84  Michigan.  Law.  Review.  583,588  (1986)  (reviewing 
Developments  in  State  Constitutional  law:  The  Williamsburg  Conference 
(1985). 
85.  "The  Failed  Discourse  of  State  Constitutionalism",  90  Michigan.  Law. 
Review,  761  (1992). 
86.  Ibid  at  778. 
193 relevant  decision  of  every  state  court,  defines  a  field  of  inquiry 
whose  main  limitations  are:  a)  Taking  into  consideration  a  number 
of  criteria  he  confines  his  survey  to  a  sample  of  seven  states;  b) 
arguing  that  state  supreme  courts  are  far  more  likely  to  devote 
sustained  attention  to  state  constitutional  issues  than  are  lower 
courts,  he  only  examines  decisions  of  the  highest  court  of  each 
state;  c)  he  excludes  decisions  In  which  the  state  high  court  did  not 
write  a  full  opinion,  or  at  least  perform  some  kind  of  legal  analysis 
and  d)  he  confines  his  analysis  to  cases  decided  during  1990,  the 
most  recent  for  which  published  state  high  court  decisions  were 
available,  at  the  time  the  survey  was  conducted.  As  regards  this 
last  limitation,  Gardner  admits  that  his  choice  to  focus  on  a  single 
year  may  result  in  some  distortion  due  to  annual  variations  in 
caseload.  He  points  out  however,  and  this  seems  to  be  a  valid 
argument  that  the  more  recent  the  focus,  the  more  any  distortion 
would  tend  to  favour  the  predictions  of  New  judicial  Federalism. 
This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  independent  state  interpretation 
decisions  are  more  likely  with  the  passage  of  time,  since  the  more 
recent  the  year,  the  more  time  the  message  of  the  New  judicial 
Federalism  has  had  to  penetrate  the  state  judiciaries.  Additionally, 
since  the  US  Supreme  Court  by  continuing  each  year  to  slow  or 
reverse  the  expansion  of  federally  protected  rights,  providing  thus 
state  courts  with  more  to  react  against.  87 
in  Professor  Gardner's  survey  the  record  of  the  Court  of 
Appeals,  of  the  State  of  New  York,  the  highest  ranking  court  of 
that  state,  holds  a  prominent  position.  Initially,,  In  an  attempt  to 
demonstrate  the  Infrequency  of  state  constitutional  decisions,  it  is 
mentioned  that  in  New  York  only  20%  of  the  cases  that  have  been 
87.  Ibid  at  780,  note  66. 
194 decided  involved  state  constitutional  issues.  The  actual  numbers 
are  as  follows.  In  1990,  the  Court  of  Appeals  issued  240  opinions 
containing  some  kind  of  legal  analysis.  Out  of  these,  184  involved 
no  constitutional  issue  at  all,  7  involved  only  a  federal  constitu- 
tional  claim  and  37  Involved  state  constitutional  claims.  Another 
12  opinions  left  unclear  whether  the  case  rose  to  constitutional 
dimensions.  88  out  of  the  37  cases  that  rested  on  the  state  consti- 
tution,  In  12  the  mention  of  the  state  constitution  consists  of  ei- 
ther  an  acknowledgement  that  a  party  is  raising  a  state  constitu- 
tional  claim,  a  citation  to  the  state  constitution  or  the  assertion 
that  the  case  will  have  the  same  outcome  under  both  the  state  and 
federal  constitutions.  89  In  12  more  opinions,  the  court  held,  that 
some  "right"  or  "constitutional  right"  is  at  Issue,  without  mention 
of  any  constitution.  90 
88.  Ibid  at  780,  note  68. 
89.  Ibid  at  78  1,  note  70.  People  v.  Carter,  566  N.  E.  2d  119,120,123  (N.  Y.  199o), 
cert.  denied,  111  S.  Ct.  15  99  (199  1),  Johnson  Newspaper  Corp.  v.  melino,  5  64 
N.  F.  2d  1046,1047,1049  (N.  Y.  1990),  People  v.  Ortiz,  5  64  N.  E.  2d  63  0,63  2  (N.  Y. 
1990),  Schneider  v.  Sobol,  558  N.  E.  2d  23,24  (N.  Y.  1990),  McKenzie  v.  Jackson, 
556  N.  E.  2d  1072  (N.  Y.  1990),  People  v.  Basora,  556  N.  E.  2d  1070,1071  (N.  Y. 
1990),  People  v.  Cain,  556  N.  E.  2d  125,126  (N.  Y.  1990),  cert.  denied,  111  S.  Ct. 
134  (1990),  Ford  v.  New  York  State  Ethics  Commn.,  554  N.  E.  2d  876,882-86 
(N.  Y.  1990),  People  v.  Hernandez,  552  N.  E.  2d  621,624  (N.  Y.  1990),  affd.  sub 
nom.  Hernandez  v.  New  York,  111  S.  Ct  1859  (1991),  People  v.  Sides,  551 
N.  E.  2d  1233,1234  (N.  Y.  1990),  People  v.  Cintron,  551  N.  E.  2d  5  61,566,5  67  (N.  Y. 
1990). 
90.  Ibid  at  782,  note  71.  People  v.  Rodriguez,  564  N.  E.  2d  65  8,659  (N.  Y.  1990) 
(due  process  right  to  be  present  at  trial),  People  v.  LaClere,  564  N.  F-2d  640, 
61  (N.  Y.  1990)  (right  to  counsel),  People  v.  Thomas,  5  63  N.  E.  2d  280,281  (N.  Y. 
1990)  (right  to  have  counsel  at  line-up),  People  v.  Gordon,  563  N.  E2d  274, 
27S  (N.  Y.  1990)  (showup  identification),  City  of  New  York  v.  State,  562  N.  E.  2d 
118,121  (N.  Y.  1990)  (equal  protection  argument),  People  v.  Han-is,  559 
N-E.  2d  660,661  (N.  Y.  1990)  (due  process  right).  In  re  lionel  F.,  558  N.  E.  2d  30. 
31  (N.  Y.  1990)  (double  jeopardy),  cert.  denied,  111  S.  Ct.  304  (1990s,  People  v. 
Garcia,  555  N.  R2d  902,902  (N.  Y.  1990)  (ineffective  assistance  of  counsel), 
people  v.  Wandell,  554  N.  E.  2d  1274,1274  (N.  Y.  1990)  (effective  assistance  of 
counsel),  People  v.  Gonzalez,  554  N.  E.  2d  1269,1270  (N.  Y.  1990)  (right  to 
counsel),  cert.  denied,  111  S.  Ct  99  (1990).  In  re  Jamal  C.,  553  N.  E.  2d  1018,1019 
(N.  Y.  1990)  (constitutional  right  to  the  presence  of  counsel),  People  v.  Tuck, 
551  N.  E.  2d.  578,578  (N.  Y.  1990)  (right  to  confrontation). 
195 Gardner  uses  the  fact  that  in  none  of  these  cases  did  the 
court  make  any  statement  of  the  Michigan  v.  Long  kind-that  Its 
decision  was  based  on  adequate  and  independent  state  grounds-to 
conclude  that  It  is  impossible  to  determine  whether  these  rulings 
are  state  constitutional  rulings  or  not.  91  It  is  further  argued  that 
this  approach  of  the  Court  of  Appeals,  led  to  a  situation  where  liti- 
gants  were  discouraged  to  make  such  claims,  something  easily 
seen  by  the  low  proportion  of  cases  where  a  state  constitutional 
ruling  is  requested.  The  example  used  is  the  protection  of  freedom 
of  speech.  Although  both  the  federal  and  the  state  constitution 
protect  It,  92  only  3  published  opinions  were  Issued  by  New  York 
trial  courts  under  the  state  constitution  In  199093,  as  opposed  to 
15  issued  by  the  US  district  courts  sitting  in  New  York.  94  Gardner 
91.  ibid  at  78  2. 
92.  U.  S.  Const.  amend.  1,  N.  Y.  Const.  art.  I  section  8. 
93.  Gardner  at  784,  note  82.  People  v.  Perkins,  558  N.  Y.  S2d  459  (Dist.  Ct.  1990), 
People  v.  Reynolds,  554  N.  Y.  S2d  391  (City  Ct.  1990),  People  v.  Blanchette,  554 
N.  Y.  S.  2d  388  (City  Ct.  1990).  Gardner  notes  that  a  fourth  case,  People  v. 
pennisi,  563  N.  Y.  S.  2d  612  (Sup.  Ct.  1990),  seems  unclear  as  to  whether  the 
constitutional  claim  adjudicated  is  a  federal  or  a  state  one,  a  fifth  case, 
Delano  Village  Cos.,  v.  Orridge,  553  N.  Y-S2d  938  (Sup.  Ct.  1990),  seems  to 
clearly  decide  a  free  speech  claim  under  the  federal  constitution  but  it  Is 
unclear  about  whether  the  ruling  should  also  be  understood  as  one  under 
the  state  constitution,  and  two  other  free  speech  cases,  Johnson  Newspaper 
Corp.  v.  Melino,  564  NX-2d  1046  (N.  Y.  1990)  and  Golden  v.  Clark,  564  N.  E.  2d 
611  (N.  Y.  1990)  were  decided  under  the  state  constitution. 
94.  Piesco  v.  City  of  New  York,  753  F.  Supp.  468  (S.  D.  N.  Y  1990)  (retaliatory 
discharge),  New  York  News,  Inc.  v.  Metropolitan  Transp.  Auth.,  753  F.  Supp. 
133  (S.  D.  N.  Y.  1990)  (restricting  sale  of  newspapers),  Levin  v.  Harleston,  752 
F.  Supp.  620  (S.  D.  N.  Y  1990)  (academic  freedom),  Central  Am.  Refugee  Ctr.  v.. 
City  of  Glen  Cove,  753  F.  Supp  437  (E.  D.  N.  Y.  1990)  seeking  employment,  New 
york  State  Assn.  of  Career  Schools  v.  State  Educ.  Dept.,  749  F.  Supp.  1264 
(W.  D.  N.  Y.  1990)  (regulation  of  schools),  Uryevick  v.  Rozzi,  751  F.  Supp.  1064 
(E.  D.  N.  Y.  1990)  (employment  rules),  New  Alliance  Party  v.  Dinkins,  743  F. 
Supp.  1055  (S.  D.  N.  Y.  1990)  (regulation  of  political  party  rally),  Wojnarovicz 
v.  American  Family  Assn.,  745  F.  Supp.  130  (S.  D.  N.  Y.  1990)  (state  copyright 
law),  Don  King  Prods.,  Inc.  v.  Douglas,  742  F.  Supp.  778  (S.  D.  N.  Y.  1990) 
(libel),  Nee  York  State  Natl.  Org.  for  Women  v.  Terry,  737  F.  Supp.  1350 
(S.  D.  N.  Y.  1990)  (civil  rights),  Starace  v.  Chicago  Tribune  Co.,  17  Media  L 
Rep.  (BNA)  2330  (S.  D.  N.  Y.  1990)  (libel),  Selkirk  v.  Boyle,  738  F.  Supp.  70 
(E.  D.  N.  Y.  1990)  (public  employment),  Bordell  v.  General  Elec.  Co.,  732  F. 
Supp.  327  (N.  D.  N.  Y.  1990)  (workplace  confidentiality),  Sarceno  v.  City  of 
Utica,  733  F.  Supp.  538  (N.  D.  N.  Y.  1990)  (retaliatory  discharge),  Young  v.  New 
196 though,  being  at  pains  to  prove  that  litigants  dealing  with  free 
speech  Issues,  when  faced  with  the  choice  between  a  federal  and  a 
state  court,  placed  a  lower  value  on  the  opportunity  to  raise  a 
state  constitutional  issue,  devotes  only  a  footnote  in  order  to 
mention  two  free  speech  cases  where  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New 
York,  after  adopting  an  interstitial  approach,  expressly  asserted 
that  the  state  constitution  provides  greater  protection  for  free 
speech  than  its  federal  counterpart.  95 
Where  the  survey  of  Gardner  Is  Important  though,  as  re- 
gards  the  course  of  New  judicial  Federalism  In  New  York  Is  the 
somewhat  reluctant  acknowledgement,  that  state  constitutes  one 
of  the  exceptions  that  provide  "comfort"  to  the  "proponents  of  New 
Federalism".  96  In  1990,  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  held  in  4 
cases  that  the  state  constitution  provides  greater  protection  of  In- 
dividual  rights  than  the  Federal  Constitution.  97  A  characteristic  ex- 
ample  of  the  court's  state  constitutional  analysis  is  its  approach  In 
people  v.  Dunn.  98  There  a  criminal  defendant  placed  a  challenge 
against  a  search  both  under  the  state  and  the  federal  constitu- 
tions.  The  court  examined  in  the  first  place  the  claim  under  the 
Fourth  Amendment  of  the  US  Constitution.  It  held  that  no  search 
had  occurred  as  a  matter  of  federal  constitutional  law.  99 '  The  court 
then,  apparently  following  an  Interstitial  approach,  turned  to  the 
state  constitutional  claim.  It  considered  whether  the  analysis  of 
york  City  Transit  Auth.,  729  F.  Supp.  341  (S.  D.  N.  Y.  1990)  (regulation  of 
begging). 
95.  Ibld  note  84.  Immuno  AG.  v.  Moor-Jankowski,  567  N.  E.  2d  1270,1277-78 
(N.  y.  1991),  O'Neill  v.  Oakgrove  Constr.,  523  N.  E.  2d  277,280  n.  3  (N.  Y.  1988). 
96.  IbIdat  795. 
97.  People  v.  Dunn,  564  N-E.  2d  1054  (N.  Y.  1990),  People  v.  Van  Pelt,  556  N.  E.  2d 
423  (N.  Y.  1990),  People  v.  Villardi,  555  N.  E.  2d  915  (N.  Y.  1990),  People  v.  Davis, 
553  N.  E2d  1008  (N.  Y.  1990). 
98.564  N.  E.  2d  1054  (N.  Y.  1990). 
99.5  64  N.  E2d  at  105  6-5  7. 
197 the  controlling  federal  case  should  be  adopted  as  a  matter  of  state 
constitutional  law.  100  The  court  continued  by  Indicating  that  It  had 
interpreted  the  state  constitution  independently  from  its  federal 
counterpart  In  the  past,  and  that  it  would  do  that  again  here.  101 
"Unlike  the  Supreme  Court",  the  New  York  court  thought  that  the 
analysis  under  the  state  constitution  should  have  a  different  focus 
from  the  controlling  Fourth  Amendment  precedent.  That  focus 
was  contained  in  a  federal  circuit  court  opinion  which  the  New 
York  court  found  "persuasive.  "  102  The  New  York  court  additionally 
cited  a  dissenting  Supreme  Court  opinion  by  Justice  Brennan,  as 
well  as  some  previously  decided  New  York  cases.  It  then 
concluded,  that  a  search  had  occurred  under  the  state  constitution, 
although  the  defendant's  state  constitutional  rights  had  not  been 
violated  by  that  search.  103  Similarly  in  People  v.  Davis,  104  the  court 
after  considering  a  right  to  counsel  claim  under  both  the  state  and 
the  federal  constitutions,  It  held  that  the  New  York  constitution 
provided  broader  protection  than  the  federal  one  and  cited 
contrasting  state  and  federal  cases  to  prove  It.  105 
6.3.2.  SumMarY 
New  York  seems  to  be  one  of  those  States  where  the  call  of 
New  judicial  Federalism  has  had  a  positive  response.  Historical 
100.564  N.  E2d  at  1056-57.  Gardner  correctly  observes,  that  this  approach 
somehow  diverges  from  a  proper  interstitial  approach,  since  when  it  comes 
to  the  latter  there  is  no  suggestion  that  state  courts  decide  whether  a 
federal  rule  should  be  adopted  as  the  state  law  based  on  the  merits  of  the 
federal  rule.  Rather,  state  courts  are  urged  to  adopt  any  rule  an 
independent  interpretation  of  the  state  constitution  dictates. 
101.564N.  E2datIO57. 
102.564  N.  F-2d  at  1058  nA 
103.564N.  E2datIO58. 
104.553  NX.  2d  1008  (N.  Y.  1990). 
105.553  NX.  2dat  1010-1011. 
198 circumstances  and  socio-cultural  characteristics  which  are  unique 
to  New  York,  have  contributed  to  an  Increased  tendency  of  the 
state  to  rely  on  the  state  constitutional  provisions,  Instead  of  the 
federal  ones,  for  the  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  their 
citizens.  What  is  significant  in  the  case  of  New  York  Is  that  a 
preference  towards  the  state  provisions  Is  observed,  even  in 
circumstances  where  a  similar  federal  provision  exists.  Moreover, 
the  state  provision  is  frequently  preferred  over  the  federal  one, 
even  when  the  latter  is  worded  similarly  with  the  former.  When  it 
comes  to  the  New  Federalist  approaches,  the  New  York  Court  of 
Appeals  seems  to  make  frequent  use  of  the  Interstitial  and  the 
lockstep  ones.  Both  have  been  utillsed  In  criminal  law  and 
procedure  issues.  The  Interstitial  approach  Is  also  the  favourite  of 
the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  In  due  process  cases,  while  the 
lockstep  approach  has  been  widely  utillsed  In  equal  protection 
situations.  The  interstitial  approach  seems  to  be  the  preferred  one 
in  freedom  of  speech  cases  as  well  as  in  cases  concerning  land  use. 
Table  12  summarises  the  New  Federalist  approaches  favoured  by 
the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  In  the  cases  made  available: 
Table  12 
court  Case  Subject  Approach 
Court  of  Appeals  Ives  v.  South  Buffalo  Due  process  Interstitial 
courtofAppeals  Sharrock  v  Dell  Dueprocess  Interstitial 
Buick-Cadillac,  Inc. 
199 Court  of  Appeals  Svendsen  v  Smith's  Due  process  Interstitial 
Moving  and  Trucking 
Co. 
Court  of  Appeals  Central  Savings  Bank  Due  process  Lockstep 
v  City  of  New  York 
Court  of  Appeals  People  v  Hobson  Due  process  Interstitial 
Court  of  Appeals  People  v  Ponder  Criminal  law  and  Lockstep 
procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  People  v  Gonzalez  Criminal  law  and  Lockstep 
procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  Dorsey  v  Stuyvesant  Equal  protection  Lockstep 
TownCorp. 
Court  of  Appeals  Under  21  v  City  of  Equal  protection 
New  York 
Court  of  Appeals  Esler  v  Walters 
Court  of  Appeals  Cooper  v  Morin 
Equal  protection 
Lockstep 
Lockstep 
Criminal  law  and  Interstitial 
procedure 
200 Court  of  Appeals  People  v  P.  J.  Video  Criminal  law  and  Interstitial 
Inc.  procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  People  v  Dunn  Criminal  law  and  Interstitial 
procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  People  v  Davis 
Court  of  Appeals  People  v  Bigelow 
Right  to  councel  Interstitial 
Criminal  law  and  Interstitial 
procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  People  v  Johnson  Criminal  law  and  Interstitial 
procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  McMinn  v  Town  of  Land  use  Interstitial 
Oyster  Bay 
Court  of  Appeals  People  v  Barber  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
sion 
Court  of  Appeals  Bellanca  v  State  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
Liquor  Auth.  sion 
court  of  Appeals  Arcara  v  Cloud  Books,  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
Inc.  sion 
Court  of  Appeals  Johnson  Newspaper  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
Corp.  v  Melino  sion 
201 Court  of  Appeals  Golden  v  Clark  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
sion 
Court  of  Appeals  Immuno  AG.  V  Moor-  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
Jankowski  sion 
Court  of  Appeals  O'Neill  v  Oakgrove  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
Constr.  sion. 
6.4.  MARYLAND 
6.4.1.  The  scope  of  New  judicial  Federalism  in  Maryland 
As  is  already  known  a  signiflcant  change  in  the  relationship 
between  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  and  the  state 
supreme  courts  became  apparent  In  the  1970s.  During  the  era  of 
the  Warren  Court  any  changes  In  the  direction  of  the  protection  of 
civil  rights  and  liberties  would  stem  almost  exclusively  either 
from  the  Supreme  Court  or  other  federal  courts.  That  situation 
started  to  change  when  the  Court  under  Justice  Burger  decided  to 
adopt  a  different,  less  stringent,  approach  as  regards  the  protec- 
tion  of  individual  rights  and  liberties  than  the  one  to  which  Its 
predecessor  had  opted  to  adhere  to.  As  the  protection  of  a  signifl- 
cant  number  of  federal  rights  shrivelled,  state  courts  began  to 
explore  the  potential  offered  by  their  own  constitutions  to  defend 
the  protection  of  Individual  rights  and  liberties.  In  a  spectrum  of 
cases  ranging  from  abortion  matters  to  the  right  of  the  press  to  be 
202 present  in  judicial  proceedings,  state  courts  around  the  country 
started  to  Interpret  their  state  constitutions  independently  from 
the  dicta  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Federal  Bill  of  Rights. 
When  It  comes  to  how  the  Maryland  courts-especially  the 
highest  of  all  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals-handled  the  alterna- 
tive  possibility  of  protection  of  Individual  rights  through  indepen- 
dent  interpretation  of  the  state  constitution,  the  phrase  that  best 
describes  the  situation  is  "middle  of  the  way".  An  examination  of 
its  decisions,  from  the  1970s  onwards,  Indicates  that  the  Court  of 
Appeals  was  not  Indifferent  to  invocations  of  provisions  of  the 
Maryland  Constitution  and  Declaration  of  Rights. 
The  first  area  to  be  examined  is  that  of  freedom  of  speech. 
In  general,  despite  the  difference  in  text  between  Article  40  of  the 
Maryland  Declaration  of  Rights  and  the  First  Amendment  of  the 
US  Constitution,  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals  has  Interpreted 
the  two  provisions  similarly,  following,  thus,  a  lockstep  approach. 
only  occasionally,  mainly  in  the  area  of  speech  on  private 
property,  has  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals  expanded  freedom  of 
speech  In  the  state.  In  State  v.  Schullerlo6  the  Maryland  Court 
relied  on  the  uncertainty  in  federal  doctrine  to  strike  down  the 
state's  statute  banning  residential  picketing.  Here  the  court  opted 
for  the  more  protective  line  of  cases  in  which  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  considered  picketing  as  a  form  Of  expression, 
protected  therefore  by  the  First  Amendment.  107  Although  the 
Maryland  court  adopted  the  more  speech  protective  line  of  cases 
in  this  area  of  free  speech  law,  it  did  so  on  the  basis  of  federal  not 
106-  280  Md.  305  (1977) 
107-  Thomhill  v.  Alabama  -3  10  Us.  88  (1940). 
203 state  tradition.  In  this  respect  the  interstitial  approach  that  the 
Maryland  court  chose  In  order  to  protect  an  Individual's  right  to 
free  speech  on  private  property,  contrasts  with  the  primacy 
approach  taken  by  the  California  Supreme  Court  in  PruneYard 
shopping  Center  v  Robins.  108  The  Maryland  court  has  followed  the 
federal  precedent  In  cases  involving  commercial  speech,  as  the 
outcome  In  the  case  of  re  Oldtown  Legal  Clinic'09  indicates.  The 
situation  is  not  different  in  the  area  of  obscenity.  Notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  the  Maryland  court,  had  since  the  1920s,  established 
a  speciflc  practice,  It  finally  decided  to  walk  in  lockstep  with  the 
guidelines  provided  by  the  US  Supreme  Court"O  as  It  is  apparent 
in  the  cases  of  Mangum  v.  Maryland  State  Board  of  CenSorS111  and 
Gayety  Books  v.  City  of  Baltimore.  112  Things  are  slightly  different 
when  it  comes  to  freedom  of  the  press  cases.  In  a  case  Involving 
the  press's  right  to  be  present  In  judicial  proceedings,  113  the 
court's  decision  rested  both  on  the  state's  tradition  of  press  rights 
and  courtroom  openness  and  the  federal  standard.  When  it  came 
to  defamation  cases,  although  the  court's  early  experience  was  one 
of  realignment  with  the  federal  dicta,  as  the  case  of  jacron  Sales 
co.  v.  Sindorf  Indicates,  114  it  later  showed  in  the  Hearst  Corp.  v. 
Hughes  115  case  a  willingness  to  go  one  step  further  than  the 
federal  document. 
108-  447  U.  S.  74  (1980). 
109-  285  Md.  13  2  (1979) 
110-  Burstyn  v.  Wilson,  343  U.  S.  495  (1952),  Roth  v.  U.  S.,  354  U.  S.  476  (1957), 
Manual  Enterprises  v.  Day,  370  U.  S.  478  (1962),  Jacobellis  v.  Ohio,  378  U.  S. 
184  (1964),  Memoirs  v.  Attorney  General  of  Massachusetts,  383  U.  S.  413 
(1966),  Miller  v.  California,  413  U.  S.  15  (1973). 
111-  273  Md.  176  (1974). 
112-  297  Md.  206  (1977). 
113-297  Md.  68  (1983). 
114-  276  Md.  580  (1976). 
115-297  Md.  112  (1983). 
204 The  treatment  of  religious  freedom  and  the  problems  of 
church-state  relations  is  another  area  indicative  of  the  Maryland 
Court  of  Appeals  approach  to  state  constitutional  development.  It 
should  be  noted,  that  there  are  many  areas  of  church-state  rela- 
tions  where  the  US  Supreme  Court  has  not  ruled.  Consequently, 
until  the  nation's  high  court  rules,  the  responsibility  for  resolving 
these  problems  remains  with  the  state  courts,  which  have  the  op- 
portunity  to  utilise  their  own  constitutions  to  that  effect.  The 
Maryland  position  seems  to  be  that  where  the  US  Supreme  Court 
has  ruled,  as  in  the  question  of  free  exercise  of  religion,  116  to 
follow  the  lockstep  approach.  117  In  areas  where  there  is  a 
difference  In  the  provisions  between  the  US  and  the  Maryland 
Constitution,  as  In  the  area  of  religious  establishment,  the 
Maryland  court  has  permitted  the  state  greater  leeway  than  the 
federal  courts  have  allowed.  For  instance,  In  the  question  of  public 
aid  to  private  colleges  with  religious  affiliation,  the  Maryland 
court  found  that  none  of  the  grants  violated  Article  36  of  the 
Maryland  declaration  of  Rights.  118  To  support  its  view  the  court 
examined  history  and  mentioned  a  number  of  cases'19  that  held 
that  "grants  to  educational  Institutions  ...  have  never,  in  Maryland, 
been  held  to  be  impermissible  under  Article  36,  even  though  the 
Institutions  may  be  under  the  control  of  a  religious  order.  11120  It 
has  been  a  consistent  practice  of  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals 
116-  Torcaso  v.  Watkins,  367  U.  S.  488  (1961). 
117.  Schowgurow  v.  Maryland,  240  Md.  121  (1965). 
118.  Horace  Mann  League,  Inc.  v.  Board  of  Public  Works,  242  Md.  645,  cert. 
denied,  385  U.  S.  97  (1966). 
119-  Speer  v.  Colbert,  24  App.  D.  C.  187  (1904),  Mt.  St.  Mary's  College  v. 
Williams,  13  2  Md.  184  (1918),  Baltzell  v.  Church  Home,  110  Md.  244  (1909). 
120-  242  Md.  645,690,  (1966). 
205 ever  since  to  permit  significant  degrees  of  state  Involvement  in 
certain  areas  of  religious  matters. 
The  experience  of  the  Maryland  court  in  the  area  of  pri- 
vacy  and  personal  autonomy  Is  again  one  of  moderation  and  re- 
straint.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  right  to  privacy  is  not  explic- 
itly  provided  for  in  the  text  of  the  US  Constitution.  Rather,  the 
Supreme  Court  has  recognised  through  a  number  of  decisions,  that 
there  are  additional  fundamental  rights  existing  alongside  those 
specifically  mentioned  in  the  Bill  of  Rights  which  protect  an  indi- 
vidual's  autonomy  In  deciding  matters  concerning  marriage  and 
child  rearing,  121  contraception,  122  and  abortion.  123As  far  as  the 
states  are  concerned,  only  four,  Florida,  Alaska,  California  and 
Montana  have  an  express  constitutional  provision  guaranteeing  an 
independent  right  to  privacy.  This  however,  should  not  mean  that 
there  Is  no  room  for  state  court  development  of  the  right  of  pri- 
vacy  in  states  like  Maryland  that  do  not  specifically  recognise  it. 
The  Maryland  Court  of  Special  Appeals,  when  addressed  with  this 
question  In  Schochet  v.  State'24  held  that:  11  ...  we  are  writing  on  a 
slate,  moreover,  one-third  of  which  has  already  been  filled  by  the 
Supreme  Court.  On  the  basis  of  that  part  of  constitutional  picture 
already  completed,  we  are  called  upon  to  make  an  honest  predic- 
tion  of  what  we  think  the  remaining,  unfinished  part  of  the  pic- 
ture  will  turn  out  to  be".  125  That  means  that  there  Is  room  for 
constitutional  development  where  the  US  Supreme  Court  has  not 
decided  yet,  such  as  In  the  areas  of  drug  testing  and  euthanasia. 
121.  Meyer  v.  Nebraska,  262  U.  S.  390  (1923). 
122  Griswold  v.  Connecticut,  381  U.  S.  479  (1965). 
123:  Roe  v.  Wade,  4  10  U.  S.  113  (1973). 
124-541  A.  2d  183  (1988). 
125-Ibid  at  186. 
206 However,  when  not  writing  on  a  "clear  slate",  the  Maryland  Court 
has  not  so  far  shown  any  willingness  to  expand  the  right  of  pri- 
vacy  beyond  the  federal  scope,  again  following  a  lockstep 
approach.  126 
The  rebirth  of  -equality  guarantees  In  state  constitutions 
renders  this  area  of  individual  rights  a  very  interesting  one  to 
consider.  The  equal  protection  clause  of  the  Federal  Constitution  Is 
included  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  When  It  comes  to  state 
constitutions,  even  though  they  do  not  contain  an  express  provi- 
sion  guaranteeing  the  "equal  protection  of  the  laws",  a  number  of 
provisions  have  been  held  to  contain  an  equal  provision  compo- 
nent.  Most  of  the  states  have  interpreted  the  broad  guarantees  of 
individual  rights  as  requiring  equal  protection  of  the  laws  gener- 
ally.  These  states  have  considered  these  broad  guarantees  as  not 
only  protecting  Individuals  against  governmental  decisions  to 
treat  people  differently,  but  also  as  providing  equality  In  specific 
situation,  such  as  state  education  funding.  Thus,  there  is  a  differ- 
ence  In  terms  of  the  affirmative  component  of  equality  between 
the  federal  and  the  state  provisions,  a  fact  allowing  considerable 
room  for  states  to  interpret  their  own  constitutions  independently. 
in  Marylandq  the  equal  protection  element  is  deemed  by  the 
Maryland  Court  of  Appeals  to  be  included  In  the  state  due  process 
clause  (Article  24).  However,  since  the  state  constitution  has  no 
express  equal  protection  clause,  Article  24  has  been  held  to  afford 
no  greater  protection  than  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the 
Federal  Constitution.  127This  though,  has  not  prevented  a  number 
126-  Doe  v.  Commander,  Wheaton  Police  Department,  273  Md.  262  (1974), 
Montgomery  County  v.  Walsh,  274  Md.  502  (1975),  NeviRe  v.  State,  290  Md. 
364  (1981)  and  Schochet  v.  State,  541  A.  2d  183  (1988). 
127.  U.  S.  Mortgage  Co.,  v.  Matthews,  167  Md.  383  (1934). 
207 of  judges  since  1981  from  leaving  open  the  option  of  innovation 
and  indulge  into  an  interstitial  thinking,  by  utillsing  the  state 
equal  protection  provision.  In  Attorney  General  v.  Waldronl2s  the 
metaphor  of  a  "double  helix"  has  been  used  to  suggest  that  the 
Maryland  equal  protection  provision  has  a  life  of  its  own 
distinguished  from  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  clause. 
Consequently,  the  US  Supreme  Court  interpretation  of  the  equal 
protection  provision  of  the  federal  Constitution  is  persuasive  au- 
thority  in  most,  but  not  all,  cases  regarding  equality  issues  under 
Article  24  of  the  Maryland  charter.  This  case,  involving  "the  right 
to  engage  in  a  chosen  calling"  along  with  Hornbeck  v.  Somerset  Co. 
. 
uoard  ofEducation  129  a  case  Involving  "the  right  to  a  thorough  and 
efficient  education",  are  the  only  Instants  subject  to  a  heightened 
standard  of  review.  In  a  1989  case,  Potomac  Electric  Co.  v. 
Smith'30  the  Court  of  Special  Appeals  rejected  a  claim  that  the 
right  to  recover  non  economic  damages  was  an  important  personal 
right  within  the  meaning  of  Waldron,  and  held  that  the  ceiling 
imposed  by  the  state  legislature  was  not  in  violation  of  either  the 
equal  protection  principles  embodied  in  Article  24  or  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment.  In  general  the  Maryland  court  shows  a 
certain  reluctance  to  abandon,  in  equal  protection  situations,  Its 
lockstep  thinking.  However,  it  has  not  precluded  the  possibility  of 
doing  so  in  the  future,  as  its  writing  In  Waldron  suggests.  131 
A  lot  of  the  discussion  regarding  state  constitutionalism  has 
focused  on  criminal  law.  Indeed,  the  most  extensive  experimenta- 
128-  289  Md.  683  (1981). 
129-  295  Md.  597  (1983). 
130-558  A.  2d  768,79  Md.  App.  591  (1989). 
131-I'Article  24  acts  to  vindicate  important  personal  rights  protected  by  the 
Maryland  Constitution  or  those  recognized  as  vital  to  the  history  and 
traditions  of  the  people  of  this  State 
208 tion  In  terms  of  state  constitutional  interpretation  has  taken  place 
in  this  area.  Despite  the  misconception  of  New  Federalism  being 
used  as  a  code  word  for  increased  rights  of  the  criminally  accused, 
the  development  of  fundamental  criminal  rights  based  on  state 
constitutions  is  considered  to  be  a  most  significant  phenomenon. 
What  then  was  the  Maryland  response  to  these  developments? 
In  the  area  of  searches  and  seizures  the  Maryland  Court  of 
Ar% 
,  peals  followed  the  lockstep  approach,  a  stance  that  has  earned 
it  the  reputation  of  a  "law  and  order"  court.  Article  26  of  the 
Maryland  Declaration  of  Rights  which  Is  the  state  analogue  to  the 
Fourth  Amendment  has  been  a  part  of  the  Maryland  Constitution 
since  1776.  As  Article  23  of  the  state's  first  Declaration  of  Rights 
in  1776,  the  protection  against  unreasonable  searches  and 
seizures  preceded  the  Fourth  Amendment  to  the  Federal 
Constitution.  Also,  the  language  appears  to  consider  the  Maryland 
clause  broader  and  potentially  more  protective  than  Its  federal 
counterpart.  The  Maryland  courts  however,  did  not  take 
advantage  of  the  potential  of  their  state  constitution.  Article  26 
has  been  held  to  have  the  same  meaning  and  effect  as  the  Fourth 
AmendmenL132  The  one  notable  exception  was  the  case  of 
Garrison  v.  State.  133There,  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals,  which 
historically  has  permitted  the  use  of  evidence  Illegally  seized  by 
state  officers  and  more  recently  has  refused  to  adopt  a  different 
probable  cause  standard  than  the  one  applied  In  the  Fourth 
Amendment,  adopting  an  interstitial  thinking,  rejected  the  "good 
faith"  exception  of  the  exclusionary  rule  adopted  by  the  Supreme 
132-  Givner  v.  State,  2  10  Md.  484  (195  6),  Smith  v.  Maryland,  442  U.  S.  73  5 
(1979),  Potts  v.  State  300  Md.  567  (1984). 
133-  303  Md.  385  (1985). 
209 Court  in  the  case  of  United  States  v.  Leon.  134However,  when  the 
same  issue  arose  four  years  later  In  Makolm  v.  State,  135  the 
Maryland  court  returned  to  Its  normal  approach  of  walking  In 
lockstep  with  the  federal  provisions.  136  In  general,  the  court's 
reluctance  to  move  away  from  the  federal  cases,  even  when  Its 
decision  rests  on  independent  state  grounds,  137  is  consistent  with 
its  lockstep  approach  to  criminal  law  Issues. 
The  Interpretation  by  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals  of  the 
privilege  against  self-incrimination  provisions  Is  characteristic  of 
its  approach  to  state  constitutionalism  In  criminal  law  and  proce- 
dure.  The  Maryland  analogue  to  the  FIfth  Amendment  to  the  US 
Constitution  is  Article  22  of  the  Maryland  Declaration  of  Rights. 
The  leading  case  is  Lodowski  v.  State.  138  There,  the  Court  of 
Appeals,  applying  the  Fifth  Amendment  to  the  US.  Constitution, 
ruled  that  the  trial  judge  had  erred  In  refusing  to  suppress  a 
written  statement  by  a  defendant  who  had  supposedly  waived 
his  right  to  counsel.  The  court  reasoned  that  a  suspect  can  not  vol- 
untarily  waiver  his  right  of  counsel,  if  he  Is  not  told  that  attorneys 
have  been  retained  on  his  behalf,  are  physically  present  In  the 
police  station,  and  are  available  for  Immediate  consultation.  139 
Shortly  after  Lodowski  I  was  decided,  the  Supreme  Court  came  to 
the  opposite  conclusion  In  Moran  v.  Burbine.  140  What  Is  more  Im- 
portant,  the  Court  expressly  permitted  the  states  In  Burbine,  to 
134-  468  U.  S.  897  (1984). 
135-  314  Md.  221  (1988). 
136.  Ibid  at  240. 
137.  It  should  be  noted,  that  in  Garrison  the  Maryland  court  did  not  attempt  a 
"Plain  statement"  as  Indicated  by  the  outcome  of  Michigan  V.  Long. 
138.  Lodowski  v.  State  1,302  Md.  691  (1985),  vacated  and  remanded,  475  U.  S. 
1078  (1986),  revd  on  remand,  Lodowski  H,  307  Md.  233  (1986). 
i3q.  Lodowski  1,302,  Md.  691,721  (1985). 
140-  475  U.  S.  412  (1986). 
210 reach  a  different  result:  "Nothing  we  say  today  disables  the  States 
from  adopting  different  requirements  for  the  contact  of  Its  em- 
ployees  and  officials  as  a  matter  of  state  law.  "141  The  State  of 
Maryland  appealed  the  judgement  In  Lodowski  I  to  the  Supreme 
Court,  which  vacated  the  judgement  and  remanded  the  case  to  the 
Maryland  Court  of  Appeals  for  reconsideration  in  light  of  Burbine. 
The  state  court  however,  despite  the  permission  it  was  granted  by 
the  US  Supreme  Court  to  interpret  the  state  constitution  Indepen- 
dently,  reasoned  that  no  matter  how  independent  the  Maryland 
charter  may  be  from  Its  federal  analogue  In  theory,  in  practice  the 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  are  virtually  direct  authority  in 
the  area  of  criminal  law:  "It  is  true  that  similar  provisions  within 
the  Maryland  and  United  State  Constitutions  are  Independent  and 
separate  from  each  other.  Generally,  however,  comparable  provi- 
sions  of  the  two  constitutions  are  deemed  to  be  in  pare  mate- 
ria-Provisions  comparable  to  the  Fifth  Amendment  clauses  con- 
cerning  self-incrimination  and  due  process  of  law  ..  appeared  In  the 
Declaration  of  Rights,  Constitution  of  Maryland  (1776)  and  In  each 
constitution  thereafter.  Thus  the  concern  with  self-incrimina- 
tion-was  shared  by  those  who  framed  the  Federal  Constitution 
and  those  who  framed  the  Maryland  Constitution 
...  We  cannot 
say  ..  that  the  Federal  provisions  and  the  State  provisions  are  to  be 
construed  and  applied  differently.  "142The  court  then  concluded 
that  under  Its  previous  holdings,  the  Fifth  Amendment  to  the  US 
Constitution  and  Article  22  of  the  Maryland  Declaration  of  Rights 
will  be  construed  similarly.  Its  approach  then  and  Interpretation 
of  the  Fifth  Amendment  and  Article  22  of  the  state  constitution  Is 
141.  ibid  at  42  8. 
142.  Lodowsld  v.  State  H,  307  Md.  233,245-246  (1986). 
211 the  same  as  its  approach  and  reconciliation  of  the  differences 
between  the  two  provisions  guaranteeing  Individuals  against  un- 
reasonable  searches  and  seizures,  namely  the  lockstep  one. 
The  situation  is  no  different  when  it  comes  to  the  Maryland 
experience  of  the  right  to  trial  by  jury.  The  Maryland  Constitution 
has  three  relevant  provisions.  Article  5  of  the  Declaration  of 
Rights,  which  has  no  federal  counterpart,  guarantees  that  the  In- 
habitants  of  this  state  "arý  entitled  to  the  Common  Law  of  England 
and  the  trial  by  jury,  according  to  the  course  of  Law.  "  Article  2  1, 
which  Is  almost  identical  to  the  Sixth  Amendment  to  the  US 
Constitution  declares:  "That  in  all  criminal  prosecutions  every  man 
has  a  right  ...  to  a  speedy  trial  by  an  impartial  jury,  without  whose 
unanimous  consent  he  ought  not  to  be  found  guilty.  "  Finally 
Article  23,  which  is  similar  to  the  Seventh  Amendment  states:  The 
right  of  trial  by  Jury  of  all  issues  of  fact  in  civil  proceedings  In  the 
several  Courts  of  Law  in  this  State,  where  the  amount  in  contro- 
versy  exceeds  the  sum  of  five  hundred  dollars,  shall  be  Inviolably 
preserved.  "  The  Maryland  courts  had  the  chance  to  get  Involved  In 
a  discussion  of  state  constitutional  Interpretation  in  issues  regard- 
ing  jury  size'43  and  the  use  of  peremptory  challenges  In  jury  se- 
lection.  144  In  both  Instances  the  Maryland  court  declined  to  em- 
ploy  Its  own  constitution,  opting  Instead  to  follow  a  lockstep  ap- 
proach  with  the  developments  In  federal  law. 
The  stance  of  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals  towards  the  is- 
sue  of  capital  punishment,  Is  also  illustrative  of  the  continual  ef- 
forts  to  comply  with  the  shifting  mandates  stemming  from  the  US 
Supreme  Court.  The  federal  precedent  on  this  occasion  is  the  case 
143-  State  v.  McKay,  280  Md.  558  (1977). 
144.  Lawrence  v.  State,  295  Md.  557  (1983),  Evans  v.  State,  304  Md.  304  Md.  487 
(1985). 
212 of  Furman  v.  Georgia,  14.5  where  the  US  Supreme  Court  nullified  In 
effect  most  death  penalty  laws  and  overturned  death  sentences 
throughout  the  country.  Maryland's  pre-Furman  death  penalty 
statute  gave  the  trial  court  absolute  discretion  to  impose  the  death 
penalty,  unless  the  jury  specified  "without  capital  punishment"  in 
the  verdict.  Following  the  Furman  decision,  the  Maryland  Court  of 
Appeals  struck  down  that  statute  concluding  that  the  "death 
penalty  is  unconstitutional  when  its  Imposition  is  mandatory.  11146 
In  Bartholomey  v.  State'47  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals  ruled 
that  the  recent  US  Supreme  Court  decision,  Furman  v.  Georgia, 
barred  the  death  sentence  under  Maryland  law,  relying  on  the 
Supreme  Court  decision  that  declared  the  death  penalty  unconsti- 
tutional  because  it  was  Imposed  at  the  discretion  of  the  judge  or 
the  jury  and  as  a  result  was  disproportional  against  blacks.  The 
General  Assembly,  as  a  reaction  to  that  decision  approved  In  1975 
a  mandatory  death  penalty,  automatically  Imposed  upon  convic- 
tion  of  a  narrowly  defined  first  degree  murders,  a  law  that  the 
Maryland  Court  of  Appeals  ruled  in  Blackwell  v.  State'48  unconsti- 
tutional  because  it  barred  judges  from  executing  discretion  in 
sentencing.  In  1976  the  US  Supreme  Court  concluded  In  Gregg  v. 
Georgia'49  that  the  death  penalty  is  not  per  se  cruel  and  unusual 
punishment  In  violation  of  the  Eighth  Amendment.  Not  surpris- 
ingly,  the  next-and  current-death  penalty  statute  provided  for 
schemes  approved  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  Gregg  v.  Georgia.  And 
145-  408  U.  S.  238  (1972). 
146.13artholomey  v.  State,  267  Md.  175  (1972). 
147-  Ibid 
148-  278  Md.  466,  cert.  denied,  431  U.  S.  918  (1976). 
149-  428  U.  S.  153  (1976). 
213 in  Tichnell  v.  State,  150  the  first  review  of  a  capital  sentence  Im- 
posed  under  the  current  Maryland  death  penalty  statute,  the 
Court  of  Appeals  announced  that  the  "Maryland  statutory  scheme 
for  the  Imposition  of  the  death  penalty"  was  constitutional  on  Its 
face.  151  This  then  Is  another  area,  where  the  Maryland  Court  of 
Appeals  was  unwilling  to  depart  from  Its  traditional,  lockstep  ap- 
proach  to  matters  of  criminal  law. 
When  It  comes  to  challenges  to  economic  regulations  of  the 
states  on  the  basis  of  the  federal  Constitution  the  cases  brought  In 
federal  courts  are  rare  today.  Since  1937,  federal  judicial  review 
of  legislation  that  has  to  do  with  economic  rights  and  interests  has 
been  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule,  and  the  only  casel.  52  since 
1937  where  the  Supreme  Court  invalidated  a  state  economic  mea- 
sure  was  subsequently  overruled.  153  Towards  the  end  of  the  nine- 
teenth  century,  the  due  process  clauses  of  the  Fifth  and 
Fourteenth  amendments  came  to  use  In  order  to  establish  sub- 
stantive  rights  not  specifically  mentioned  In  the  Constitution. 
Initially  the  doctrine  of  substantive  due  process  was  applied  by 
only  a  small  number  of  state  courts.  The  Supreme  Court  took  over 
in  1905  when,  In  the  case  of  Lochner  v.  New  Ybrk,  '554  It  held  that  a 
statute  that  limited  the  working  hours  of  employees  in  a  bakery 
violated  the  due  process  clause.  During  the  Lochner  era  the  fed- 
eral  courts  regularly  quashed  decisions  of  the  legislature  on  a 
number  of  subjects,  such  as  labour  laws,  tax  statutes  and  rates 
established  by  public  utility  agencies. 
150-  287  Md.  695  (1980). 
15  1.  Ibid  at  73  0. 
152.  Morey  v.  Doud,  354  U.  S.  457  (1957). 
153.  City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Dukes,  427  U.  S.  297  (1976). 
1-54-  198  U.  S.  45  (1905). 
214 This  line  of  decisions  came  to  an  end  in  1937  when  in  the 
case  of  West  Coast  Hotel  Co.  v.  Parrish155  the  Court  overruled  a 
previous  case,  sustaining  a  state  minimum  wage  law  for  women.  156 
From  then  on  the  rule  was  that,  If  legislation  did  not  Intrude  upon 
the  Bill  of  Rights,  and  did  not  restrict  the  political  processes,  It 
would  be  upheld  unless  the  law  was  "of  such  character  as  to 
preclude  the  assumption  that  it  rests  upon  some  rational  basis".  157 
As  a  consequence  of  that  retrenchment  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
state  courts  have,  generally,  played  a  more  activist  role  In 
economic  matters  than  the  federal  one.  If  the  doctrine  of 
substantial  due  process  no  longer  has  any  vitality  at  the  federal 
level,  it  Is  very  much  alive  In  the  state  courts.  At  least  thirty-two 
state  hIghest  courts  have  refused  to  abide  by  the  US  Supreme 
Court  holdings  and  are  active  In  reviewing  economic  rights.  Is  the 
maryland  Court  of  Appeals  one  of  these  courts7  Has  It  been  active 
in  the  recognition  and  protection  of  economic  rights?  The  due 
process  provision  embodied  In  Article  24  of  the  Maryland 
Declaration  of  Rights,  had  been  used  in  the  nineteenth  century  to 
strike  down  a  number  of  laws'58  and  to  sustain  a  number  of 
others.  159  In  general,  this  line  of  cases  Indicates  that  Article  24 
was  construed  in  a  similar  manner  to  the  late-nineteenth-century 
construction  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  cases  Involving  the  due 
process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  Throughout  the  first 
155-  300  U.  S.  379  (1937). 
156-  Adkins  v.  Children's  Hospital,  261  U.  S.  525  (1923). 
157-  U.  S.  v.  Carolene  Products  Co.,  304  U.  S.  144  (1938). 
158.  Grove  v.  Todd,  41  Md.  633  (1875),  Ulman  v.  Baltimore,  72  Md.  587  (1890), 
Scharf  v.  Tasker,  73  Md.  378  (1891),  Arnsperger  v.  Crawford,  101  Md.  247 
(1905). 
159-  State  v.  Mayhew,  2  gil,  487  (1945),  Wright  v.  Wright,  2Md.  429  (1852), 
i3altimore  v.  State,  15  Md.  376  (1860),  Singer  v.  State,  72  Md.  464  (1890), 
Deems  v.  Baltimore,  80  Md.  164  (1894). 
215 half  of  the  twentieth  century,  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals 
developed  a  policy  of  deferring  to  the  legislature,  a  policy  similar 
to  the  one  federal  courts  were  following  after  1937.  For  instance, 
in  Goldsmith  v.  Mead  Johnson  &  Cd.,  160  a  case  involving  the  valid- 
ity  of  the  Maryland  Fair  Trade  Act,  the  court  held  that  the  state 
economic  regulation  did  not  violate  the  state's  due  process  clause. 
A  change  of  course  took  place  when  the  court  in  the  case  of 
Loughran  v.  Lord  Baltimore  Candy  and  Tobacco  CO.,  161  departing 
from  the  lockstep  approach  with  the  federal  court  It  used  since 
then,  it  struck  down  a  state  statute  on  substantive  due  process 
grounds.  This  became  the  predominant  approach  of  the  Maryland 
court  through  most  of  the  1970's.  In  the  case  of  Maryland  Board 
of  Pharmacy  v,  Sav-a-Lot'62  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals  struck 
down  a  statute  regulating  prescription  drug  prices  because  it 
violated  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  and 
Article  24  of  the  Maryland  Declaration  of  Rights.  The  same 
approach  was  used  again  In  the  case  of  Maryland  State  Board  of 
Examiners  v.  Kuhn'63  to  review  economic  legislation.  In  1977,  af- 
ter  using  this  approach  for  thirty  seven  years,  the  Court  of 
Appeals  found,  In  Governor  v  Exxon,  164  that  a  statute  distin- 
guished  between  producers  and  refiners  on  the  one  hand,  and 
other  sellers  of  petroleum  products  on  the  other,  prohibiting  the 
former  to  operate  retail  service  stations,  was  not  In  violation  of 
Article  24  of  the  Maryland  Declaration  of  Rights  and  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Federal  Constitution.  165  This 
160-  176  Md.  682  (1939). 
161-178Md38(1940). 
162-  270  Md.  103  (1973). 
163-  270  Md.  496(1973). 
164ý  279  Md.  410  (1977). 
165-  279  Md.  410,417  (1977). 
216 interstitial  approach  announced  in  Exxon  is  the  standard  today 
and  as  a  consequence  economic  regulation  In  Maryland  will  not  be 
held  void  if  it  can  be  supported  by  any  considerations  relating  to 
public  welfare.  However,  nothing  precludes  the  Maryland  Court  of 
Appeals  from  returning  to  its  primacy  model  approach  that  It 
used  between  1940  and  1976,  In  circumstances  appropriate  by 
state  law  or  tradition. 
6.4.2.  Summary 
All  but  one-the  dual  sovereignty-dominant  models  have,  at 
one  time,  been  used  by  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals.  Its  ap- 
proach  could,  in  general,  be  described,  as  the  "middle  way".  In 
handling  individual  rights,  the  court  was  satisfied  to  "fill  the  gaps" 
and  walk  In  lockstep  with  the  federal  Constitution,  through 
adoption  in  most  cases  of  the  federal  dicta,  and  turning  to  its  own 
constitution  only  in  the  absence  of  federal  law.  The  best  example 
of  this  approach  can  be  seen  In  the  way  the  court  handled 
situations  involving  the  right  of  privacy.  It  behaved  accordingly  in 
equality  casesq  as  well  as  in  cases  having  to  do  with  issues  of 
religious  freedom,  freedom  of  speech  on  private  property  and 
freedom  of  press.  Finally,  the  court  filled  In  the  gaps  by  recognis- 
Ing  "less"  rather  than  more  protection  In  the  areas  of  commercial 
speech  and  defamation.  In  handling  criminal  law  matters,  the 
court  tended  to  walk  In  lockstep  with  the  developments  dictated 
by  the  US  Supreme  Court.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  judges  of  the 
Maryland  Court  of  Appeals  have  had  since  the  early  1970s  more 
time  to  consider  state  constitutional  Issues  raised  before  them,  the 
highest  state  court  still  follows  the  lead  of  Washington.  In  search 
217 and  seizure  cases,  the  court  missed  the  opportunity  to  adopt  a 
stricter  probable  cause  standard  than  the  one  announced  by  the 
US  Supreme  Court,  for  the  evaluation  of  the  constitutionality  of  a 
search  and  seizure.  Again,  In  Issues  of  a  criminal  defendant's 
rights,  the  Maryland  Court  refused  to  Interpret  the  state  clause 
broader  than  the  right  based  on  the  Interpretation  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  provision.  Even  following  the 
Supreme  Court's  encouragement  to  the  states  to  "adopt  different 
requirements  for  the  conduct  of  Its  ...  officials  as  a  matter  of  state 
law,  "166  the  state  court  demonstrated  no  willingness  to  depart 
from  its  position  that  in  the  area  of  criminal  law  the  US  Supreme 
Court's  decisions  are  direct  authority. 
The  primacy  model  was  only  used  in  the  court's  treatment 
of  state  and  local  Issues,  as  well  as  situations  regarding  the  area  of 
separation  of  powers  and  economic  rights  until  1977.  The  reason 
that  this  approach  Is  the  one  less  preferred,  Iles  In  the  political 
culture  In  Maryland,  that  dictates  the  norms  and  traditions  that 
shape  the  judicial  process.  Maryland  has  a  heterogenous  political 
culture,  stemming  initially  from  the  existence  of  divided  loyalties 
at  the  time  of  the  Revolution  up  to  and  through  the  existence  of 
two  opposed  ways  of  life  prior  to  the  Civil  War  into  the  twentieth 
century.  The  existence  of  two  cultures  throughout  Maryland  his- 
tory  (Loyalist  and  Revolutionary,  free  and  slave  economy,  north- 
ern  and  southern  ways  of  life)  forced  the  state  to  elevate  com- 
promise  and  accommodation  Into  an  art,  In  order  to  make  govern- 
ing  possible.  This  background  explains  why  the  Maryland  Court  of 
Appeals  has  adopted  a  more  innovative  approach  In  some  areas  of 
law  while  refraining  from  it  In  others.  The  primacy  approach  In 
166.  Moran  v.  Burbine,  475  U.  S.  412,450  (1986). 
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and  state  and  local  issues,  areas  that  traditionally  fall  beyond  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  federal  courts  and  the  review  of  economic  legis- 
lation  before  1977,  an  issue  the  US  Supreme  Court  Is  eschewing. 
This  also  explains  the  court's  approach  to  civil  rights  and  liberties. 
The  existence  of  a  well-developed  federal  analogue  forced  the 
state  court  to  opt  for  the  lockstep  approach.  The  following  Table 
13  summarlses  the  New  Federalist  approaches  that  the  Maryland 
court  of  Appeals  has  adopted  when  faced  with  different  aspects  of 
human  rights  protection: 
Table  13 
court  Case  Subject  Approach 
Court  of  Appeals  State  v  Schuller  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
sion 
Court  of  Appeals  Re  Oldtown  Legal  Freedom  of  expres-  Lockstep 
CHnic  sion 
Court  of  Appeals  Mangum  v  Maryland  Freedom  Of  exPres-  Lockstep 
State  Board  of  slon 
Sensors 
court  of  Appeals  Gayety  Books  v  City  Freedom  of  expres-  Lockstep 
of  Baltimore  sion 
219 Court  of  Appeals  jacron  Sales  Co.  v  Freedom  of  expres-  Lockstep 
Sindorf  sion 
Court  of  Appeals  Hearst  Corp.  v  Hughes  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
sion 
Court  of  Appeals  Schowgurow  v  Md.  Freedom  of  expres-  Lockstep 
sion 
Court  of  Appeals  Horace  Mann  League,  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
Inc.  v  Board  of  Public  sion 
Works 
Court  of  Appeals  Mt.  St.  Mary's  College  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
v  Williams  sion 
Court  of  Appeals  Baltzell  v  Church  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
Home  sion 
Court  of  Appeals  Speer  v  Colbert  Freedom  of  expres-  Interstitial 
sion 
Court  of  Appeals  Schochet  v  State  Right  of  privacy 
Court  of  Appeals  Doe  v  Commander,  Right  of  privacy 
Wheaton  Police  Dep't 
Lockstep 
Lockstep 
220 Court  of  Appeals  Montgomery  County  Right  of  privacy  Lockstep, 
v  Walsh 
Court  of  Appeals  Neville  v  State  Right  of  privacy  Lockstep, 
Court  of  Appeals  U.  S.  Mortgage  Co.,  v  Equal  protection  Lockstep 
Matthews 
Court  of  Appeals  Attorney  General  v  Equal  protection  Interstitial 
Waldron 
Court  of  Appeals  Hornbeck  v  Somerset  Equal  protection  Interstitial 
Co.  Bd.  of  Education 
Court  of  Appeals  Potomac  Electric  Co.  v  Equal  protection  Lockstep 
Smith 
Court  of  Appeals  Givner  v  State  Criminal  law  and  Lockstep 
procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  Frank  v  Maryland 
Court  of  Appeals  Garrison  v  State 
Court  of  Appeals  Malcolm  v  State 
Criminal  law  and  Lockstep 
procedure 
Criminal  law  and  interstitial 
procedure 
Criminal  law  and  Lockstep 
procedure 
221 Court  of  Appeals  Lodowski  v  State  I  Criminal  law  and  Lockstep 
procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  Lodowski  v  State  II  Criminal  law  and  Lockstep 
procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  State  v  McKay  Criminal  law  and  Lockstep 
procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  Lawrence  v  State  Criminal  law  and  Lockstep 
procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  Bartholomey  v  State  Criminal  law  and  Lockstep 
procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  Blackwell  v  State  Criminal  law  and  Lockstep, 
procedure 
Court  of  Appeals  Tichnel  v  State 
Court  of  Appeals  Grove  v  Todd 
Court  of  Appeals  Ulman  v  Baltimore 
Criminal  law  and  Lockstep 
procedure 
Substantive  due  Lockstep 
process 
Substantive  due  Lockstep 
process 
222 Court  of  Appeals  Scharf  v  Tasker 
Court  of  Appeals  Arnsperger  v  Craw- 
ford 
Court  of  Appeals  Baltfmore  v  State 
Court  of  Appeals  Deems  v  Baltimore 
Court  of  Appeals  Wright  v  Wright 
Court  of  Appeals  State  v  Mayhew 
Court  of  Appeals  Singer  v  State 
Substantive  due  Lockstep 
process 
Substantive  due  Lockstep 
process 
Substantive  due  Lockstep 
process 
Substantive  due  Lockstep 
process 
Substantive  due  Lockstep 
process 
Substantive  due  Lockstep 
process 
Substantive  due  Lockstep 
process 
Court  of  Appeals  Goldsmith  v  Mead  Substantive  due  Lockstep 
Johnson  process 
Court  of  Appeals  Loughran  v  Lord  Substantive  due  Primacy 
Baltimore  Candy  and  process 
TobaccoCo., 
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Pharmacy  v  Sav-a-  process 
Lot 
Court  of  Appeals  Maryland  State  Substantive  due  Primacy 
Board  of  Examiners  v  process 
Kuhý 
Court  of  Appeals  Governor  v  Exxon  Substantive  due  Interstitial 
process 
6.5.  Concluding  Remarks 
Certain  Interesting  remarks  can  be  made  as  regards  the 
response  of  the  three  states  analysed  to  the  message  of  New 
judicial  Federalism.  The  movement  Itself,  in  the  first  place  seems 
to  have  taken  different  forms.  In  Florida,  state  courts  have  been 
reluctant  to  resort  to  the  provisions  of  their  state  constitution  for 
the  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  citizen,  despite  a  promising 
start.  The  Florida  courts  prefer,  when  the  federal  constitution 
provides  guarantees  for  a  certain  individual  rights,  to  Ignore  the 
parallel  protective  state  constitutional  guarantees. 
Similar  is  the  approach  adopted  by  the  Maryland  courts.  The 
use  of  state  constitutional  protective  norms,  greatly  depends  on 
whether  parallel  federal  provisions  e)dst  as  well  as  interpretations 
of  these  provisions  by  the  federal  Supreme  Court.  In  these  situa- 
tions,  the  reluctance  to  part  company  with  the  federal  norms  is 
224 apparent.  Where  no  federal  analogues  exist,  the  Maryland  courts 
appear  to  turn  to  their  own  constitutional  traditions  and  case-law 
more  often. 
The  courts  of  New  York  on  the  other  hand  seem  to  be  more 
receptive  to  the  calls  of  New  Federalism.  Even  when  federal  ana- 
logues  to  the  state  constitutional  provisions  eýdst,  there  is  a  steady 
tradition  of  favouring  the  state  norms,  in  a  significant  number  of 
occasions.  it  seems  that  the  unique  historical  circumstances  and 
particular  cultural  characteristics  which  were  the  cause  for  the 
undermining  of  the  ideas  of  New  Federalism  in  Florida  and 
Maryland  and  contributed  to  the  underdevelopment  of  their  own 
state  constitutional  discourse,  had  the  opposite  result  In  the  case 
of  New  York. 
When  it  comes  to  the  utilisation  of  the  methods  of 
interpretation  advocated  by  New  Judicial  Federalism,  certain 
common  patterns  emerge  as  regards  the  decisions  of  the  courts  of 
the  three  states.  The  approach  preferred  is  dependent  on  the 
subject  of  each  case  decided.  In  criminal  law  and  procedure  cases, 
in  the  first  place,  the  highest  ranking  courts  of  all  three  states 
clearly  opt  to  entrust  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  their  citizens 
to  the  provisions  of  the  federal  Constitution,  following,  thus,  a 
lockstep  approach.  The  state  provisions  are  considered  to  provide 
no  broader  protection  than  the  ones  of  the  federal  document.  This 
tendency,  which  suggests  that  the  message  of  New  Judicial 
Federalism  has  not  been  received  in  the  specific  issues,  is 
surprising,  taking  Into  consideration  that  It  was  the  suggestion  of 
existence  of  problems  In  the  area  of  criminal  law  and  procedure 
issues,  that  sparked  the  birth  of  this  movement.  It  would  be 
expected  that  state  courts  would  avail  themselves  of  their  state 
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primacy  approach.  It  seems,  however,  that  it  is  more  convenient, 
in  the  sensitive  area  of  criminal  law  and  procedure,  to  follow  the 
lead  of  the  federal  Supreme  Court  than  take  initiatives  which 
might  be  proved  costly  in  the  future.  The  search  and  seizure 
situation  In  Florida  is  proof  to  that.  The  state  judges  dared  to 
deviate  from  the  dicta  of  the  federal  Supreme  Court,  only  to  be 
forced  by  the  state  electorate  to  realign  themselves  with  the 
latter. 
Another  common  pattern  that  emerges  is  in  the  area  of  civil 
rights  and  liberties  and  specifically  the  freedom  of  expression. 
Here  the  Interstitial  approach  is  the  one  used  more  frequently. 
Whereas  though  in  New  York  and  Florida  the  use  of  the  above 
approach  Is  covering  almost  every  aspect  of  the  freedom  of 
expression,  In  Maryland  It  is  preferred  only  in  cases  having  to  do 
with  the  freedom  of  press  and  defamation. 
One  observation  common  to  all  three  states,  is  that  the  state 
constitutional  provisions  were  more  eagerly  relied  on,  and  the 
primacy  approach  preferred,  when  no  parallel  federal  norms  or 
Supreme  Court  Interpretation  existed.  This  is  the  situation  In  cases 
dealing  with  issues  of  substantive  due  process,  although  in  Florida 
the  tendency  now  Is  to  follow  an  interstitial  approach.  In  general, 
though  it  is  Indicated  that,  although  the  primacy  approach  has 
appeared  with  considerable  frequency  in  the  available  decisions 
of  the  state  courts  under  examination,  the  former  approach  is  not 
often  utillsed  in  practice,  simply  because  the  vast  majority  of 
human  rights  are  In  some  way  covered  by  the  provisions  of  the 
federal  Constitution.  When  this  is  the  case,  the  state  courts  are 
226 very  hesitant  to  Ignore  the  federal  dicta  completely,  as  the 
primacy  approach  advocates. 
one  last  point  which  Is  common  in  regard  to  the  choice  of 
New  Federalist  approaches  In  all  three  states  as  seen  from  the 
available  case-law,  is  that  the  dual  sovereignty  approach  has 
never  been  utillsed  by  any  of  the  courts.  This,  though  should  not 
come  a  surprise,  since  this  approach  is  not  widely  utilised.  Indeed 
only  the  Supreme  Courts  of  Vermont  and  Washington  seem  to 
prefer  this  approach. 
The  above  seem  to  be  the  only  areas  where  common 
elements  In  the  attitude  of  the  courts  of  the  three  states  under 
examination,  as  regards  their  New  Federalist  preferences,  can  be 
detected  from  the  available  case-law.  In  other  human  rights  areas 
the  choice  of  preferences  does  not  seem  to  follow  a  specific 
pattern  common  to  all  three  states.  All  three  approaches  have 
been  used  in  almost  every  human  rights  area  by  each  state  court, 
with  the  exception  of  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  which  seems 
to  avoid  the  primacy  approach.  it  can  be  said  that  the  Individual, 
specific  characteristics  of  each  state  are  of  paramount  Importance 
when  the  New  Federalism,  in  general,  and  its  specific  approaches, 
in  particular,  are  considered  by  the  state  courts. 
The  New  Federalist  approaches  that  the  courts  of  each  of  the 
three  states  prefer  In  general  areas  of  human  rights  protection  are 
summarised  In  Table  14.  For  the  Purposes  of  this  tabular 
summary  the  areas  considered  are  civil  rights  and  liberties,  which 
include  In  general  political  rights,  freedom  of  conscience  and 
expression  and  the  right  of  privacy  and  personal  autonomy,  and 
criminal  law  and  procedure,  which  incorporates,  among  others, 
issues  of  searches  and  seizures,  trial  by  jury  and  capital 
227 punishment.  Additionally  the  area  of  economic  rights,  which 
includes  substantive  due  process  is  going  to  be  considered,  albeit 
only  in  regard  to  Florida  and  Maryland,  since  no  information  was 
made  available  of  how  the  New  York  courts  deal  with  the  issue: 
Table  14 
Civil  rights  and  Criminal  law  and 
State  liberties  procedure  Economic  rights 
Florida  Lockstep/Inters  Lockstep/Prima  Primacy 
titial/Primacy  cy/Interstitial 
New  York  Interstitial  Lockstep/Inters 
titial 
N4aryland  Lockstep/Inters  Lockstep/Inters  Lockstep/Prima 
titial  titial  cy/Interstitial 
At  this  point,  it  would  be  interesting  to  examine  If  any  analogies 
could  be  drawn  between  the  situation  In  the  USA  and  that  In  the 
EC,  as  regards  the  attitude  of  the  courts,  when  having  to  choose 
between  the  national  and  the  uniformly  applied  sets  of  norms  In 
order  to  protect  the  rights  of  their  citizens.  Such  an  analogy  seems 
appropriate  In  the  area  of  criminal  law  and  procedure.  in  the  EC 
the  courts  of  the  Member  States  have  demonstrated  a  tendency 
towards  entrusting,  In  criminal  matters,  the  protection  of  the 
rights  of  their  citizens  to  the  European  Convention  of  Human 
228 Rights.  The  latter  Is  what  comes  closer  to  be  considered  a 
uniformly  applied  set  of  norms  for  the  Member  States  of  the  EC,  a 
role  which  In  the  USA  Is  played  by  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  the  Federal 
Constitution.  A  similar  tendency  Is  demonstrated,  as  we  saw 
earlier,  by  the  decisions  of  the  courts  of  the  American  states 
under  examination.  In  criminal  matters  they  chose  to  protect  the 
rights  of  their  citizens  by  means  of  the  provisions  of  the  federal 
Bill  of  Rights  and  walk  in  lockstep  with  the  way  the  latter  is 
interpreted  by  the  federal  Supreme  Court.  The  state  provisions 
are  given  the  same  meaning  as  their  federal  counterpart.  This 
might  suggest  that,  at  least  to  a  certain  degree,  the  area  of 
criminal  law  and  procedure  is  one  that  could,  In  the  context  of 
non-unitary  entities,  In  general  be  regulated  by  means  of 
uniformly  applied  provisions. 
A  further  similarity  that  exists  between  the  two  entities  has 
to  do  with  the  time  of  the  appearance  and  elaboration  of  the 
consideration  of  whether  to  entrust  the  protection  of  their 
respective  citizens  to  the  respective  uniformly  applied  provisions 
or  not.  The  Member  States  of  the  EC  started  considering  seriously 
the  European  Convention  since  the  early  1980s.  At  around  that 
time  the  movement  of  New  Federalism  posed  the  dilemma  for  the 
state  courts  of  choosing  between  the  state  protective  provisions 
and  the  ones  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  the  Federal  Constitution. 
The  most  important  conclusion  from  all  the  above,  though,  is 
that,  despite  the  variations  in  the  absorption  of  the  theories  of 
New  Federalism-from  underdevelopment  in  Florida  and  Maryland 
to  highly  influential  in  New  York,  there  is  no  doubt  that  this  new 
njovement  Is  here  to  stay.  The  fact  that  its  use  may  be  limited  in 
the  circumstances  that  each  individual  states  considers  appropri- 
229 ate  in  accordance  to  its  unique  characteristics,  cannot  detract  from 
the  validity  of  the  argument  that  the  states  have  discovered  that 
the  bills  of  rights  of  their  own  state  constitutions  may  offer  to 
their  citizens  higher  levels  of  efficiency,  In  terms  of  protection  of 
individual  rights,  than  the  uniformly  applied  federal  Bill  of  Rights. 
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In  Its  Introduction,  this  thesis  set  two  hypotheses  as  regards 
the  levels  of  efficiency  that  a  system  of  protection  of  the  rights  of 
the  individual  from  violation  by  governmental  authority,  could 
achieve.  The  first  hypothesis  was  that  where  a  system  of 
protection  operates  through  fragmented  procedures,  then  it  could 
be  presumed  that  individuals  are  not  enjoying  the  most  efficient 
protection  of  their  rights.  Conversely,  the  second  hypothesis  was 
that  maximum  levels  of  efficiency  of  protection  could  be  achieved 
where  the  system  operates  through  one  uniformly  applied  set  of 
norms  as  opposed  to  fragmented  procedures.  The  validity  of  these 
hypotheses  was  put  to  the  test  by  means  of  the  comparison 
between  the  European  and  the  American  situation  In  the  relevant 
legal  area.  And  the  findings  of  this  analysis  may  be  worth 
considering  by  the  Europeans  In  their  attempts  to  proceed  to 
integration  in  the  field  of  human  rights  by  means  of  a  list  of  rights 
of  uniform  application. 
The  presumption  of  the  first  hypothesis  was  that  frag- 
mented  procedures  do  not  guarantee  efficient  protection  of  indi- 
vidual  rights.  The  obvious  testing  ground  of  this  argument  is  the 
EC.  The  citizen  of  a  state  which  was  a  member  of  the  EC  in  1992, 
enjoyed  protection  of  Its  individual  rights  by  a  number  of  sets  of 
norms.  Initially,  as  a  citizen  of  a  certain  state,  his  rights  were 
guaranteed  from  the  relevant  constitutional  provisions  of  that 
231 state.  Then  as  a  citizen  of  a  state  which  was  at  the  time  a  member 
of  the  EC,  he  enjoyed  the  protection  that  the  judicial  organ  of  the 
Community,  the  Court  of  Justice,  afforded  to  him  by  means  of 
interpretation,  In  the  absence  of  a  list  of  rights  within  the  EC 
context.  Lastly,  as  a  citizen  of  a  state  which  at  the  time  was  a 
signatory  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  he  had  at 
his  disposal  a  further  net  of  protective  norms.  The  fragmentation 
of  the  procedures  Is  clear.  The  protective  measures  that  come 
closer  to  have  some  degree  of  uniform  application  are  those  of  the 
European  Convention.  The  fact  remains,  however,  that  the 
Convention  is  an  international  agreement  with  all  the 
disadvantages  this  might  carry  as  regards  status  In  the  domestic 
legal  order  of  the  signatory  states. 
Does  the  fact  that  the  European  citizen  relies  for  the  protec- 
tion  of  his  individual  rights  on  a  number  of  different  sets  of  pro- 
visions  compromise  the  efficiency  of  this  protection?  It  Is  difficult 
to  argue  in  favour  of  this  position.  It  Is  clear  in  the  first  place,  that 
the  protective  net  of  the  separate  national  rules  functions  on  high 
levels  of  efficiency.  Proof  of  that  is  that  the  use  of  other  sets  of 
provisions  Is  usually  second  priority  to  the  national  rules,  as  it 
happens  with  the  guarantees  of  the  European  Convention  on 
Human  Rights.  The  protection  of  human  rights  at  the  EC  level 
could  also  be  described  as  efficient,  to  the  extent  that  the  Court  of 
justice  has  made  sure  that  the  appropriate  human  rights 
principles  were  inserted  into  the  framework  of  European  law. 
The  second  hypothesis  was  that  rights  of  the  individuals  are 
protected  at  maximum  level  when  this  protection  is  entrusted  to 
one,  uniformly  applied  set  of  norms.  The  validity  of  this  pre- 
sumption  can  be  tested  by  taking  into  consideration  the  system  of 
232 protection  of  individual  rights  in  the  USA.  There,  as  mentioned 
before,  citizens  enjoy  double  security  as  regards  infringements  of 
their  rights  by  the  government,  to  the  extent  that  both  state  and 
the  federal  constitutional  provisions  are  in  place.  However,  it  is 
only  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  the  federal  Constitution  that  guarantees 
the  rights  of  all  the  American  citizens,  Irrespective  of  state  citizen- 
ship.  Does  then  the  federal  Constitution  afford  the  maximum  level 
of  efficiency  for  the  security  of  the  individual  liberties  of  the 
American  citizens?  The  proponents  of  New  judicial  Federalism  do 
not  seem  to  be  in  favour  of  this  argument.  They  feel,  as  seen 
before,  that  the  tendency  to  substitute  the  state  constitutional 
provisions  with  the  federal,  uniformly  applied  one,  has  led  to 
lowered  levels  of  efficiency  of  the  protection  of  individual  rights. 
Efficiency  of  protection,  they  advocate,  can  be  restored  by 
abandoning  reliance  on  the  federal  document.  The  state 
constitutions  are  armed  with  more  than  enough  ammunition  to 
counter  any  human  rights  Infringements.  But  In  the  end,  how 
influential  could  the  theory  of  New  judicial  Federalism  be,  within 
the  legal  context  of  human  rights  protection7  After  all,  Its 
proponents,  albeit  mostly  figures  of  importance  In  the  judicial  and 
academic  world,  admittedly  constitute  a  minority.  The  state  courts 
as  well,  are  deciding  only  a  fraction  of  the  cases  that  come  before 
them  on  the  basis  of  state  constitutional  provisions.  That  means, 
that  the  general  feeling  is  that  the  uniformly  applied  norms  of  the 
federal  Constitution  afford,  if  not  maximum  levels  of  efficient 
protection,  at  least  satisfactory  ones. 
The  arguments  against  the  theory  of  New  judicial 
Federalism,  and  consequently  against  the  position  that  the  Bill  of 
Rights  of  the  federal  Constitution  and  its  interpretation  by  the 
233 American  Supreme  Court  has  reached  a  point  where  it  does  not 
function  properly,  can  be  convincing.  However,  they  are  all  based 
on  a  specific  point  In  relation  to  the  course  of  New  judicial 
Federalism.  This  point  Is  the  practical  application  of  Its  theoretical 
principles  by  the  state  judiciary.  It  is  of  paramount  Importance  to 
them  that  the  state  courts  do  not  seem  in  their  majority  to  entrust 
the  protection  of  the  Individual  rights  of  their  citizens  to  the 
provisions  of  the  state  constitutions,  preferring  to  resolve 
differences  on  the  basis  of  the  federal  Bill  of  Rights.  They  seem  to 
Ignore  though,  that  as  every  theoretical  legal  construction,  New 
judicial  Federalism  must  also  be  evaluated  as  to  its  significance, 
by  taking  Into  consideration  two  more  of  Its  aspects.  The  first  one, 
is  the  mere  fact  of  Its  emergence.  If  the  problem  of  efficiency  of 
protection  by  the  federal  Constitution  did  not  exist,  then  there 
would  be  no  reason  for  the  disruption  of  the  status  quo  of  the 
federal  protection.  After  all  this  practice  had  gone  unchallenged 
for  years,  until  the  retrenchment  of  the  Supreme  Court,  when  In- 
terpreting  the  federal  Bill  of  Rights,  gave  rise  to  suspicions  of  in- 
efficiency  of  protection.  The  second  important  aspect  is  future 
perspectives.  It  Is  generally  acknowledged  that  state  constitu- 
tional  protection  of  human  rights,  as  advocated  by  New  judicial 
Federalism7  has  not  completed  its  course.  Its  followers  argue,  that 
as  constitutional  law  of  the  states  finds  Its  way  in  the  university 
curricula,  new  lawyers  which  recognise  Its  potential  will  start 
utillsing  it  in  the  courts,  instead  or  in  conjunction  with  the  federal 
provisions.  State  judges  then,  will  be  obliged  to  take  the  state 
constitutional  arguments  Into  serious  consideration.  Steadily  but 
slowly,  the  state  Judiciary  could  start  to  regard  It  mandatory  that 
litigation  is  based  on  state  constitutional  arguments,  whenever 
234 possible.  Even  the  fierce  opponents  of  New  judicial  Federalism 
warn  about  the  repercussions  of  further  acceptance  and  practical 
application  of  its  principles,  admitting  thereby  that  this  movement 
is  not  only  a  flash  In  the  pan  in  the  area  of  the  protection  of 
human  rights  in  America. 
The  situation  on  the  USA  then  might  Indicate,  taking  Into 
consideration  the  repercussions  of  New  Judicial  Federalism,  that 
the  presumption  that  uniform  application  of  sets  of  rules  provide 
maximum  efficiency  Is  questionable.  What  Is  more  important,  its 
validity  Is  not  without  question  even  in  the  European  context.  As 
mentioned  before,  the  set  of  norms  that  come  the  closest  to  be 
considered  as  a  uniformly  applied  measure  for  the  protection  of 
the  rights  of  the  Individual  in  the  EC,  is  the  European  Convention 
on  Human  Rights.  If  our  second  hypothesis  Is  correct,  then 
member  states  would  elect  to  entrust  the  protection  of  the  rights 
of  their  citizens  by  means  of  the  uniformly  applied  convention,  In 
order  to  achieve  maximum  efficiency.  However,  the  results  of  the 
test  of  the  application  of  the  New  judicial  Federalism  approaches 
on  the  European  situation  conducted  earlier  In  this  thesis,  Indicate 
that  the  situation  Is  nothing  like  this,  Despite  the  fact  that  during 
the  second  half  of  the  1980s  the  awareness  of  the  member  states 
as  regards  the  European  Convention  has  grown  considerably,  the 
rule  has  been  that  national  protective  norms  are  the  preferred 
means  of  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  Individual.  This  might 
Indicate  that  the  courts  of  the  Member  States,  especially  the  larger 
ones,  consider  the  European  Convention  to  be  functioning  at  a 
lower  level  In  terms  of  efficiency  of  protection. 
What  usefulness  then,  If  any,  could  the  finding  that  the  two 
hypotheses  set  initially  are  of  questionable  validity,  have  for  the 
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specific  one  of  the  creation  of  a  catalogue  of  human  rights  for 
Europe7  We  argue  that  they  are  worth  considering  in  both  occa- 
sions.  As  regards  the  general  problem  in  the  first  place,  the  choice 
is  between  integration  as  regards  human  rights  for  the  sake  of 
Integration,  Integration  for  the  sake  of  efficiency  of  protection  of 
human  rights  and  efficient  protection  of  human  rights,  regardless 
of  how  this  will  be  achieved-either  through  uniform  procedures  or 
fragmented  ones.  We  submit,  that  It  Is  the  last  two  choices  that 
are  the  most  appropriate.  Without  prejudice  to  the  general  weight 
that  integration  carries,  the  focus  as  regards  human  rights  should 
shift  from  the  hunt  for  Integration  to  the  hunt  for  efficiency.  This 
is  dictated  from  the  particular  characteristics  that  the  field  of 
human  rights  possesses  In  its  legal  sense,  which  advocates  that 
any  legal  approach  should  procure  more  than  technical 
arrangements.  The  first  priority  then  is  for  the  efficient  protection 
of  the  rights  of  the  individual  per  se.  The  means  by  which  this 
protection  will  be  achieved  should  be  a  secondary  preoccupation 
If  it  can  be  ensured  that  efficient  protection  will  materiallse 
through  uniformly  applied  measures,  then  this  should  be  the  way 
to  go  ahead.  On  the  other  hand,  If  there  are  doubts  as  to  the 
efficiency  of  the  uniform  norm  approach,  then  different 
alternatives  should  be  considered. 
The  above  consideration  bears  a  certain  weight  on  the  spe- 
cific  question  of  the  usefulness  of  an  Integrating  attempt  In  the 
field  of  human  rights  in  the  context  of  the  EC.  This  could  assume 
the  form  of  a  catalogue  of  human  rights,  which  will  apply 
uniformly  to  all  the  member  states.  Such  a  catalogue  will  have  to 
ensure  that  the  EC  citizen  is  afforded  the  highest  possible  levels  of 
236 efficiency  In  the  protection  of  his/her  rights.  Otherwise,  if  there 
are  doubts  as  to  the  efficiency  of  protection  that  its  norms 
guarantee,  its  existence  will  be  redundant.  How  can  efficiency  be 
assessed?  The  simplest  way  Is  to  consider  the  effects  that  other 
integrative  attempts  had  in  the  specific  legal  area.  The  utilisation 
of  the  paradigm  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  the  American  Constitution 
seems  to  be  an  appropriate  comparative  example.  The  efficiency 
of  protection  of  Its  norms  was  not  in  doubt  until  the  proponents  of 
New  judicial  Federalism  diagnosed  a  number  of  worrying 
symptoms.  The  way  these  provisions  were  interpreted  by  the  fed- 
eral  Supreme  Court,  had  the  effect  that  the  citizens  were  afforded 
less  efficient  protection  of  their  individual  rights  than  before.  The 
whole  structure  then  of  uniform  application  of  human  rights 
norms  In  the  USA  became  suspect  as  to  Its  ability  to  function  in  an 
appropriate  manner.  Can  such  a  phenomenon  of  deficient  protec- 
tion  of  human  rights  occur  In  Europe,  if  a  uniformly  applied  set  of 
provisions  becomes  responsible  for  the  protection  of  the  EC 
citizens  by  governmental  violations?  We  submit  that  this  Is  not  an 
impossibility.  It  Is  conceded  that  Europe  and  the  USA  have  been 
subjected  to  different  integrative  experiences.  Most  Importantly, 
they  now  occupy  different  degrees  of  Integration.  The  USA  Is  the 
most  prominent  example  of  a  federal  structure  world-wide.  The 
EC,  on  the  other  hand,  has  been  described  as  a  quasi-federation  or 
a  confederation.  This  second  description  might  Indicate  that  the 
EC,  has  now  the  characteristics  that  the  USA  had  at  Its  embryonic 
stages,  before  It  became  a  federal  state.  And  although  by  no 
means  certain,  It  Is  not  out  of  the  question  that  the  Community 
might  evolve  from  a  confederal  formation  to  become  a  federal 
one,  along  the  lines  of  the  American  paradigm.  Should  such  a 
237 development  occur,  there  Is  no  reason  why  the  same  problems 
will  not  emerge  In  the  performance  of  uniformly  applicable  sets  of 
norms  in  certain  legislative  areas.  The  field  of  human  rights 
protection  Is  one  of  these  areas  which,  as  seen,  has  not  been 
without  problems. 
The  plans,  then,  for  a  common  catalogue  for  human  rights  in 
the  EC,  should  be  treated  with  scepticism.  It  might  be  that  the  fact 
that  the  Member  States  have  developed  their  own  human  rights 
safeguards  will  prevent  any  uniformly  applied  measure  from 
becoming  Inefficient.  But  this  will  depend  on  the  status  that  will 
be  awarded  to  the  common  set  of  norms  and  Its  hierarchical 
relationship  with  the  relevant  national  laws.  Additionally  the 
American  example,  as  seen  from  the  New  Federalist  point  of  view 
indicates,  that  even  strong  national  protective  measures  do  not 
guarantee  the  highest  levels  of  efficiency  for  the  uniformly 
applied  one.  The  American  phenomenon  of  dormancy  of  state  law, 
as  a  consequence  of  years  of  non-utilisation  of  state  constitutional 
provisions  and  its  substitution  with  the  parallel  ones  of  the 
federal  document  In  conjunction  with  the  reluctance  to  break 
away  from  the  dicta  of  the  federal  Supreme  Court,  could  find  its 
way  in  Europe,  albeit  at  later  stages  of  its  development.  Exclusive 
use  of  a  uniformly  applied  list  of  rights  In  the  EC  could, 
hypothetically,  result  in  a  weakening  of  national  protective 
measures.  And  if,  like  the  American  situation,  the  efficiency  of  the 
European  common  set  of  norms  is  doubted  by  the  member  states, 
then  this  attempt  will  backfire  In  terms  of  its  Integrative 
usefulness. 
In  the  end,  what  is  Important  is  that  the  human  rights  of  the 
individuals  are  efficiently  protected.  Whether  this  will  materiallse 
238 by  means  of  fragmented  or  uniformly  applied  measures  is  almost 
irrelevant.  Admittedly  in  a  union  of  states,  it  would  be  ideal  if  the 
protection  of  the  rights  of  Individuals  followed  the  path  of 
Integration.  However,  If  such  Integrative  attempts  ultimately 
jeopardised  the  ability  of  Individuals  to  control  governmental 
violations  of  their  rights,  then  perhaps  others  non-Integrative 
alternatives  should  be  considered. 
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